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viForeword
I
n the second half of the twentieth century, many developing countries adopted broad social
assistance programs, like food subsidies, ostensibly designed to help poor people. Their ef-
fectiveness was mixed and, unfortunately, many of these expensive programs did not make
much difference in the lives of poor people, much less help them climb permanently out of
poverty. In the 1990s Mexico took a completely new approach. It launched a social program—
PROGRESA—that was revolutionary in two ways. First, PROGRESA aimed to integrate in-
terventions in health, education, and nutrition simultaneously, based on an understanding that
these dimensions of human welfare are interdependent and that poor health, education, and nu-
trition are both causes and consequences of poverty. Second, PROGRESA was designed from
the beginning to be continually evaluated and improved, so that it would become ever more
effective at improving the well-being of Mexico’s poorest people.
From 1998 to 2000 the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) assisted the
PROGRESA administration in evaluating the program. This research resulted in a series of
IFPRI reports, synthesized here, on aspects of PROGRESA’s performance. The evaluation not
only highlighted areas of success, but also suggested needed improvements in the program. On
the one hand, for example, the research showed that PROGRESA has helped keep poor chil-
dren in school longer, improved the health of young children and adults, increased women’s
use of prenatal care, and improved child nutrition. On the other hand, the evaluation revealed
that PROGRESA could have a greater impact on school enrollment by focusing on attendance
in secondary schools—the stage at which many poor children drop out.
In the election of 2000, the people of Mexico voted a new party into power. Yet, faced with
evidence of PROGRESA’s effectiveness, the new government decided to keep the program
(renamed Oportunidades) and to make needed improvements in its operation.
IFPRI’s research on PROGRESA has advanced our knowledge about policy steps that
governments can take to improve the capacities of poor people, who may require interventions
in several areas to make real headway in overcoming poverty. In the meantime comparable
programs have been tested or implemented in other countries, including Brazil, Honduras, and
Nicaragua, and it would be promising to explore their adaptation in African and Asian coun-
tries as well. It is our hope that research of this kind will encourage replications, adaptations
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I
n early 1998, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was asked to assist
the PROGRESA administration to “determine if PROGRESA is functioning in practice as
it is intended to by design.” This document synthesizes the findings contained in a series of
reports prepared by IFPRI for PROGRESA between November 1998 and November 2000. A
more detailed description of the research, rationale, and methods appears in the original IFPRI
reports, which are provided in English and in Spanish on the CD enclosed with this publication.
PROGRESA is one of the major programs of the Mexican government aimed at develop-
ing the human capital of poor households. Targeting its benefits directly to the population in
extreme poverty in rural areas, PROGRESA aims to alleviate current and future poverty 
levels through cash transfers to mothers in households. The cash transfers provided are condi-
tioned on regular school attendance and visits to health care centers. At the end of 1999, 
PROGRESA covered approximately 2.6 million families, representing one ninth of all fami-
lies in Mexico; the beneficiaries comprised about 40 percent of all rural families. At that time,
the program operated in almost 50,000 localities in more than 2,000 municipalities and 31
states. PROGRESA’s budget of approximately US$777 million in 1999 was equivalent to 0.2
percent of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP).
For Mexico, the design of PROGRESA represents a significant change in the provision of
social programs. First, in contrast to previous poverty alleviation programs in Mexico, 
PROGRESA applies targeting at the household level to ensure that the resources of the pro-
gram are directed and delivered to households in extreme poverty, that is, the households that
can most benefit from the program. General food subsidies, such as the tortilla price subsidy
[Subsidio a la Tortilla (TORTIBONO)], are widely acknowledged to have had a high cost in
the government budget and a negligible effect on poverty because of the leakage of benefits to
non-poor households. In addition, more decentralized, community-based, demand-driven pro-
grams such as the earlier anti-poverty program PRONASOL, in place during 1988 and 1994,
were thought to be susceptible to local political influences and not very effective at reaching
those in extreme poverty.1 Under PROGRESA, communities are first selected using a mar-
ginality index based on census data. Then, within the selected communities, households are
chosen using socioeconomic data collected for all households in the community.
Second, unlike earlier social programs in Mexico, PROGRESA contains a multisectoral
focus. By design, the program intervenes simultaneously in health, education, and nutrition.
The integrated nature of the program reflects a belief that addressing all dimensions of human
capital simultaneously has greater social returns than their implementation in isolation. Im-
proved health and nutritional status not only are desirable in themselves, but also have an in-
direct impact through enhancing the effectiveness of education programs, since, for example,
school attendance and performance are often adversely affected by poor health and nutrition.
Poor health is therefore both a cause as well as a consequence of poverty. Also by design,
1See Yaschine (1999) and Levy (1994) for a description of the program.
ixPROGRESA differs in the mechanism of delivering its resources. Recognizing the potential
of mothers to use resources effectively and efficiently in a manner that reflects the immediate
needs of the family, PROGRESA gives benefits exclusively to mothers.
Specifically, the education component of PROGRESA is designed to increase school en-
rollment among youth in Mexico’s poor rural communities by making education grants avail-
able to pupils’ mothers, who then are required to have their children attend school regularly.
In localities where PROGRESA currently operates, households that have been characterized
as poor, and have children enrolled in grades 3–9, are eligible to receive these educational
grants every two months. The levels of these grants were determined taking into account,
among other factors, what a child would earn in the labor force or contribute to family pro-
duction. The educational grants are slightly higher at the secondary level for girls, given their
propensity to drop out at earlier ages. Every two months, confirmation of whether children 
of beneficiary families attend school more than 85 percent of the time is submitted to 
PROGRESA by schoolteachers and directors, and this triggers the receipt of bimonthly cash
transfers for school attendance.
In the area of health and nutrition, PROGRESA brings basic attention to health issues and
promotes health care through free preventive interventions, such as distribution of nutritional
supplements, and education on hygiene and nutrition as well as monetary transfers for the pur-
chase of food. Receipt of monetary transfers and nutritional supplements is tied to mandatory
health care visits to public clinics. This aspect of the program emphasizes targeting benefits to
children under five, and pregnant and lactating women, and is administered by the Ministry of
Health and by IMSS-Solidaridad, a branch of the Mexican Social Security Institute, which
provides benefits to uninsured individuals in rural areas.
Nutritional supplements are given to children between the ages of four months and two
years, and to pregnant and breastfeeding women. If signs of malnutrition are detected in chil-
dren between two and five years of age, nutritional supplements will also be administered. The
nutritional status of beneficiaries is monitored by mandatory visits to the clinic and is more
frequently monitored for children five years of age and under and pregnant and lactating
women. At each visit, young children and lactating women are measured for wasting (weight-
for-height), stunting (height-for-age), and weight-for-age. An appointment monitoring system
is set up and a nurse or doctor verifies adherence. Every two months the health care profes-
sionals submit certification of beneficiary visits to PROGRESA, which triggers the receipt of
the cash transfer for food support.
The average monthly payment (received every two months) by a beneficiary family
amounts to 20 percent of the value of monthly consumption expenditures prior to the initia-
tion of the program. One additional requirement of the PROGRESA program is that house-
holds benefiting from PROGRESA were to stop receiving benefits from other programs in ef-
fect, such as Niños de Solidaridad, Abasto Social de Leche, de Tortilla, and the National
Institute of Indigenous People (INI). This requirement of the PROGRESA program represents
the short-run objective of the new poverty alleviation strategy of the Mexican government 
to minimize duplication of benefits to poor families. A longer run objective is to absorb the 
variety of poverty alleviation programs within one program such as PROGRESA that repre-
sents an integrated approach to poverty alleviation.
Poverty alleviation programs such as PROGRESA are an important component of the set
of instruments that government has at its disposal for redistributing income and assets among
households. Program evaluation can improve the design and implementation of programs so
that they can have a greater effect on household welfare. In addition, program evaluation,
when applied consistently across a wide spectrum of programs, allows governments to have a
stronger effect on social welfare with the same budget by reallocating resources from less to
x SUMMARYmore effective programs. In addition to these economic considerations, there are also social
and political reasons for justifying program evaluations. Primary among these is that program
evaluation can serve as a means of increasing the accountability of governments toward their
citizens by providing a template for comparing sensibly whether public funds are used effec-
tively toward poverty alleviation.
In the case of PROGRESA the national elections that were forthcoming in the year 2000
and the increasing public support toward the opposition parties contributed to an unprece-
dented willingness by the Zedillo administration to support a rigorous and politically neutral
evaluation of the program. It is hard to dismiss the interpretation that the design of the pro-
gram, with its careful targeting of the benefits to poor rural households, along with the deci-
sion to evaluate PROGRESA, also served political purposes. For example, the targeting of the
program to households in extreme poverty and the provision of the cash transfers directly to
the beneficiary households signaled a break from the wasteful practices of the past. At the
same time, the decision to evaluate the program established a precedent that any future ad-
ministration could hardly afford not to imitate.
Until the implementation of PROGRESA in Mexico, as in most developing countries, 
national poverty alleviation programs were not customarily subjected to rigorous evaluations.
In the rare instances in which programs were evaluated, the decision to do so was usually taken
years after the implementation of the program. In such situations, it is typically too late to eval-
uate the program because the program has already achieved wide coverage and it is practically
impossible to construct a reliable comparison group that is essential for the credible evaluation
of the program’s impact.
PROGRESA distinguishes itself further by the fact that the elements essential for a rigor-
ous evaluation of the program’s impact were taken into consideration since the very early
stages of the implementation of the program. The strategy adopted for the evaluation of 
PROGRESA consisted of the following two critical elements:
1. The adoption of an experimental design in the early stage of the implementation of the
program, which allows the measurement of program impact by comparing the mean 
values of key outcome indicators among beneficiary households (treatment group) with
similar households that were not yet covered by the program (comparison/control group).
The experimental evaluation design of PROGRESA offers the opportunity to evaluate the
impact of the program on beneficiary households by systematically removing the influ-
ence of other factors that might have contributed to the observed changes.
2. The collection of information from these two groups of households (treatment group 
and comparison groups) before and after the implementation of the program.
Specifically, the full sample used in the evaluation of PROGRESA consists of repeated ob-
servations (panel data) collected for 24,000 households from 506 localities in the seven states
of Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacan, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, and Veracruz. Of the
506 localities, 320 localities assigned to the treatment group (where PROGRESA was in op-
eration) and 186 localities were assigned as controls. As originally planned, the localities serv-
ing the role of a control group started receiving PROGRESA benefits by December 1999. 
A total of 24,000 households from 506 localities in these states were interviewed periodically
between November 1997 and November 1999. Focus groups and workshops with beneficiar-
ies, local leaders, PROGRESA officials, health clinic workers, and schoolteachers were also
carried out. The following are some key highlights beginning to emerge from IFPRI’s evalua-
tion of the impact of PROGRESA on its target group, Mexico’s rural poor:
SUMMARY xi• After three years poor children in rural areas of Mexico where PROGRESA is currently
operating are more likely to enroll in school. Mexico’s primary school children typically
maintain a primary school enrollment rate of 93 percent but generally begin dropping 
out of school after completing the sixth grade. Enrollment rates in general witness an-
other steep decline as children transition to senior high school. Research reveals that
PROGRESA has had the largest impact on children who enter secondary school and 
represents a percentage increase of enrollment of more than 20 percent for girls and 10
percent for boys. The research revealed that much of the positive impact on enrollment is
attributable to increasing continuation rates rather than on getting children who were out
of school to return.
• The accumulated effect of increased schooling from grades 1–9 suggests that the pro-
gram can be expected to increase educational attainment for the poor by 0.66 years of
additional schooling by grade 9 (0.72 years of additional schooling for girls, 0.64 years
for boys). Given that the average 18-year-old youth typically achieved 6.2 years of com-
pleted schooling, PROGRESA effectively can be expected to increase educational attain-
ment of poor Mexican rural children by 10 percent.
• Improved livelihood security for the poor depends on improving early childhood health
care. Frequency and duration of illness have profound effects on the development and
productivity of populations. The IFPRI analysis indicates that improved nutrition and
preventive health care in PROGRESA areas have made younger children more robust
against illness. Specifically, PROGRESA children one to five years of age have a 12 
percent lower incidence of illness than non-PROGRESA children.
• Adult PROGRESA beneficiaries on average have 19 percent fewer days of difficulty
with daily activities, 17 percent fewer days incapacitated by illness, 22 percent fewer
days in bed, and are able to walk about 7 percent longer than nonbeneficiaries.
• In January 1996, more than a year before PROGRESA began, average visits to health
clinics were identical in PROGRESA and non-PROGRESA localities. In 1998, the first
full year in which PROGRESA was operational in all treatment localities, visit rates in
PROGRESA areas were shown to grow faster than in non-PROGRESA areas.
• PROGRESA increased the number of first visits in the first trimester of pregnancy by about
8 percent. This shift to early prenatal care significantly reduced the number of first visits in
the second and third trimesters of pregnancy. This positive change in behavior is docu-
mented to have a significant improvement in the health of infants and pregnant mothers.
• In 1999, median food expenditures were 13 percent higher in PROGRESA households
when compared with control households. This increase was driven largely by higher 
expenditures on fruit, vegetables, meats, and animal products. By November 1999, 
median caloric acquisition had risen by 10.6 percent. Beneficiaries felt that since the 
initiation of PROGRESA, poor households are eating better.
• The nutrition of preschool children is of considerable importance not only because of
concern over their immediate welfare, but also because their nutrition in the formative
stages of life is widely perceived to have a substantial and persistent impact on their
physical and mental development and on their health status as adults. Stunting—low
height-for-age—is a major form of protein-energy malnutrition. In 1998, survey results
indicated that 44 percent of 12- to 36-month-old children in PROGRESA regions were
stunted.
• Data suggest that PROGRESA has had a significant impact on increasing child growth
and in reducing the probability of child stunting; an increase of 16 percent in mean
growth rate per year (corresponding to 1 cm) for children who received treatment in the
critical 12- to 36-month age range.
xii SUMMARY• The analysis suggests that PROGRESA may be having a fairly substantial effect on 
lifetime productivity and potential earnings of currently small children in poor house-
holds. IFPRI estimates that the impact from the nutritional supplements alone and their
effect on productivity into adulthood could account for a 2.9 percent increase in lifetime
earnings.
• The administrative costs employed in getting transfers to poor households appear to be
small relative to the costs incurred in previous programs and for targeted programs in
other countries. According to the program cost analysis, for every 100 pesos allocated 
to the program, 8.9 pesos are “absorbed” by administration costs. Dropping household
targeting would reduce program costs from 8.9 pesos to 6.2 pesos per 100 pesos trans-
ferred, while dropping conditioning would reduce the program costs from 8.9 pesos to 
6.6 pesos per 100 pesos transferred. Dropping both would reduce these costs to 3.9 pesos
per 100 pesos transferred.
One of the most important contributions of IFPRI’s evaluation of PROGRESA has been
the continuation of the program in spite of the historic change in the government of Mexico
in the 2000 elections. The overwhelming (and unprecedented) evidence that a poverty alle-
viation program shows strong signs of having a significant impact on the welfare and human
capital investment of poor rural families in Mexico has contributed to the decision of the Fox
administration to continue with the program and to expand its coverage in the poor urban
areas of the country after some improvements in the design of the program.
The majority of the improvements in the design of PROGRESA (renamed Oportunidades
by the Fox administration) were based on findings of the evaluation of PROGRESA that re-
vealed areas of needed improvements in some of the structural components and the operation
of the program. For example, the evaluation revealed a larger program impact only on the
schooling attendance of children of secondary school age. This suggests that it would be
preferable to reorient the funds from primary school to families with children of secondary
school age. Oportunidades did exactly that by extending the benefits of the program to chil-
dren attending high school (preparatoria) rather than just junior high school, as it was in the
earlier PROGRESA. Also, initially the award of PROGRESA’s educational benefits was con-
ditional on regular school attendance but not performance. Oportunidades improved on this
design feature by linking benefits to performance, such as granting bonuses to encourage suc-
cessful completion of a grade, or linking benefits with participation in other programs. For ex-
ample, the creation of a related program, Jovenes con Oportunidades, aims to create income-
generating opportunities for poor households through preferential access to microcredit,
housing improvements, adult education, and social insurance.
Yet in spite of these improvements in the program, the evaluation findings suggest that
some issues remain to be resolved. For example, the program was found to have no measur-
able impact on the achievement test scores of children in beneficiary localities or on their reg-
ular school attendance. This implies that if the program is to have a significant effect on the
human capital of children, more attention needs to be directed to the quality of education pro-
vided in schools. Enrolling in and attending school regularly are only necessary conditions for
the improvement of children’s human capital. Finally, it is also important to find ways to main-
tain and improve the quality of the information provided in the pláticas.
The opportunity to conduct a rigorous evaluation of a program such as PROGRESA has
set a higher set of standards for the design and conduct of social policy in Mexico and in Latin
America in general. As policymakers now have a better sense of the basic elements of a pro-
gram that can be effective toward alleviating poverty in the short run and, perhaps, in the long
run, the list of questions and concerns about program choices and design cannot help but grow
SUMMARY xiiilarger. For example, is it possible for unconditional cash transfers without any “strings” at-
tached to have similar or higher impacts on human capital investments of poor rural families?
Is the amount of the cash transfer given to families too high? Perhaps a lower cash transfer
could achieve the same impact. Is the simultaneous intervention in the areas of education,
health, and nutrition areas preferable to intervening in each of these sectors separately? 
PROGRESA has been accompanied by complementary efforts and resources directed at
strengthening the supply and quality of educational and health capacity constraints that might
arise as a result of the more intensive use of existing facilities and resources. Perhaps this fea-
ture of the program plays a critical role for the success of PROGRESA, and programs that do
not pay sufficient attention to the capacity constraints that might arise as a result of the condi-
tionality of cash transfers may be less effective. Is it not possible that similar or even higher
effects on school attendance can be achieved through alternative programs, such as building
new schools or improving the quality of educational services? What if the benefits were given
to the fathers rather than the mothers in the household? Are programs aimed toward younger
children to be preferred over programs aimed toward older children?
The nature of the program and the scope of the evaluation of the program’s impact can pro-
vide only a tentative answer to some of these questions. More definite answers can be obtained
through the analysis and evaluation of programs that incorporate all or some of these features
as part of their structure. Hopefully, early involvement of researchers in the design and evalu-
ation of programs implemented in other countries, such as Brazil (Bolsa Familia), Colombia
(Familias en Accion), Honduras (PRAF), Jamaica (PATH), Nicaragua (RPS), and Turkey, can
shed more light on these critical questions for policy.
Finally, the critical question of whether the vicious cycle of poverty and its intergenera-
tional transmission are indeed broken can be determined only by following the cohorts of chil-
dren currently in the program. At least in Mexico, the evaluation of PROGRESA’s impact in
the short term has provided a solid foundation for determining whether the program had a sig-
nificant difference in the welfare and earnings of these children as adults.
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Background and Program Description
I
n 1997, the federal government of Mexico introduced the Programa de Educación, Salud y
Alimentación (the Education, Health, and Nutrition Program), known by its Spanish
acronym, PROGRESA, as part of its renewed effort to break the intergenerational trans-
mission of poverty. The program has a multiplicity of objectives, aimed primarily at improv-
ing the educational, health, and nutritional status of poor families, particularly of children and
their mothers. PROGRESA provides cash transfers linked to children’s enrollment and regu-
lar school attendance and to clinic attendance. The program also includes in-kind health ben-
efits and nutritional supplements for children up to age five and for pregnant and lactating
women.
The expansion of the program across localities and over time was determined by a planned
strategy that involved the annual budget allocations and logistical complexities associated with
the operation of the program in very small and remote rural communities (such as verification
that the localities to be covered by the program had the necessary educational and health fa-
cilities). In consequence, the expansion of the program took place in 11 phases.2 In phase 1,
which began in August 1997, 140,544 households in 3,369 localities were incorporated. Phase
2 of the program began in November 1997 when a further 160,161 households in 2,988 lo-
calities were incorporated. The greatest expansion occurred in 1998 (i.e., phases 3–6) when
nearly 1.63 million families in 43,485 localities were incorporated. By phase 11, the final
phase of the program in early 2000, the program included nearly 2.6 million families in 72,345
localities in all 31 states. This constitutes around 40 percent of all rural families and one ninth
of all families in Mexico. The total annual budget of the program in 1999 was around $777
million, equivalent to just under 20 percent of the federal poverty alleviation budget or 0.2 per-
cent of gross domestic product (GDP).
As part of an overall strategy for poverty alleviation in Mexico, PROGRESA works in con-
junction with other programs that are aimed toward developing employment and income op-
portunities (such as Programa de Empleo Temporal [PET]) and facilitating the formation of
physical capital, such as the Fondo para la Infraestructura Social Municipal (FISM) (for a
more detailed description of the various anti-poverty programs in Mexico, see Appendix A).
For Mexico, the design of PROGRESA represents a significant change in the provision of
social programs. First, in contrast to previous poverty alleviation programs in Mexico, PRO-
GRESA applies targeting at the household level to ensure that the resources of the program
are directed and delivered to households in extreme poverty, that is, the households that can
most benefit from the program. General food subsidies, such as the tortilla price subsidy (Sub-
2For more details see Section 4 and Table 1 in Coady (2000).
1sidio a la Tortilla [TORTIBONO]), are
widely acknowledged to have had a high
cost on the government budget and a negli-
gible effect on poverty because of the leak-
age of benefits to non-poor households. In
addition, more decentralized, community-
based, demand-driven programs such as the
earlier anti-poverty program Programa Na-
cional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL), in
place during 1988 and 1994, were thought
to be susceptible to local political influences
and not very effective at reaching the ex-
treme poor.3 Under PROGRESA, commu-
nities are first selected using a marginality
index based on census data. Then, within
the selected communities, households are
chosen using socioeconomic data collected
for all households in the community.
Second, unlike earlier social programs
in Mexico, PROGRESA contains a multi-
sectoral focus. By design, the program in-
tervenes simultaneously in health, educa-
tion, and nutrition. The integrated nature of
the program reflects a belief that addressing
all dimensions of human capital simultane-
ously has greater social returns than their
implementation in isolation. Improved
health and nutritional status are desirable
not only in themselves, but also have an in-
direct impact through enhancing the effec-
tiveness of education programs since, for
example, school attendance and perfor-
mance are often adversely affected by poor
health and nutrition. Poor health is therefore
both a cause as well as a consequence of
poverty. Also by design, PROGRESA dif-
fers in the mechanism of delivering its 
resources. Recognizing the potential of
mothers to use resources effectively and ef-
ficiently in a manner that reflects the imme-
diate needs of the family, PROGRESA
gives benefits exclusively to mothers.
These features of the program, in com-
bination with its enormous scale, suggest
that the program has the potential to have a
significant impact on current and future
poverty in Mexico. PROGRESA distin-
guishes itself further by the fact that the el-
ements essential for a rigorous evaluation of
the program’s impact were taken into con-
sideration since the very early stages of the
implementation of the program. For exam-
ple, the PROGRESA administration took
advantage of the sequential expansion of the
program and adopted an experimental de-
sign for its evaluation. This permitted the
collection of repeated observations from
beneficiary households surveyed before and
after the implementation of the program as
well as the collection of similar data from
comparable households that were not yet
covered by the program. This experimental
evaluation design of PROGRESA offers the
opportunity to evaluate the impact of the
program on beneficiary households by
measuring the changes that have taken place
in the indicators of household investment in
human capital and other economic and so-
cial measures while systematically isolating
the influence of other factors that might
have contributed to the observed changes.4
This document synthesizes 24 months
of extensive research by International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) re-
searchers, academic collaborators, and
PROGRESA staff, designed to evaluate the
impact of PROGRESA and the extent to
which the measured impacts are delivered in
a cost-effective manner. The impact evalua-
tion focuses primarily on three poverty re-
duction areas: improving school enrollment,
improving health and nutrition outcomes,
and increasing household consumption for
poor rural families. Other topics such as the
impact of PROGRESA on women’s status,
intrahousehold transfers, and work incen-
tives are also examined. The synthesis 
presented here builds on a series of reports
2 CHAPTER 1
3See Yaschine (1999) and Levy (1994) for a description of the program.
4For a more detailed discussion of the variety of quasi-experimental designs available in the evaluation literature,
see Valadez and Bamberger (1994) and Ravallion (1999).presented by IFPRI to PROGRESA from
November 1998 through November 2000. 
A more detailed description of the research,
rationale, and methods appears in the origi-
nal IFPRI reports, which are provided in
English and in Spanish in a CD enclosed
with this publication.
This analysis of the PROGRESA pro-
gram comes at a crucial time as other Latin
American countries (such as Honduras,
Nicaragua, Colombia, Brazil, and Argen-
tina) are in the process of revising their so-
cial program along lines similar to those of
the PROGRESA program in Mexico (Rawl-
ings and Rubio 2002).
To provide readers with a common
knowledge about the program, the require-
ments and the benefits of the program, as
well as some of its operational aspects, are
described in detail. Most of the presentation
in this report is drawn from documents pre-
pared by the PROGRESA administration 
as well as from discussions of IFPRI re-





Education is seen as a pivotal component of
PROGRESA, reflecting the strong empiri-
cal link between human capital, productiv-
ity, and growth, but especially because it is
seen as a strategic factor in breaking the vi-
cious cycle of poverty. Investments in edu-
cation are therefore viewed as a way of fa-
cilitating growth while simultaneously
reducing inequality and poverty.
The stated objectives of the program are
to improve school enrollment, attendance,
and educational performance. This is in-
tended to be achieved through four channels:
1. A system of educational grants
2. Monetary support for the acquisition of
school material
3. Strengthening the supply and quality of
education services
4. Cultivation of parental responsibility for,
and appreciation of the advantages stem-
ming from, their children’s education.
These are obviously interrelated in that
each is thought to enhance the effectiveness
of the others in improving attendance and
performance.
The system of educational grants is in-
tended to encourage regular and continuous
attendance, especially for females. This is
reflected in two crucial design features (see
Table 1.1). First, the size of the grant in-
creases through grade levels. Second, at the
secondary level, grants are higher for fe-
males. The latter is meant to address the cul-
tural gender bias against female social par-
ticipation as well as being an attempt to
internalize education externalities that ac-
crue to other families after the marriage of
women. The level of the grants was set with
the aim of compensating for the opportunity
cost of children’s school attendance.
The program tries to maintain the real
value of the cash benefits stable over time.
The nominal value of the educational cash
benefits and the cash benefit granted for
food consumption is adjusted every six
months to account for changes in the cost of
living. The program design also tries to
avoid diluting a household’s incentives for
self-help. The total monthly monetary trans-
fer (i.e., from education grants and food
support) a family can receive is capped (for
the period July–December 1999) at 750
pesos (including 125 pesos for food). This
may possibly impact on family education
decisions, for example, how many and
which eligible children to enroll. Also, as
stated in PROGRESA documents, in order
to avoid adverse fertility incentives, only
children over the age of seven years (the
standard age of third-year primary students)
are eligible for education grants.5
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5As it is outlined in the model of Chapter 2, as long as families consider the full lifetime costs and benefits of hav-
ing an additional child, this feature of the program is unlikely to leave the fertility decisions of families unaffected.The grants are awarded to mothers every
two months during the school calendar and
all children over the age of 7 years and
under the age of 18 years are deemed eligi-
ble. To receive the grant parents must enroll
their children in school and ensure regular
attendance (i.e., students must have a mini-
mum attendance rate of 85 percent, both
monthly and annually). Failure to fulfill this
responsibility will lead to the loss of the
benefit, at first temporarily, but eventually
permanently.
There are two forms that contain regis-
tration and attendance information. Benefi-
ciaries are provided with a form (E1) at the
general assembly that contains a list of the
names of eligible children. This has to be
taken to the specific school where each
child is to be registered and must be signed
by a schoolteacher/director to certify enroll-
ment. This form is then returned to, and re-
tained by, the district level PROGRESA
representatives (UAEP) when the first pay-
ment is collected. The second form (E2), for
maintenance of detailed attendance records,
is sent directly to the schools: one form per
school with names of registered children
taken from the E1 forms returned by benefi-
ciaries. Also, valid justification for absences
(e.g., sickness) is to be maintained by the
school authorities with the cooperation of
parents’associations.6
The amounts for the support of school
materials differ according to educational
level. For example, for the period of July to
December 1999, for primary school stu-
dents from beneficiary families, the support
consists of 165 pesos, of which 110 pesos
are paid at the beginning of the school year
and 55 pesos are paid halfway through the
4 CHAPTER 1
6Recent changes now mean that schools will return details only for those who do not meet attendance requirements.
Table 1.1 PROGRESA monthly cash transfer schedule (nominal pesos)
January–June July–December January–June July–December
Grant 1998 1998 1999 1999
Educational grant per child (conditioned on child school enrollment and regular attendance)
Primary
Third grade 65 70 75 80
Fourth grade 75 80 90 95
Fifth grade 95 100 115 125
Sixth grade 130 135 150 165
Secondary
First—male 190 200 220 240
Second—male 200 210 235 250
Third—male 210 220 245 265
First—female 200 210 235 250
Second—female 220 235 260 280
Third—female 240 255 285 305
Grant for school materials per child
Primary—September — In-kind — 110
Primary—January 40 — 45 —
Secondary—September — 170 — 205
Grant for consumption of food per household (conditioned on attending scheduled visits to health centers)
Cash transfer 95 100 115 125
Maximum grant per household 585 625 695 750
Source: Hernandez, Gomez de Leon, and Vasquez (1999).school year (i.e., in January/February 2000),
for the replacement of materials, as long as
children continue to attend school. For sec-
ondary school students, this support in-
creases to 205 pesos and is delivered in a
single payment, at the beginning of the
school year, once pupils have enrolled.
Children attending primary schools that are
supplied by the state-run Consejo Nacional
de Fomento Educativo (CONAFE) suppli-
ers (under the Ministry of Education), that
is, essentially all schools except those lo-
cated in very marginal communities receive
school materials directly from their schools
rather than a cash transfer. These are deliv-
ered at the beginning of the school year and
CONAFE informs PROGRESA which
schools received the school materials and
how much they received.
Description of the Health
and Nutrition Component
The health and nutrition component can be
seen as a collection of a number of interre-
lated subcomponents, namely:
1. A basic package of primary health care
services
2. Nutrition and health education and
training for families and communities
3. Improved supply of health services 
(including annual refresher courses for
doctors and nurses)
4. Nutrition supplements for pregnant and
lactating mothers and young children.
Although the general focus is on improving
the health and nutritional status of all house-
hold members, special emphasis is placed
on the welfare of mothers and children.
Some components are more important than
others in this regard.
Primary Health Care Services
The basic approach of PROGRESA is that
of preventive health care that enables house-
holds to anticipate both the causes and pres-
ence of illnesses, with the objective of de-
creasing the incidence and duration of these
illnesses. This is reflected in the nature of
the package of health services provided (see
Table 1.2). The most important actions are
related to maternal and child health (e.g.,
pre- and postnatal health care) and family
planning services. A crucial ingredient in
the program is the emphasis placed on reg-
ular visits to health centers and the setting
up and monitoring of a schedule of appoint-
ments. This includes the setting of appropri-
ate health-center timetables that minimize
the inconvenience associated with the mak-
ing and keeping of appointments. To facili-
tate this, on registration at a health clinic
beneficiaries are given an appointments
booklet containing a specified schedule of
appointments for each household member,
with particular attention placed on visits by
vulnerable members, according to Table
1.3. This information is entered on the S1
form brought to the clinic by the benefici-
ary, ensuring that a record of attendance by
household members is kept at the clinic.
The other part of the form (formato CRUS)
is returned to the beneficiary, who uses it as
proof of registration in order to receive cash
grants for food. For the period between July
and December 1999 the value of the cash
grant for food consumption was 125 pesos
per month.
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Table 1.2 Composition of the basic
health services package
1. Basic sanitation at the family level
2. Family planning
3. Prenatal, childbirth, and puerperal care
4. Supervision of nutrition and children’s growth
5. Vaccinations
6. Prevention and treatment of outbreaks of 
diarrhea in the home
7. Antiparasite treatment
8. Prevention and treatment of respiratory 
infections
9. Prevention and control of tuberculosis
10. Prevention and control of high blood pressure
and diabetes mellitus
11. Accident prevention and first aid for injuries
12. Community training for health care self-helpBeneficiaries are also asked to attend
health and nutrition talks (referred to as
pláticas) at the clinic. Each clinic7 receives
an S2 form from the UAEP every two
months that contains the names of benefici-
aries as compiled from the CRUS form. The
S2 form, which contains only the benefi-
ciary’s name with two columns (one for
health center visits, another for attendance
at  pláticas) for registering compliance or
noncompliance by the household, must be
filled out by a nurse or a doctor at the health
unit every two months, certifying whether
family members visited the health units as
recommended (and presumably scheduled).
This form is then submitted to the UAEPs,
via the state health authorities (Juridicion
Sanitaria), in order to trigger the receipt of
the bimonthly food support. In principle, if
at least one member did not comply with
scheduled visits then the household is con-
sidered not to have complied and thus will
not receive food support. However, since
adults are asked to comply with only one
visit per year, if the appointment date is
changed in advance, the health center will
focus only on the compliance of women and
children. Very often, though, adult members
complete their required visit at the time of
registration. Also, since a household may
visit a clinic other than the one at which it is
registered, the UAEPs require information
from more than one clinic in order to regis-
ter compliance correctly. This information
is entered onto a computer and a computer-
ized file sent to CONPROGRESA.
Nutrition and Health Education
An underlying assumption in PROGRESA
is that effective health care requires active
community participation and a culture of
preventive care. To empower individuals
and communities to take control over their
own health, beneficiaries are required to at-
tend nutrition and health education lectures
(pláticas). Up to 25 themes are discussed in
the lectures, including nutrition, hygiene,
infectious diseases, immunization, family
planning, and detection and prevention of
chronic diseases. Because mothers are the
primary caretakers, the pláticas are directed
mainly to them, but other members of bene-
ficiary families as well as non-beneficiaries
are invited to attend. Participants are trained
in various aspects of health and nutrition,
with a special emphasis on preventive
health care; more specifically they are
taught about: (1) ways to prevent and reduce
6 CHAPTER 1
7Regarding mobile clinics (unidad mobiles) that already existed in some localities, PROGRESA reached agree-
ment with another program (Programas de Ampliacion de Cobertura) on a new frequency of visits to beneficiary
localities in order to facilitate the expected increase in demand.
Table 1.3 Annual frequency of health care visits required by PROGRESA
Age group Frequency of check-ups
Children
Younger than 4 months Three check-ups: 7 and 28 days, and 2 months
4 months to 24 months Eight check-ups: 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, and 24 months, with 
one additional monthly weight and height check-up
2–4 years Three check-ups a year: one every 4 months
5–16 years Two check-ups a year: one every 6 months
Women
Pregnant Five check-ups: prenatal period
During puerperium and lactation Two check-ups: in immediate puerperium and one during lactation
Adults and youths
17–60 years One check-up per year
Over 60 years One check-up per yearhealth risks (e.g., through prenatal care,
early detection of malnutrition, childhood
immunizations, safe food and water treat-
ment); (2) how to recognize signs or symp-
toms of sickness; and (3) how to follow 
appropriate primary-care procedures (e.g.,
treatment of diarrhea by means of oral 
rehydration). Participants are also trained 
in the use of the nutritional supplements
provided by the program, as well as in 
optimal breastfeeding and complementary
feeding of young children. Efforts are 
also made to broaden the information for
adolescents and young people, particularly
women, to favor the adoption of appropriate
behaviors to protect their health from an
early age.
Supply of Health Services
All public-sector health institutions are to
provide the package of basic health care
services. To facilitate this, especially in the
face of anticipated increased demand, re-
sources will be devoted to strengthening the
supply of health services as follows:
1. Ensuring adequate supply of equipment
to units
2. Encouraging staff working in remote
rural areas to remain there on a long-
term basis
3. Ensuring that health care units have the
necessary medicines and materials 
(including educational health materials
to distribute to families)
4. Providing extra training to improve 
both the quality of the medical attention
and the operational dimensions of the
service.
These resources are deemed necessary if the
public health sector is to meet the additional
demands placed on it by the program and
provide an efficient and high-quality ser-
vice. Although the greatest efforts made by
the institutions involved will concentrate on
primary care, mechanisms will also be es-
tablished for the timely detection and refer-
ral (free of charge) of the beneficiaries who
need attention in units at the second and
third levels of health care.
Nutritional Supplements
Special attention is given to the prevention
of malnutrition in infants and small chil-
dren, which is a crucial determinant of their
future development. Therefore, an addi-
tional component of the program is the pro-
vision of food (nutritional) supplements to
pregnant and lactating women and to chil-
dren between the ages of four months and
two years. These supplements will also be
given to children between two and five
years of age if any signs of malnutrition are
detected or to non-PROGRESA households
under similar circumstances.
Two different supplements were formu-
lated specifically for the program: one for
pregnant or lactating women and the other
one for young children. Both supplements
contain whole dry milk, sugar, maltodex-
trin, vitamins, minerals, and artificial fla-
vors and colors, but their specific macro-
and micronutrient content is adapted to
meet the specific nutritional needs of moth-
ers and children, respectively. The supple-
ments are distributed in 240-gram packages
and are ready to eat after they are rehy-
drated. The child supplement produces a
type of pap and is available in banana,
vanilla, and chocolate flavors. A 40-gram
daily ration (of dry product) supplies 194
kilocalories, 5.8 grams of protein, and ap-
proximately one recommended daily al-
lowance (RDA) of selected micronutrients
(see Table 1.4). The supplement for women
is intended to be consumed as a beverage
after rehydration, and is available in banana,
vanilla, or natural flavor. The daily ration 
is 52 grams and provides 250 kilocalories 
of energy, 12–15 grams of protein, and se-
lected vitamins and minerals.8
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8A complete description of the design, formulation, and composition of the supplement is available in Rosado et
al. (2000) and Rivera et al. (2000).The supplements are prepared at one
production plant devoted solely to this task
and then distributed to health centers
through Distribuidora Comercial CONA-
SUPO (Compania Nacional de Subsisten-
cias Populares) (DICONSA), which is an
operational arm of the Ministry of Social
Development (Secretaria de Desarrollo So-
cial [SEDESOL]) and also the largest dis-
tributor of food in rural areas. There are
about 18,000 DICONSA stores in rural
areas. The supplements have a long shelf-
life of about one year.
Mothers visit the clinic at least once a
month (more if they are pregnant or have
small children) and are expected to pick up
a one-month supply of the supplement for
each targeted household member. Appropri-
ate use of the supplements and other con-
cepts of optimal child feeding and feeding
during pregnancy and lactation are rein-
forced during the nutrition and health pláti-
cas provided in the clinics.
PROGRESA and Benefits
from Other Programs
One additional requirement of the PRO-
GRESA program is that households benefit-
ing from PROGRESA are supposed to stop
receiving benefits from other preexisting
programs. For example, according to the
operational guidelines of PROGRESA,
households receiving PROGRESA benefits
should not be receiving other similar bene-
fits from programs such as Niños de Soli-
daridad, Abasto Social de Leche, de Tortilla,
and the National Institute of Indigenous
People (Insituto Nacional Indigenista
[INI]). This requirement of the PROGRESA
program represents the short-run objective
of the new poverty alleviation strategy of
the Mexican government to minimize dupli-
cation of benefits to poor families. A longer
run objective is to absorb the variety of
poverty alleviation programs within one
program such as PROGRESA that repre-
sents an integrated approach to poverty 
alleviation. Before the establishment of
PROGRESA, previous government inter-
ventions in the areas of education, health,
and nutrition in the rural sector of the coun-
try consisted of many programs each inter-
vening separately in health, education, or
nutrition with little prior coordination or
consideration of the potential synergies that
could result from a better coordinated and
simultaneous intervention.
Size of Monetary Transfers
Received by PROGRESA
Beneficiary Households
Figure 1.1, based on the administrative
records of PROGRESA containing the 
payments sent out to beneficiary families,
reveals that there is a substantial variation in
the average cash transfer received per
month by beneficiary families.9 For exam-
ple, the average cash transfer paid out to
families in December 1998, July 1999, and
December 1999 were between 400 and 500
pesos, amounts that are considerably higher
than those paid out in most other months. In
the initial months of program implementa-
tion, there were considerable delays in the
8 CHAPTER 1
9The sample used is the sample of beneficiary households in the 506 localities used for the evaluation of 
PROGRESA.
Table 1.4 Micronutrients contained 





Vitamin B12 Vitamin A
Vitamin C Vitamin C
Vitamin E Vitamin E
Folic acid Riboflavin
Iodine Vitamin B12
Folic acidprocessing of the forms necessary for pay-
ment authorization. The unusually high
payments made during the months of De-
cember and July are a consequence of PRO-
GRESA’s efforts to catch up with the distri-
bution of payments owed to the beneficiary
families.
Figure 1.1 also reveals that the first
monetary benefits associated with participa-
tion in PROGRESA started in May 1998,
covering, in principle, the first two months
of participation in the program (i.e., March
and April 1998). However, the fact that the
first payments that were sent out to some
households in May 1998 exceeded the max-
imum bimonthly amount suggests that some
households were incorporated before March
1998 (e.g., in January 1998).10 Taking into
consideration these factors, it was deter-
mined that it would be more appropriate to
derive the estimate of the average cash
transfer received based on the 12-month in-
terval between November 1998 and October
1999.
Actual average payments, in total and by
component, received over the 12-month pe-
riod between November 1998 and October
1999, along with data on household con-
sumption averaged across all three rounds,
are reported in Table 1.5. The average
monthly transfers are around 197 pesos per
beneficiary household per month (expressed
in November 1998 pesos). The calculation
of this average includes households that 
did not receive any benefits because of non-
adherence to the conditions of the program,
or delays in the verification of the require-
ments of the program or in the delivery of
the monetary benefits. These transfers are
19.5 percent of the mean value of consump-
tion of poor households in control localities.
On average, households receive 99 pesos for
BACKGROUND AND PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 9
10There is no record of the specific date that a household was incorporated into the program.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.food support (alimento), and 91 pesos for
the educational grant (beca). The alimento
accounts for 68 percent of the transfers re-
ceived by households headed by individuals
60 years or older, a finding not surprising,
given that such households will tend to have
fewer children of school age.
Scope of Evaluation
The structure of the benefits and require-
ments of the program naturally pose some
limitations on the kinds of questions that the
evaluation can and cannot address. First, the
evaluation of PROGRESA, as well as of any
other social program, requires a clear defi-
nition of its objectives. Clearly specified ob-
jectives provide a benchmark against which
the performance of the program can be eval-
uated. PROGRESA has multiple and inter-
linked objectives. At the risk of oversimpli-
fying, the objectives of PROGRESA are to
alleviate poverty by inducing households
through conditional cash transfers to invest
in their human capital, such as health, edu-
cation, and nutrition.11 Clearly, the main ob-
jectives of the program are long-run goals
that can be evaluated only over the lifetimes
of program participants. The PROGRESA
evaluation data are limited to only two 
years of observations since the start of the
program. This implies that the evaluation 
results presented herein can provide little 
information about the long-term conse-
quences of the program on the human capi-
tal and lifetime welfare of beneficiaries. The
evaluation of PROGRESA conducted by
IFPRI is based on more short-term indica-
tors of program impact on human capital,
such as whether children from beneficiary
households are more likely to enroll or re-
main in school or exhibit higher attendance
rates and improved scores in educational
achievement examinations; whether benefi-
ciaries make more frequent use of the health
services provided by the program; whether
morbidity among beneficiaries decreases;
whether food consumption and nutrition at
the household level increases; and whether
the intervention, especially on the nutri-
tional side, has any measurable impact on
the nutritional status of children. In addi-
tion, given that this is certainly an implicit
objective of PROGRESA, IFPRI’s evalua-
tion includes the potential impact of the
cash transfer component of the program on
short-run poverty measures and household
welfare.
Second, it is important to note that the
educational and health services of the pro-
gram as well as the nutritional supplement
and pláticas are all provided as a package.
This feature of the program makes it impos-
sible to evaluate the impact of individual
program components (e.g., on the impact of
the health component of the program on
school attendance) or shed any light on pro-
gram design (e.g., what if the cash transfers
were awarded to fathers instead of mothers).
It is certainly possible that households can
choose to comply with some of the require-
ments of the program such as visiting health
centers and not with others, such as en-
rolling their children of eligible age into
school. Although selective take-up of spe-
cific program components is a real possibil-
ity, this is an issue not directly addressed in
this evaluation but left for analyses of the
program in the future.
Lastly, although PROGRESA is pri-
marily a demand-side program, meaning that
its main objective is to induce households
(through cash transfers and conditions asso-
ciated with the receipt of these cash trans-
fers) to make more intensive use of the ex-
isting educational and health facilities, it is
important to keep in mind that it is also ac-
companied by complementary efforts and
resources directed at the supply and quality
of the educational and health services. Thus
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11See Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999a,b) for a more detailed presentation of the stated objectives of the
PROGRESA program.although the program does not aim to in-
crease the quantity of educational and
health facilities (such as building new
schools and health centers), it does try to an-
ticipate and ease potential capacity con-
straints that might arise as a result of the
more intensive use of the existing facilities.
Since these increased resources related to
the quality of services are part of the overall
PROGRESA benefit package provided, the
evaluation of the program can provide little
direct evidence on whether a demand-side
intervention is more effective (in terms of
impact and/or in terms of cost) relative to a
supply-side intervention.
Chapter 2 of this synthesis report con-
tains an economic framework that is useful
in understanding the potential impacts of
the program. Chapter 3 presents the experi-
mental design and the information sources
used in the evaluation of PROGRESA.
Chapter 4 discusses the evaluation of PRO-
GRESA’s targeting and its impact on
poverty. Chapter 5 summarizes the econo-
metric methods used to evaluate the impact
of the program, while Chapter 6 contains a
summary of the quantitative and qualitative
results of the evaluation of PROGRESA
along with the cost analysis of the program.
Chapter 7 contains a summary of the policy
considerations derived from the evaluation
of the program. Readers seeking a more de-
tailed description of the research, rationale,
and methods may consult the original IFPRI
reports that are contained in the CD en-
closed with this publication.
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PROGRESA Seen through an Economic Lens
T
he major component of IFPRI’s evaluation of PROGRESA focuses on the identifica-
tion of the impact of the program (i.e., reductions in poverty levels, increased school
enrollment and attendance, increased use of health services for preventive care, and im-
proved nutritional status). Knowledge of program impacts is an essential component of any
economic evaluation. However, in isolation impact evaluation provides limited guidance for
policy. For this reason, an analysis of the costs and the cost effectiveness of the program is also
carried out. A number of policy instruments could be employed to generate a given impact,
and these may differ substantially in terms of cost. Cost-effectiveness analysis quantifies the
costs associated with bringing about a given impact. This aspect of policy choice is particu-
larly important when budget allocations are tight.
In general, a complete economic evaluation of a program of the nature of PROGRESA re-
quires not only the identification of the impacts of the program, and the costs of bringing about
these impacts, but also a comparison of these two key factors in order to determine the overall
welfare impact of the program and how effectively the program achieves these welfare impacts
relative to alternative policy instruments. This immense task typically requires the measure-
ment of the benefits associated with higher investments in human capital. Assigning a mone-
tary value to the increased nutrition, health, and education of a child over his or her lifetime as
a result of the social program requires a series of assumptions that stretch the limits of credi-
bility. Nevertheless, in some instances, assumptions of this nature are made in order to provide
readers and policymakers with a rough quantitative estimate of the benefits of the program.
With these caveats in mind, the first part of this chapter outlines the economic framework
that summarizes some of the key determinants of household investment in human capital and
the ways in which participation in PROGRESA may influence these decisions. In very simple
terms, households have preferences that are summarized by a welfare function; a set of con-
straints, such as expenditures cannot exceed income; and a set of variables, some of which are
under the control of the agent (endogenous or choice variables) and some are taken as given
(exogenous variables or parameters). The main objective of a household is to determine the
values for the variables that are under its control so as to get the maximum level of welfare as
possible while at the same time satisfying the constraints faced. The key feature of this eco-
nomic framework is that a household will determine all its choice variables so that the ratio of
the marginal benefit (MB) to the marginal cost (MC) associated with a small change in each
of its choice variable is equated across all choice variables.
In the remainder of the chapter, the main insights derived from this economic framework
about the direct as well as indirect impacts of the program, the nature and the size of these im-
pacts, as well as some of the factors that could limit the impact of the program are discussed.
13An Economic Model of
Human Capital Investment
within Households
The design of the PROGRESA program and
the structure of its cash benefits and re-
quirements suggest that the program is well
aware of the direct costs involved in induc-
ing households to invest in human capital.
For example, the size of the educational
grant varies with child gender and age and is
based on the labor income children con-
tribute to households. In addition, the fact
that the educational benefits are given for
children older than seven years of age sug-
gests that the design of the program is also
cognizant of the possible indirect effects of
the program on fertility.
This section presents a model of house-
hold decision making that highlights the
various costs and benefits associated with
the decision to invest in the human capital of
children. The model is sufficiently flexible
to embody the production of human capital
by heterogeneous households (Rosenzweig
and Schultz 1983; Rosenzweig 1988), the
role of the mother’s time (Willis 1974), the
interaction between child quantity and qual-
ity in the household budget constraint
(Becker 1981), the economic value of chil-
dren (Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977), and
the biology of reproduction (Rosenzweig
and Schultz 1983) emphasized in prior stud-
ies formulating models of the household.
To simplify the presentation, it is as-
sumed that households have full informa-
tion and collapse all the decisions of the
household made early in life and the out-
comes of these choices in the adult life of
children into one period. Fertility is initially
treated as exogenous. Later the model is
amended to allow households to make deci-
sions about the number of children they
have and considers the possible interaction
effects of PROGRESA with fertility. The
model is also a unitary model, which means
that it treats the household as if it were max-
imizing a single welfare function without
specifying exactly whether this welfare
function reflects the preferences of the adult
male or the mother in the household.
Cleary, most of these assumptions may
be questioned on the grounds that they im-
pose some strong or unrealistic restrictions
on household behavior. For example, the
collapsing of the life cycle of the household
into one period may be less acceptable for
poor rural economies characterized by im-
perfect credit markets, liquidity constraints,
and limited possibilities of ensuring house-
hold consumption (Jacoby and Skoufias
1997, 1998). In addition, the assumption of
a unitary household may be subject to criti-
cism as attested by the amount of theoretical
and empirical work that has been conducted
on the alternative model of collective deci-
sion making within families (e.g., Haddad,
Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997).
Although it is important to acknowledge
the limitations of this model, it is also quite
instructive to present it as a means of obtain-
ing a better understanding of the pathways
through which PROGRESA might influence
household behavior and its investments on
the human capital of children.
For the purposes of keeping the model
simple, the term human capital will be used
to summarize the investments of families in
both education and health. One essential
feature of the model is that human capital
(H) per child is produced by the household
using as inputs the time of family members
and other goods and services purchased
from the market.12 The function describing
the effects of changes in household re-
sources on the level of human capital in-
vested in each child is given by
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12In reality, since families produce more than one form of human capital simultaneously, there may be some im-
portant feedbacks or synergies involved in the production of education and health. The health status of a child, for
example, may be an important factor in the child’s school attendance rate. In order to keep the model simple, these
types of synergies are left out of the model but are discussed in more detail later.H = h(tc
H,t m
H, X; Z, µ, K). (1)
The first partial derivatives for the first three
arguments of the human capital production
function are assumed to be positive (i.e., h1,
h2, h3 > 0). These restrictions on derivatives
of the production function are equivalent to
assuming that as children or their mothers
devote more time to schooling the stock of
human capital embodied in children in-
creases. Here, three important human capi-
tal inputs are highlighted: the time of the
child tc
H (in school, medical care), the time
of the mother tm
H, and purchased goods and
services X (e.g., books, medical care). The
human capital production function, equa-
tion (1), also contains the terms Z, µ, and K.
The term Z summarizes observable child
characteristics such as gender or the birth
order, which also directly but exogenously
influence H. The term µ captures, for exam-
ple, the influence of biological factors, pos-
sibly genetically transmitted, such as child
ability or health endowment, which also di-
rectly but exogenously influence H. Typi-
cally, the term µ can be observed by the par-
ents of the child but is unobservable to
outsiders. The third term, K, reflects the role
of parental education; community charac-
teristics such as distance from the market,
health, or educational center; environmental
factors; and the general availability of
knowledge and information about the pro-
duction of human capital. It is possible that
some of the components of K may act as
substitutes or complements for each other.
For example, parental education may be a
substitute for the lack of information avail-
able about sanitary practices. Thus both the
human capital “endowment” and increased
access to relevant information about human
capital production may influence household
decisions. For example, increased aware-
ness about sanitation, proper cooking meth-
ods that retain the nutrients in food, and
other health maintenance practices can af-
fect the productivity of the other inputs.
The income of an adult child is assumed
to be determined by the stock of human cap-
ital accumulated through parental invest-
ments. Thus child earnings when he or she
becomes an adult denoted by E are
E = αµ + βH = 
αµ + βh(tc
H, tm
H, X; Z, µ, K), (2)
where α is the market return to the genetic
endowment of an individual and β is the
market rental rate on accumulated human
capital.
The budget constraint incorporates the
possibility that children contribute income
to the household when not engaged in
human capital accumulation (e.g., in
school) and parents receive some fraction θ
of the earnings of “grown” children. Specif-
ically, the budget constraint of the house-
holds is
V + Wc (Ω – Tc
H)N + Wm(Ω – Ntm
H) + θNE
= NpxX + Y, (3)
where  N denotes the number of children 
in the household, V is non-employment
sources of income including the labor in-
come of adult men in the household, Wc is
wage rate of children, Wm is the wage rate
of the mother, Ω is time available, px is the
price of X, and Y is household consumption
(assumed to be the numeraire) excluding the
purchased goods and services for human
capital accumulation.13
Finally, parents are assumed to “care
about” the number and adult earnings of
their children, and the level of household
consumption.14 These parental preferences
can be summarized by the parental welfare
function,
PROGRESA SEEN THROUGH AN ECONOMIC LENS 15
13Note that the health of the family members may also be modeled as increasing the amount of the time endow-
ment of the family.U = U(E,Y), (4)
which is assumed to possess the usual neo-
classical properties.15
Assuming that parents maximize (4)
subject to (1)–(3) by choosing the levels of
X, Y and by allocating parental (tm
H) and child
time (tc
H) across activities, the first-order nec-
essary conditions from the optimization
problem of the household for each of its con-
trol variables are (in addition to the budget
constraint described by equation [3]):
UE Wc




MRSEY = ––– = N{––– – θ} = MCtm
H . (6)
UY βh2
UE P x MRSEY = ––– = N{––– – θ} = MCx . (7)
UY βh3
Expressions (5), (6), and (7) highlight the
fact that at the optimum households equate
the marginal rate of substitution between
adult children’s earnings and house-
hold consumption (denoted by the ratio of
the partial derivatives of the utility func-
tion with respect to E and  Y) with the 
marginal cost (MC) or “shadow price” of
investing in the human capital of a child.
In addition, the combination of these 
three equations implies that households
will allocate child time (tc
H), parental (tm
H)
time, and market resources (X) so as to
equalize the marginal costs associated




For example, expression (5) implies
that the marginal cost of children’s time in
human capital production depends posi-
tively on Wc, the wage rate children could
earn (opportunity cost of time in school),
and negatively on the marginal increases in
earnings associated with a unit increase 
in school time. Moreover, with all else
equal for households with a larger number
of children (higher N), the marginal cost of
investing in child human capital is higher.
Along similar lines, the MC of the time a
mother allocates to human capital produc-
tion depends on the wage rate of the mother
and the marginal productivity of her time 
in the production of human capital. In
combination, expressions (5) and (6) imply
that at the optimum the household will al-
locate the time children and mothers spend
in human capital production so as to equal-
ize the marginal costs associated with these
two activities.
Changes in non-employment income V
alone leave the shadow prices of the re-
sources unchanged since V does not enter
directly into any of the expressions (5)–(7).
Provided that E and Y are “normal” com-
modities, increases in V result in “pure in-
come effects” that increase human capital
and consumption. In contrast, changes in
any of the factors that affect the marginal
cost of time and goods used in producing
human capital can trigger substitutions
among the resources used in human capital
production as the household minimizes its
production costs and maximizes its welfare
by using more of the input whose shadow
price decreased and less of the input whose
shadow price increased.16
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14In this specification of parental preferences, parents value child human capital only by its effect on the adult
earnings of children. Another feasible specification is that parents care about the stock of their children’s human
capital directly (e.g., parents derive direct pleasure from having healthier or more educated children).
15Meaning that it has positive partial derivatives for each of its arguments and that it is strictly concave.
16See Behrman and Knowles (1999) for a similar approach to the determination of human investments within
families.The Conditionality 
of Cash Transfers
At the risk of oversimplifying, one of the key
features of PROGRESA is that the cash
transfers paid by the program are condi-
tioned on school attendance and visits to
health centers. Simple economic theory sug-
gests that a household is generally better off
receiving an unconditional cash transfer than
a conditional cash transfer. The reason for
this lies in the fact that conditionalities in-
duce households to make choices that are
different from those that they would make if
they were given the cash transfer uncondi-
tionally and allowed to use it as they pleased.
One possible justification for the imposition
of these requirements may be that significant
market failures in rural economies tend to
make poor households invest less in educa-
tion or in health than would be best in the so-
ciety’s point of view.17 In the presence of
market failures and other externalities, the
conditionality of cash transfer schemes can
be considered as an effective means of im-
proving efficiency. Requiring that benefici-
ary households fulfill some minimum re-
quirement in school attendance and visits to
health centers may result in a gain in social
welfare that is greater than that obtained
from an unconditional cash transfer.
Based on the model outlined in the pre-
vious section, it is instructive to follow
through some of the pathways in which this
key characteristic of PROGRESA can im-
pact on the investments of families in the
human capital of their children. Such an ex-
ercise, at a minimum, provides useful guid-
ance about the cases or types of households
in which impact can be expected.
Consider, first, the cash transfers by
themselves, ignoring for the moment that
these transfers are awarded conditionally. In
this very simple example, participation in
the program increases the term V in equa-
tion (3) while leaving the determinants of
the marginal costs unaffected. Then the cash
transfers of PROGRESA act as an income
effect that tends to increase the human cap-
ital invested in children.
Next consider the requirements associ-
ated with the program. Participation in 
and compliance with the conditions of
PROGRESA are likely to result in changes
in the shadow price or marginal cost of in-
vestment in human capital.18 For example,
consider a household with a child enrolled
in school and with an attendance rate 
less than the 85 percent rate required by
PROGRESA. Assuming full compliance
with the requirements of the program, the
changes in the amount of time the child and
the mother devote to schooling, and in the
amount of the school supplies X (such as
textbooks, pencils, and paper) made avail-
able by the program are likely to change the
marginal costs or shadow prices of the
household. Specifically, consider the impact
of the program on the MC of tc
H (see equa-
tion [5]). Even though the extra time the
child devotes to schooling has a cost in
terms of the lost child wage Wc, what mat-
ters to the household is the ratio of child
wage to the marginal increase in earnings
given by the term βh1(tc
H, tm
H, X; Z, µ, K) that
enters in the denominator. Thus the impact
of PROGRESA on the MC of tc
H is deter-
mined by how the marginal product of the
time of a child in human capital is affected
by various components and requirements of
the program (i.e., the signs of the second
own and cross-partial derivatives (i.e., h11,
h12, h13). The higher amount of tc
H required
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17See Das, Do, and Ozler (2004) for an interesting discussion of the equity and efficiency trade-offs involved in
conditional cash transfer programs.
18In principle, an eligible household’s decision of whether to participate in the program or not can be modeled as
comparing its maximum utility level outside the program with the utility level associated with participating in the
program, adhering to all the conditions of the program imposed on the time allocation of children and mothers
and receiving the cash transfers provided by the program.by the program is likely to decrease h1in ex-
pression (5) given the diminishing marginal
productivity of own time in human capital
production (i.e., h11 < 0). However, this neg-
ative effect on h1is likely to be counteracted
by the enhanced productivity of the child’s
time resulting from the increased time spent
by the mother in producing child education
and the larger number of textbooks avail-
able (i.e., h12 > 0, h13 > 0).19
Whether the marginal cost of time de-
creases or increases depends on how strong
these effects are in relation to each other.
Since most of the program components
work to increase the marginal product of
time in human capital production it is safe to
say that the program is likely to decrease the
MC of time and thus result in further reallo-
cation of inputs within the household. In
other words, the requirements of the pro-
gram tend to generate additional shadow
price effects that lead to further substitution
and income effects that have the potential of
reinforcing the income effect resulting from
the receipt of monetary benefits.
Figure 2.1 illustrates some of these ef-
fects graphically. The vertical axis of the
graph depicts the quantity of other goods
available for consumption in the household,
whereas the horizontal axis measures the
time a child devotes to schooling (or in
human capital investment). Full or 100 per-
cent attendance rate occurs when the child
devotes all non-leisure time in school atten-
dance (including school-related homework)
(i.e., S = T where T denotes the amount of
time available after excluding leisure time
which for simplicity is assumed to be fixed).
The vertical line of height V at the value of
S = T denotes the maximum amount of
other goods available in the household when
a child devotes all of his or her time to
schooling and not working. When a child
divides his or her time between work and
schooling then the line TVA describes the
opportunity set of the household. The nega-
tive slope of this line is given by the real
market wage W for child labor, which de-
scribes the tradeoff in the market between
the consumption of other goods and school-
ing (or work).20 By devoting one hour less
in schooling and working one extra hour in
market work the household can earn W ad-
ditional units of other goods.
Let  Smin denote the 85 percent atten-
dance rate required by the PROGRESA 
program. Eligibility for the benefits of 
PROGRESA causes the budget line in the
region between points T and Smin to shift up
without changing its slope and increases the
nonlabor component of income upward to
the point V′. To the extent that the house-
hold fulfills all the requirements of the 
program then V′ – V equals the maximum
amount of benefits that the household can
obtain from the program. In consequence,
the feasible budget constraint of an eligible
family is now described by the line TV′A′BA
that is discontinuous at the point Smin.
Of course, differences in family non-
earned income and market opportunities
may be one important reason why some
children are enrolled or not enrolled in
school. To keep the exposition simple, we
assume that the income opportunities of
households are identical and consider the
case when we have two different types of
households represented by two different in-
difference curves. The household denoted
by the tangency at point C represents house-
holds with a child that has an attendance
rate close to 100 percent (S  > Smin) and
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19Note that in the case of health production the pláticas may enhance the marginal productivity of time further
(h1K > 0).
20It is assumed that the opportunity cost of child schooling is the fixed market wage for child labor. The as-
sumption of a perfectly competitive labor market can be replaced by (or combined with) the assumption that chil-
dren work at home producing home-produced commodities that are perfectly substitutable with market-purchased
commodities with no additional complications (see Skoufias 1994a).works only a very small fraction of his or
her time. The indifference curve that crosses
the vertical axis at point A represents house-
holds with a child who does not attend
school at all (S = 0) and devotes all of his or
her free time to market work. Although it
does not have to be so, for simplicity, point
A is depicted as a tangency point between
the indifference curve of the household and
the real wage line W.
The discontinuity of the budget con-
straint of the household, in combination
with the assumption of utility maximiza-
tion, implies that there is a minimum condi-
tional cash transfer that will induce the
household to send its child to school. Let 
B′ denote the point of intersection of the in-
difference curve of household A with the
vertical line at Smin. Then the vertical differ-
ence B′ – B represents the minimum cash
transfer that will make household A just 
indifferent between complying with the 85
percent attendance requirement and keep-
ing their child out of school. A conditional 
cash transfer less than B′ – B is insuffi-
cient to induce the household to enroll its
child in school. This is because by having 
its child work, the family gets a higher level
of utility compared to sending the child to
school.
In Figure 2.1, it is implicitly assumed
that the size of the conditional cash transfer
V′ – V is greater than the minimum amount
B′ – B needed to induce household A to en-
roll the child in school and comply with the
85 percent attendance requirement. In con-
















Figure 2.1 Effect of conditional cash transfers on children’s school attendance and work
Note: A, Initially not attending; C, initially attending full time; T, maximum amount of time available excluding
leisure; Smin, program’s required school attendance.sequence, household A finds it to its advan-
tage to enroll the child in school. As can be
inferred from this figure, participation in the
program is likely to affect households dif-
ferently depending on their location on the
budget line before the administration of the
program. Consider household C, for exam-
ple. Such a household can represent house-
holds with children of primary school age
where enrollment rate is close to 95 percent
or the households with children of second-
ary school age who are regularly attending
school even before the administration of the
program. Since the conditions are not bind-
ing, the program is likely to have only a
pure income effect represented in Figure 2.1
by the parallel upward shift in the portion of
the budget constraint between points T and
Smin.21 For these households the impact of
the program may be concentrated at in-
creasing the time they devote to schooling
such as spending more time studying rather
than enrollment.22
For a contrast, consider household A.
With the cash transfer conditioned on an 85
percent attendance rate, and with the amount
of the cash transfer greater than the mini-
mum cash transfer B′ – B such a household
will choose to send (enroll) its child to
school. This new equilibrium is represented
by the point A′. The same household, given
the same cash transfer of V′ – V, and without
the minimum requirement of an 85 percent
attendance rate, might choose an attendance
rate that is lower than 85 percent and achieve
a higher level of welfare (i.e., would be on a
higher indifference curve) than at point A′.
One plausible justification for introducing
“distortions” on the choices of poor house-
holds is the role of significant market fail-
ures and externalities that create differences
between individual and social welfare. As
long as such market failures are prevalent,
the social gains from making cash transfers
conditional are likely to exceed the sum of
the individual welfare losses from the impo-
sition of these distortions.
Continuing with the discussion of house-
hold A, at first sight it would appear that 
for this household it is very hard to attribute
income and substitution effects to the pro-
gram since the final equilibrium point A′ is
not a tangency point. Yet, one can still apply
the familiar concepts of income and substi-
tution effects using the analytical frame-
work of “linearizing the budget constraint”
(discussed in detail in Killingsworth 1983).
Linearizing the budget constraint amounts
to transforming point A′ into a tangency
point by drawing a line tangent to the indif-
ference curve at A′ (i.e., finding the shadow
wage  W*) and finding the corresponding
level of non-earned income (or shadow in-
come) V* that corresponds to the shadow
wage W*. As it becomes apparent, house-
hold A’s participation in the program results
in both substitution and income effects that
tend to reinforce each other. The cash trans-
fer component of the program leads to a
pure income effect that increases schooling,
while the condition that the child devote at
least 85 percent of his or her time in school
leads to a price effect. Based on standard
economic theory the price effect may be 
further decomposed into a substitution and
income effect. At the final equilibrium 
point A′ the lower shadow wage W* (<W)
represents the lower price of schooling as a
result of the program while the total in-
crease in household income as a result of the
program may be considered to be the cash
transfer V′ – V plus the implicit extra in-
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21In terms of the more detailed human capital model discussed earlier, the program will have negligible effects
on the marginal product of the child’s time at school. Insofar as the cross-effects of the other program inputs are
negligible (i.e., h12 = 0, h13 = 0) then the MC of its time would be unchanged.
22It should be noted that the program may also have important dynamic effects by increasing the probability that
children continue on to higher grades in school. These dynamic effects of PROGRESA are explored by Behrman,
Sengupta, and Todd (2001).come V* – V′ earned as a result of the lower
price of schooling.23
To summarize, the economic framework
presented above implies that participation in
the program is likely to affect households
differently depending on their constraints
and preferences (or location on the budget
line) before the implementation of the pro-
gram. For households for which the program
constraints are binding, the program is
likely to result in income and substitution
effects that tend to reinforce its impact. In
contrast, for households for which the con-
straints of the program are nonbinding, the
program is likely to have only income ef-
fects. Given the heterogeneity of house-
holds’ preferences and constraints, the ex-
tent to which the program has a significant
impact on the human capital and work of
children can be determined only through
empirical analysis.
Additional Considerations
and Topics in the Evaluation
of PROGRESA
Synergy
One important assumption in the design of
PROGRESA was that positive synergies
among interventions affecting different
types of human capital, nutrition, health,
and schooling are important. Two distinc-
tions are useful in considering possible syn-
ergies among human resource investments.
First, there is the distinction between pro-
duction function synergies and total syner-
gies. The former refers only to whether the
production function technology implies that
two inputs are complements (positive syner-
gies) or substitutes (negative synergies).
The latter incorporates all behavioral adjust-
ments to a change affecting one human re-
source investment and, depending on all pro-
duction technologies and preferences that
are relevant for a household’s decisions, may
imply larger or smaller synergies than the
pure production function synergies. Second,
there is the distinction between synergies
among human resources that are more or
less concurrent (e.g., current nutrient intakes
might increase the effectiveness of current
time in school in learning) and lagged effects
over the life cycle (e.g., infant malnourish-
ment might affect adult productivities).
The PROGRESA evaluation data are
not well suited to investigate much about
such possible synergies. Given that the nu-
tritional intervention focused on children
0–5 years of age, and the educational inter-
vention is focused on children 8–18 years of
age, there is no way to determine or quan-
tify the impact of the nutritional interven-
tion at an early age on the educational and
cognitive achievement of these children.
The PROGRESA data also do not include
critical information about various possibly
relevant human resources and related out-
comes for the same individuals. For exam-
ple, for infants and small children they in-
clude some measures of nutrition, but not of
cognitive development. For children in
school, they include information on school
enrollment, attendance, and test scores, but
not on longer-run health and nutrition status
or on short-run nutrient intakes. For adults
they include information on school attain-
ment and, for those who receive them, wage
rates, but not on longer-run cognitive devel-
opment or longer-run health and nutrition or
on shorter-run nutrient intakes. Also, of
course, given that individuals are followed
over three years at most, effectively individ-
uals cannot be followed across life-cycle
stages. Therefore, although analysis of 
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23In terms of the model above the attendance requirements of the program will affect the marginal product of the
child’s time at school. Assuming that the positive cross-effects on the household, the productivity of the child’s
time resulting from the longer time spent by the mother in production of child education, and the larger number
of textbooks available (i.e., h12 > 0, h13 > 0) are greater than the negative effect of the higher attendance require-
ment on h1 (h11 < 0), then the MC of its time is likely to decrease; see equation (5).the PROGRESA data can provide useful 
information about some pieces of human 
resource effects that may be helpful in 
understanding possible synergies, the 
PROGRESA data in themselves cannot pro-
vide much insight into the importance of
such synergies or even whether most of
them exist.
However, an extensive review of the cur-
rently available nutrition/epidemiological
and socioeconomic literatures by Behrman
(2000) reveals that human resource invest-
ments in nutrition, health, and schooling do
reflect considerably behavioral decisions at
the household level. Therefore, preferences
and other constraints matter, not just pure
production function characteristics. In fact,
the few available estimates directed to this
issue indicate that parental preferences are
such as to reinforce differentials among
their children so that the total synergistic ef-
fects are likely to be greater than the pure
production function effects. This literature
does not include much persuasive evidence
on more-or-less concurrent synergies during
the preschool and school-age stages. But
there does seem to be evidence of signifi-
cant positive synergies between concurrent
short-run nutrition and schooling in terms of
adult wages and productivities. More im-
portant from the aspect of the human re-
source emphasis in PROGRESA, there also
seem to be cross-life-cycle-stage positive
synergies, particularly regarding the impact
of preschool nutrition on schooling success
and possibly on adult wages and productiv-
ities. Illustrative simulations based on the
available estimates of the impact of human
resources on outcomes of interest and on 
the persistence of human resources for indi-
viduals over their life cycles suggest that
such synergies may importantly increase 
the returns of human resource investments,
through a number of channels, of the types
emphasized by PROGRESA beyond the 
effects of the individual human resource 
investments. Indeed the whole impact of 
the combined PROGRESA interventions 
in nutrition, health, and schooling is likely
to be significantly more than the sum of the
parts.
Fertility
Improvements in the “quality” or the human
capital embodied in children may also have
an effect on the “quantity” or the number of
children families would like to have. For ex-
ample, changes in fertility could be one of
the unanticipated consequences of the pro-
gram (e.g., Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1982).
It is quite straightforward to extend the sim-
ple human capital model presented earlier to
allow for households to determine their fer-
tility endogenously (i.e., the number of chil-
dren N enters as a direct argument of the
utility function of the household) as in
U = U (E, Y, N). (8)
Fertility is a biological process; resources
must be used by households to limit the sup-
ply of births rather than to increase supply,
as for most other “goods.” This can be ex-
pressed in its most basic form by using the
construct of a reproduction function, as in
N = φ + n(Z), n′< 0, (9)
where N = number of births (children), Z =
resources used to control births, with n′
< 0, and φ = fecundity, the number of births
that would occur in the absence of control
(Z = 0).24The household chooses its level of
control Z, but fecundity is biologically de-
termined.
With the addition of the reproduction
function and its determinants, the budget
constraint equations changes to
V + Wc(Ω – tc
H)N + Wm(Ω – Ntm
H) + θNE
= NpN + NpxX + pzZ + Y, (10)
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24Other reproductive inputs, for example, age and breastfeeding, can readily be incorporated.where pN is the direct cost of having a child
and pZ is the price of the Z good. Then par-
ents may be modeled as maximizing their
welfare function (8) subject to (1)–(3) and
(9) and (10) by choosing the levels of Z, X,
and Y and by allocating parental and child
time across activities.
In this revised maximization problem,
the same MC expressions presented above,
that is, expressions (6) and (7), still remain
valid, whereas the marginal cost or shadow
price of having an additional child is given
by the expression
MCN = πN = PN + Wmtm
h + p xX
– θE – Wc(Ω – tc
H)+ p z/n′ (11)
Expression (11) indicates that the resource
costs associated with the addition of one
child include the direct costs of a child, the
value of the mother’s time in child care, 
the value of the purchased human capital in-
puts  X, the child’s contributions to the
household when young and when grown.
Also in the numerator is the ratio of the per-
unit cost of the fertility control resource to
the “effectiveness” of control denoted by
the derivative of the control function (9)
with respect to Z.
Increases in the direct costs of children,
adult female wages, or in the prices of
human capital inputs increase the marginal
cost of having a child, whereas increases in
the children’s wages or in their potential
contribution to the family as adults act to 
reduce the marginal cost of having a child.
Moreover, reductions in the “costliness” of
fertility control—decreases in the purchase
price of contraception, pz, and/or increases
in the effectiveness with which a given in-
crease in the fertility control resource re-
duces fertility (a change in the absolute
value of n′)—influence in the same way the
marginal cost of fertility.
The revised model suggests that in-
creases in the quality or the human capital
of children are likely to have an effect on the
marginal cost of having an additional child
and thus on the number of children desired
by families. For example, the basic health
package offered to households participating
in the PROGRESA program increases the
effectiveness with which a given increase in
the fertility control resource reduces fertil-
ity, which tends to increase the MC of an
additional child. On the other hand, the
higher earnings of children with more edu-
cation when they become adults tend to de-
crease the MC of having an additional child.
Which of the two effects dominates can be
determined only empirically by observing
families over long periods of time. The em-
pirical evidence available to date (Rosen-
zweig and Wolpin 1982), however, suggests
that rural households view schooling and
child health as complements, while these
two human capital characteristics of chil-
dren are viewed by households as substi-
tutes for fertility. This implies that the in-
centives provided by PROGRESA for
families to invest in the health and education
of their children are mutually reinforcing al-
ternatives and that they will over time tend
to decrease fertility and population growth
in rural areas.
Intrahousehold Resource
Allocation and Power 
and Status of Women 
within the Household
By design PROGRESA gives transfers di-
rectly to mothers. This decision is motivated
by growing evidence that resources con-
trolled by women are more likely to mani-
fest greater improvements in child health
and nutrition than resources placed in the
hands of men (e.g., Haddad et al. 1997).25
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25Duflo (2000) provides some of the first rigorous evidence that the impact of a cash transfer on children’s nutri-
tional status is affected by the gender of its recipient. Specifically, she finds that pensions received by women in
South Africa had a large impact on the anthropometric status of girls but little effect on that of boys. The pensions
received my men had no effects on the anthropometric status of either boys or girls.The allocation of resources within
households is intricately related to the ques-
tion of whether resources in the household
are controlled by adult men or women. For
example, both unitary (e.g., Becker and
Tomes 1976) and collective models empha-
size that a household is likely to allocate re-
sources differentially among its children.
Without introducing more complex nota-
tion, in the context of the unitary model out-
lined earlier, in families with more than one
child the amount of resources allocated to
each child is likely to depend on its health
endowment and ability summarized by the
term µ. As long as two children in a family
are endowed with different amounts of µ,
households are likely to allocate different
resources to them even if all the other vari-
ables affecting the decisions of households
are the same for both children. As a conse-
quence, policies and government interven-
tions aimed at having a positive impact on
specific target groups such as girls versus
boys may be weakened or neutralized
through adjustments in the distribution of
resources within the households. It is possi-
ble, for example, that the availability of the
nutritional supplements to younger children
in households that are PROGRESA benefi-
ciaries induces these households to decrease
the share of food allocated to children.
Along similar lines, the cash transfers re-
ceived by PROGRESA households may
displace or “crowd-out” the remittances
beneficiary households received from older
children and relatives working in the United
States. Also, the loss of time in household
and on-farm productive time incurred by en-
rolling eligible boys and girls in school may
place serious time constraints on mothers
and other household members as they try to
replace the time lost from children.
Incentive Effects 
and Impact on Poverty
Cash transfers, whether they are condi-
tioned on some kind of household behavior
or not, can have “incentive effects” on the
income obtained from work by adult house-
hold members as well as “general equilib-
rium” effects, meaning that the actual trans-
fer of cash and the method used to finance
these transfers may have secondary effects
that could work to reinforce or weaken the
effects of the program. A naive approach to
cash transfers is that they lead unambigu-
ously to increases in household income and
welfare and reductions in poverty. The de-
scription of the program requirements and
the model above suggest that the effect of
conditional cash transfers such as those as-
sociated with PROGRESA may be more
complex. The “pure income effect” of the
cash transfers needs to be contrasted against
the income losses or marginal cost increases
associated with adhering to the requirements
of the program. The cash transfers house-
holds receive may be just compensating for
the income lost by beneficiary households
ending their participation in other programs
such as Niños de Solidaridad, Abasto Social
de Leche, or de Tortilla. In addition, house-
holds incur time costs when they adhere to
the requirements of the program. To the ex-
tent that these costs are high, there is a pos-
sibility that the cash transfers of the program
have no measurable effect on the income of
participating households or the poverty rate
in these communities.
Another possibility is that the cash
transfers associated with the program are
high enough to cover the income house-
holds forego when they satisfy the require-
ments of the program. In this case, house-
holds may experience an increase in their
income that in turn may affect the willing-
ness of adult members to accept low-paying
work or physically demanding work. Incen-
tive effects of this type have been empiri-
cally documented in program evaluations in
other countries (Sahn and Alderman 1995).
One important implication of the preceding
discussion concerns the impact of the pro-
gram on measured poverty. Poverty mea-
sures are typically based on measured in-
come or consumption. It is possible that
poverty measures based on income or con-
24 CHAPTER 2sumption may show little or no impact on
poverty as long as households choose to use
their cash transfers to “buy” more leisure.
Under these circumstances, it is important
not to ascribe any negative connotations to
the incentive effects of the program since
households may simply be choosing to in-
crease their welfare by having more leisure
rather than having higher consumption of
goods and services. The report of Parker
and Skoufias (2000) makes an explicit effort
to investigate the possibility of such incen-




The discussion so far has been limited to
evaluating the effects of the program by
simply focusing on the behavior and human
capital outcome indicators of beneficiary
households. PROGRESA, however, can
also affect non-beneficiary households re-
siding in the same community as well as
households in other communities, urban or
rural, where PROGRESA does not operate.
The presence of PROGRESA in a commu-
nity, for example, may affect the behavior of
non-beneficiary households in that commu-
nity through the “demonstration” or “peer-
group” effect. It is also possible that the
availability of pláticas in localities covered
by PROGRESA may have spillover effects
on the types of food consumed by non-ben-
eficiary households as information about
healthier foods and diets and better sanitary
practices spreads in the community. At the
community level, the selection of specific
households into PROGRESA and the exclu-
sion of others may introduce a new type of
social differentiation within communities
that could diminish social cohesion within
these communities.
In addition to the effects of PROGRESA
on communities covered by the program, it
is also important to recognize that PRO-
GRESA may also have an indirect effect on
the welfare of households living in commu-
nities not covered by PROGRESA. When
one takes into consideration the fact that the
cash transfers distributed by PROGRESA
have to be financed domestically, as they are
in the case of Mexico, through the elimina-
tion of distortionary price subsidies or
value-added tax reforms, then the possibil-
ity of a variety of indirect or multiplier ef-
fects arises. A closer consideration of these
indirect effects in measuring program im-
pacts in overall social welfare raises the
possibility that the first-round positive ef-
fects of the program may be offset by the
second-round negative indirect effects of the
program.
To summarize, the economic framework
presented in the preceding paragraphs im-
plies that participation in the program re-
sults in income effects and in a multitude of
substitution effects that can reinforce the
impact of the program on participating
households. Depending on the specific cir-
cumstances of the household; the con-
straints it faces; and its preferences toward
human capital, fertility, and consumption of
goods and services, the substitution effects
induced by the program may work against
the positive income effect resulting from the
cash transfer component of the program.
The theoretical model also makes it clear
that it is necessary to adopt an empirical ap-
proach to evaluating the impact of a pro-
gram such as PROGRESA. Ultimately, the
question of whether the program has a sig-
nificant impact on the investments of house-
holds in the education, health, and nutrition
of their children can be determined only 
by observing the behavior of households
participating in the program. The next 
chapter describes the quantitative and quali-
tative methods and information sources
used to evaluate empirically the impact of
PROGRESA.
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The Experimental Design and Information
Sources Used to Evaluate PROGRESA
T
he central problem in the evaluation of any social program is the fact that households
participating in the program cannot be simultaneously observed in the alternative state
of no treatment. To illustrate, let Y1 be the outcome for a given individual or household
in the treated state (i.e., during or after participation in the program) and Y0 be the outcome in
the untreated state (i.e., without participating in the program). Then the gain for any given in-
dividual or household from being treated by the program is ∆ = (Y1 – Y0). At any given time,
however, a person is either in the treated state, in which case Y1 is observed and Y0 is not ob-
served, or in the untreated state, in which case Y1 is not observed and Y0 is observed. Given
that missing Y1 or Y0 preclude measurement of this gain for any given individual, one has to
resort to statistical methods as a means of addressing this problem (e.g., see Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith 1999). The statistical approach to this problem replaces the missing data
on persons using group means or other group statistics, such as medians.
For example, the majority of the studies on evaluation of social programs focus on the
question of whether the program changes the mean value of an outcome variable among par-
ticipants compared to what they would have experienced if they had not participated. The an-
swer to this question is summarized by one parameter called “the mean direct effect of treat-
ment on the treated.” Using formal notation, the mean effect (denoted by the expectation
operator E) of treatment on the treated (denoted by T = 1) with characteristics X may be ex-
pressed as
E(∆ | T = 1,X) = E(Y1 – Y0 | T = 1,X) = E(Y1 |T = 1,X) – E(T0 | T = 1,X). (12)
The term E(Y1 | T = 1, X) can be reliably estimated from the experience of program partici-
pants. What is missing is the mean counterfactual term E(Y0 | T = 1, X) that summarizes what
participants would have experienced had they not participated in the program.
The variety of solutions to the evaluation problem differ in the method and data used to con-
struct the mean counterfactual term E(Y0| T= 1, X). For example, one approach used frequently
to evaluate social programs is based on the notion that all that is needed is repeated observa-
tions on a set of households before and after the start of a program. Thus observations on the
same households before the implementation of a social program can be used to estimate E(Y0
| T = 1, X). Another approach is that of social experimentation or randomization of individuals
into treatment and control groups. Experimental designs use information from individuals or
households in the control group to construct an estimate of what participants would have ex-
26perienced had they not participated in the
program, that is, the term E(Y0 | T = 1, X).26
The empirical framework adopted by
the PROGRESA administration for the pur-
poses of evaluating the program’s impact
offers a very flexible approach to solving
the evaluation problem. Its advantages are
derived from two key features. First, it is an
experimental design with randomization of
localities, rather than households or individ-
uals, into treatment and control groups.27
Second, data are collected from all house-
holds in both treated and control localities
before and after the start of the treatment.
The combination of these two features per-
mits researchers to evaluate the “mean di-
rect effect of treatment on the treated,” or in
other words the impact of the program on
program participants using any of the esti-
mators available in the evaluation literature,
including the before–after estimator, the 
difference-in-differences estimator, and the
first-difference or (cross-sectional) estimator
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
The expansion of the program across lo-
calities and over time was determined by a
planned strategy that involved the annual
budget allocations and logistical complexi-
ties associated with the operation of the pro-
gram in very small and remote rural com-
munities (such as verification that the
localities to be covered by the program had
the necessary educational and health facili-
ties). In consequence, the expansion of the
program took place in phases.28 In phase 1,
which began in August 1997, 140,544
households in 3,369 localities were incorpo-
rated. Phase 2 of the program began in No-
vember 1997 when a further 160,161 house-
holds in 2,988 localities were incorporated.
The greatest expansion occurred in 1998
(i.e., phases 3–6) when nearly 1.63 million
families in 43,485 localities were incorpo-
rated. By phase 11, the final phase of the
program in early 2000, the program in-
cluded nearly 2.6 million families in 72,345
localities in all 31 states.
The experimental design used for the
evaluation of PROGRESA takes advantage
of the sequential expansion of the program
in order to come up with a set of localities
that serve the role of controls. The sample
used in the evaluation of PROGRESA con-
sists of repeated observations (panel data)
collected for 24,000 households from 506
localities in the seven states of Guerrero, Hi-
dalgo, Michoacan, Puebla, Queretaro, San
Luis Potosi, and Veracruz. Of the 506 local-
ities, 320 localities were assigned to the
treatment group (T = 1) and 186 localities
were assigned as controls (T = 0).29 Specif-
ically, according to Hernandez et al. (1999),
the 320 treatment localities were randomly
selected using probabilities proportional to
size from a universe of 4,546 localities that
were covered by phase 2 of the program in
the seven states mentioned previously.
Using the same method, the 186 control lo-
calities were selected from a universe of
1,850 localities in these seven states that
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26For a more thorough discussion of the various solutions to the evaluation problem, see Heckman et al. (1999),
Ravallion (1999), and Baker (2000).
27Valadez and Bamberger (1994) provide a detailed description of the elements of experimental and quasi-exper-
imental approaches to program evaluation. For a review of evaluations of social sector programs using random-
ized control designs in Mexico and other countries, see Newman, Rawlings, and Gertler (1994). In fact, the
method used by PROGRESA to select the eligible households also offers the opportunity to evaluate the impact
of the program using a quasi-experimental design such as the Regression Discontinuity Design (Hahn, Todd, and
Van der Klaauw 2001). See Buddelmeyer and Skoufias (2004) for an evaluation of the impact of PROGRESA on
child work and schooling using the RD design.
28For more details see Section 4 and Table 1 in Coady (2000).
29More details on the geographic distribution of the evaluation sample of localities and their characteristics are
provided in Appendix B.were to be covered by PROGRESA in later
phases.30 As originally planned, the locali-
ties serving the role of a control group
started receiving PROGRESA benefits by
December 2000.
It is important to clarify that there is a
very important difference between making
the best use of the constraints involved in the
coverage of households and the “deliberate
withholding of benefits for the purposes of
the evaluation.” Annual fiscal constraints
and logistical complexities associated with
the operation of a social program such as
PROGRESA in very small and remote rural
communities typically do not permit the
program to cover all of the eligible house-
holds at once. Instead, households have to
be covered by the program in phases, as was
done in the case of PROGRESA. Rather
than purposefully depriving households of
program benefits, experimental or quasi-
experimental designs simply take advantage
of the sequential expansion of the program
to select a comparable or control group
from the set of households that are eligible
for the program but have yet to be covered
by the program. This practice offers the op-
portunity to conduct a scientifically rigor-
ous evaluation of whether the program has
an impact or not, and if so the size of this
impact on beneficiary households. A scien-
tifically rigorous evaluation is the best way
of determining whether the scarce public
funds are used effectively and efficiently to-
ward the achievement of the short-run and
long-run objectives of the program.
As discussed in more detail later in this
chapter, all households were initially sur-
veyed in October/November 1997 and,
based on this first survey, the eligibility 
status of households was determined. Based 
on PROGRESA’s beneficiary selection
method, all households in both treatment
and control communities were classified as
eligible or non-eligible for participation in
the program. On average in our sample, 78
percent of the households were classified as
eligible for program benefits.31 A second
survey took place in March 1998 before the
initiation of payments in July 1998. The
third round of the survey took place in Oc-
tober 1998, which was well after most
households received some benefits as part
of their participation in the program. The
next round of the survey took place in June
1999, and the fifth round took place in No-
vember 1999. After that round, the benefits
of the program started being distributed in
the control communities.
A useful description of the general
methodology and estimators used to evalu-
ate the impact of PROGRESA on any given
outcome indicator denoted by the letter Y is
provided in Table 3.1. Within any survey
round before (t = 0) or after the start of the
program (t = 1, 2, 3, . . .), the average value
of the outcome indicator Y within the total
survey population, denoted by [Y(t)], can be
divided into four different components de-
pending on whether an individual child or
adult belongs in a household classified as el-
igible to receive PROGRESA benefits (E =
1 for eligible households and E = 0 for non-
eligible households) and according to
whether the household that the individual
belongs in resides in a locality where PRO-
GRESA is in operation (treatment locality
or T = 1) or not (control locality or T = 0).
Given this decomposition of the sample one
may then construct all of the estimators com-
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30IFPRI’s active involvement in the evaluation of PROGRESA started in July 1998, more than one year after the
selection of the evaluation sample by PROGRESA authorities. The only way of verifying the integrity of the ran-
domization process was by using an “ex-post” approach as in Behrman and Todd (1999a). The pool of localities
used to select the evaluation sample did not include localities from the states of Campeche, Chiapas, Chihuahua,
Coahuila, Guanajuato, and Oaxaca for a variety of socioeconomic reasons, including the potential safety prob-
lems for interviewers (e.g., in Chiapas).
31As is explained later, in reality the percentage of beneficiary households in treatment localities turned out to be
less than the numbers of eligible households due to some administrative errors.EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND INFORMATION SOURCES 29
monly used in program evaluation. These
are:
1. The cross-sectional difference estimator
(CSDIF) compares differences in the means
of the outcome variable Y between groups 
A and B during the periods after the 
implementation of the program (i.e., t = 
1, 2, 3, . . .):
CSDIF = E(Y(t)|T = 1, E = 1) 
– E(Y(t)|T = 0, E = 1)
for t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . (13)
2. The before and after estimator (BADIF)
compares differences in the means of the
outcome variable Y between group A during
the periods after (t≥1) and before (t= 0) the
implementation of the program, that is:
BADIF = E(Y(t = 1)| T = 1, E = 1)
– E(Y(t = 0)| T = 1, E = 1).
(14)
3. The double differences or difference-in-
differences estimator (2DIF) measures pro-
gram impact by comparing differences in
the means of the outcome between group A
and B in post-survey rounds with the differ-
ences in the means of the outcome between
group A and B in the pre-program round.
Formally,
2DIF = [E(Y(t = 1)| T = 1, E = 1) – 
E(Y(t = 1)| T = 0, E = 1)] –
[E(Y(t = 0)| T = 1, E = 1) –
E(Y(t = 0)| T = 0, E = 1)].
(15)
Each of these estimators has some advan-
tages and shortcomings associated with it.
However, the 2DIF estimator, in compari-
son to either the BADIF or CSDIF estima-
tor, is the preferred estimator for program
evaluation. For example, one major advan-
tage of the 2DIF estimator over CSDIF in
evaluating the mean direct effect of treat-
ment on the treated is that the former con-
trols for any preexisting differences in the
expected value of Y between households in
treatment and control localities. Measuring
program impact based exclusively on post-
program difference in the mean level of the
outcome indicator between treatment and
control localities, as done by the first differ-
ence estimator, may lead to potentially mis-
leading conclusions about program impact.
For example, consider the case where there
are preprogram differences in the levels of Y
between treatment and control localities.
For example, suppose that the mean value
of the outcome indicator is lower among el-
igible households in treatment localities
than in eligible households in control local-
ities, that is,
[E(Y(t = 0)| T = 1, E = 1)] <
[E(Y(t = 0)| T = 0, E = 1)].
In addition, suppose that the program is suc-
cessful at bringing the level of Y in the treat-
ment localities up to the level of Y in control
localities in the period after the start of the
program. Then a simple comparison of
means between treatment and control local-
ities after the start of the program is likely to
Table 3.1 Decomposition of the sample of all households in treatment and 
control villages
Treatment locality where  Control locality where
PROGRESA is in operation PROGRESA operations are delayed
Description (T = 1) (T = 0)
Eligible for PROGRESA  A B
benefits (E = 1) E = 1, T = 1 E = 1, T = 0
Non-eligible for PROGRESA  C D
benefits (E = 0) E = 0, T = 1 E = 0, T = 0show no impact whereas the program has
had a significant impact.32
Ultimately, the extent to which the
CSDIF estimator may lead to biased results
depends critically on whether the selection
of treatment and control localities was in-
deed random. Pure and proper randomiza-
tion of the selection of localities would en-
sure that there are no significant preprogram
differences in the outcome variable of inter-
est between treatment and control localities,
that is,
[E(Y(t = 0)| T = 1, E =1)] =
[E(Y(t = 0)| T = 0, E = 1)]. (16)
Satisfaction of condition (16) also ensures
that CSDIF = 2DIF. In other words, ran-
domization implies that focusing exclu-
sively on post-program comparisons be-
tween treatment and controls yields
unbiased conclusions about the impact of
the program. The extent to which the selec-
tion of localities into treatment and control
groups can be considered as random is in-
vestigated in detail in one of the early re-
ports of the evaluation project (see Behrman
and Todd 1999a). Randomized assignment
to treatment implies that the distribution of
all the variables for treatments and controls
should be equal prior to the administration
of the program. To check whether random-
ization has been successfully implemented,
the treatment and control samples were
compared in two key dimensions: first, by
comparing the means of key variables trans-
formed into locality means in control and
treatment localities; and second, by compar-
ing the means of the same variables with
household level data.
When these comparisons and tests were
performed at the locality level (i.e., com-
paring locality means of age, education, 
income, access to health care, etc.) the hy-
pothesis that the means are equal between
treatment and control localities is not re-
jected. When the same comparison was per-
formed using household level data, it was
found that the null hypothesis was rejected
more frequently than would be expected by
chance given standard significance levels.
Although this rejection of random assign-
ment into control and treatment is some-
what alarming, the researchers interpreted it
as being due to the fact that the samples are
large, which means that even minor differ-
ences could lead to rejection.
Which of these two estimators is feasi-
ble in practice depends on whether data on
an outcome indicator are available not only
after but also before the start of the program.
For most of the key outcome indicators of
interest such as school enrollment and at-
tendance, child nutrition, incidence of ill-
ness, and labor force participation, data are
available before and after the start of the
program that permit implementation of 
the 2DIF estimator. For some indicators,
however, such as household consumption,
caloric availability, and individual time allo-
cation, observations are available only for
one or more rounds after the start of the
program. For these outcome indicators, 
the CSDIF estimator provides the best avail-
able option for evaluating PROGRESA.
Evaluation Tools/Information
Sources
To evaluate impact, researchers conducted
formal surveys and structured and semi-
structured observations and interviews,
focus groups, and workshops with a series
of stakeholders, including beneficiaries,
local leaders, local PROGRESA officials,
central PROGRESA officials, health clinic
doctors, nurses and assistants, and school-
teachers.
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32Along parallel lines of reasoning the 2DIF estimator relative to the BADIF is able to yield an estimate of the
program effect that is net of any time trends or aggregate effects present in the data (for more details see the dis-
cussion later and Heckman et al. 1999).In November 1997 PROGRESA con-
ducted a survey of the socioeconomic condi-
tions of rural Mexican households (Encuesta
de Caracteristicas Socioeconomicas de los
Hogares [ENCASEH]) in the evaluation
communities to determine which house-
holds would be eligible for benefits. Based
on PROGRESA’s beneficiary selection
methods, households were then classified as
eligible or non-eligible for participation in
the program in both treatment and control
communities. On average in the evaluation
sample, 78 percent of the households were
classified as eligible for program benefits.
The first evaluation survey (Encuesta de
Evaluation de los Hogares [ENCEL]) took
place in March 1998 before the initiation of
benefits distribution in May 1998.33 In com-
bination, these two surveys provide the base-
line observations available for all house-
holds before the initiation of the distribution
of cash benefits in the treatment villages.
The rest of the evaluation surveys were
conducted after beneficiary households
started receiving benefits from PRO-
GRESA.34 One round of surveys took place
in November 1998, which was well after
most households received some benefits as
part of their participation in the program.
The next two waves took place in June 1999
and November 1999.35 A number of core
questions about the demographic composi-
tion of households and their socioeconomic
status were applied in each round of the sur-
vey. These core questions were accompa-
nied by specific questionnaires, focused on
collecting information critical to a thorough
evaluation of the impact of the program.
The topics of these modules included col-
lecting information about family back-
ground, assets brought to marriage, school-
ing indicators, health status and utilization,
parental attitudes and aspirations toward
children’s schooling, consumption of food
and nonfood items, the allocation of time of
household members in various activities,
and self-employment activities. Table 3.2
presents the number of households and indi-
vidual members covered in each survey
round. It is important to keep in mind that
the March 1998 questionnaire did not con-
tain a detailed household roster based on
each household member interviewed in the
November 1997 round. In the March 1998
round the mother of the child was simply
asked to give her child’s name followed by
questions about the child’s health and
school attendance. Member codes were
later assigned to children in the March 1998
round after the completion of the survey as
long as a child’s name in a family could be
safely matched with a name in the same
family in the November 1997 round. Given
differences in the spelling, many children
could not be matched across rounds. As a
result, the March 1998 round contains a sig-
nificant number of children with a new
member code that did not exist in the previ-
ous round. This problem was corrected in
the later rounds, when interviewers were
given a household roster based on the No-
vember 1997 household roster. This prob-
lem with the member codes in March 1998
implies that panels of children constructed
by including this survey round are likely to
be problematic.
The preceding surveys were supple-
mented by school and clinic surveys, com-
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33In principle, the first payments in May 1998 were for the two-month period elapsed since incorporating fami-
lies into PROGRESA (i.e., in March 1998). Note, however, there is no record kept for the exact date of incorpo-
rating families into the program.
34IFPRI researchers and academic collaborators had a significant contribution in the design of the evaluation
questionnaires applied in November 1998 and later. IFPRI researchers were not allowed to contribute in the train-
ing of the interviewers and in the household survey process.
35An additional survey took place in June 2000. From that survey, only the fertility module has been utilized for
the evaluation of PROGRESA.munity questionnaires, data on student
achievement test scores, and other school
and clinic administrative data. The evalua-
tion surveys (ENCEL) collected by PRO-
GRESA did not allow for an evaluation of
the nutritional component of the program.
For the purposes of evaluating the nutri-
tional component of PROGRESA, separate
surveys of the same families were carried
out by the National Institute of Public
Health (INSP) in Cuernavaca. These sur-
veys included collection of data on anthro-
pometric measures (weight and height) data
of children and collection of blood samples
for tests for anemia and other deficiencies.
Note, however, that IFPRI researchers were
able to merge the child-specific anthropo-
metric data collected and made available by
the INSP with the evaluation data collected
by PROGRESA in order to conduct an early
evaluation of the impact of PROGRESA on
the height of preschool children (Behrman
and Hoddinott 2000).
In measuring the impact of a large and
administratively complex program such as
PROGRESA it is very important to take into
consideration the role that operational fac-
tors can play. Delays in the delivery, com-
pletion, and/or processing of the various
forms required to prove compliance with
the program requirements can lead to delays
in the delivery of the cash benefits associ-
ated with the program. To the extent that
such delays are not accompanied by serious
efforts by the PROGRESA administration
to solve the problems involved, they can re-
sult in loss of confidence by households
complying with the requirements of the pro-
gram. Such factors could result in weaker
program impacts with the passage of time.
In contrast, initial delays in the processing
of forms and delivery of benefits that are
improved on over time could lead to
stronger program impacts with the passage
of time. It is thus crucial that a thorough
evaluation of PROGRESA must also exam-
ine the operational process of the program,
identify potential bottlenecks in the process,
and offer constructive suggestions for im-
proving the operation and overall effective-
ness of the program.
The evaluation of PROGRESA by
IFPRI has also included an evaluation of
the operational aspects of the program. 
32 CHAPTER 3
Table 3.2 Number of households and individual members covered in each survey round
Non-eligible (E = 0) Eligible (E = 1)
Control Treatment Control Treatment
Survey round Coverage (T = 0) (T = 1) (T = 0) (T = 1) All
Pre-program/baseline census/survey
ENCASEH Nov 97 Households 2,048 3,233 7,173 11,623 24,077
Individuals 5,791 8,765 17,114 27,366 59,036
ENCEL-Mar 98 Households 1,925 3,048 6,567 10,549 22,059
Individuals n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Post-program surveys
ENCEL-Nov 98 Households 2,058 3,272 7,158 11,585 24,073
Individuals 6,147 9,290 17,793 28,258 61,488
ENCEL-Jun 99 Households 1,837 2,932 6,655 10,682 22,106
Individuals 5,361 8,090 16,406 25,775 55,632
ENCEL-Nov 99 Households 1,921 2,902 6,818 10,475 22,116
Individuals 5,804 8,421 17,219 26,000 57,444
Notes: The terms eligible (E = 1) or non-eligible (E = 0) are based on the final list of eligible households con-
structed by the PROGRESA administration (see Chapter 5 for more details).
The March 1998 ENCEL survey collected information at the individual level only for children between
birth and six years of age. No information was collected at the individual level for adult members.The evaluation used both quantitative 
and qualitative surveys. The quantitative
surveys included repeated surveys of bene-
ficiary households, schools, and health
clinics. The qualitative surveys conducted
in 1999 and in early 2000 included semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders in
PROGRESA including secondary school
and health clinic directors and nurses from
18 communities, and focus group discus-
sions with PROGRESA liaisons (promo-
toras), beneficiaries, and non-beneficiaries.
In total, 23 focus groups were held involv-
ing 230 participants: 80 beneficiaries from
8 communities, 80 non-beneficiaries from 8
communities, and 70 promotoras from 70
communities.
Although the information collected as
part of the qualitative surveys is not in-
tended to be statistically representative or
true for the majority of the population, the
research produces information that broad-
ens the field of inquiry to include questions,
issues, and factors that may have been pre-
viously missed, and additional levels of ex-
planatory and interpretive power.
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An Evaluation of PROGRESA’s Targeting 
and Its Impact on Poverty
T
he implementation of PROGRESA has involved three distinct stages (for more details
see Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman 1999a and Skoufias, Davis, and de la Vega 1999b,
2001). The first stage involved the identification of the most marginal rural localities
where the extremely poor are likely to be found. The identification of the marginal rural 
localities used a specially constructed “marginality index” based mainly on data from the na-
tional census. Additional considerations included geographical location, locality size (locali-
ties with fewer than 50 and more than 2,500 inhabitants were excluded), distance between lo-
calities, and access to some supporting infrastructure such as the presence of a primary school
within the locality and access to a secondary school and a health clinic within a certain dis-
tance from the locality. The second stage involved the selection of households within eligible
localities. Using detailed socioeconomic data collected by the program from all the house-
holds in the eligible localities, households were classified as “poor” or “non-poor” using a dis-
criminant analysis of household income and other characteristics.
Methodology
The evaluation of PROGRESA’s targeting is based on a framework consisting of three key el-
ements: (1) a social objective; (2) a set of economic, political, and social constraints under
which policy has to operate; and (3) a range of instruments available to attain these objectives.
Although PROGRESA has a number of interlinked objectives with respect to health, educa-
tion, and nutrition, the benefits of PROGRESA’s targeting are measured solely in terms of 
its potential impact on poverty alleviation.36 The economic, social, and political constraints
under which policy has to operate are partly reflected in the size of the budget available for
PROGRESA. The budget is assumed to be fixed and limited in the sense that it is not suffi-
cient to eliminate poverty completely.
Policy instruments for poverty alleviation range from uniform transfers that apply no se-
lection criteria to other schemes involving more strict selection criteria. Each of these instru-
ments has different costs and benefits associated with it. The primary benefit derived from tar-
geting at the household level is that classifying households into those eligible and ineligible
36It is also possible to evaluate PROGRESA’s targeting in terms of alternative objectives such as whether the pro-
gram selects families with children who have a higher risk of dropping out of school (e.g., de Janvry and Sadoulet
2002).
34for receiving benefits from PROGRESA
and giving benefits to those who are eligible
is a more effective way of using the limited
funds toward the achievement of the social
objective. This, however, is done at a cost.
As discussed in the report, the PROGRESA
targeting mechanism involves the collection
of a household survey within all the locali-
ties selected as marginal (or as more likely
to contain poor households). Such costs 
are taken into account by appropriately re-
ducing the fixed budget available for
poverty alleviation.
Within this framework the evaluation of
PROGRESA’s targeting can be formulated
as providing an answer to the following
question: How well does PROGRESA’s tar-
geting perform in terms of its objective
after taking into account the costs and the
constraints (financial and political) of
achieving these objectives? This question is
answered in two steps. First, PROGRESA’s
accuracy in targeting is evaluated both at
the community level and at the house-
hold level by comparing PROGRESA’s 
selection to an alternative selection of
households based on consumption. Second,
PROGRESA’s targeting performance is
evaluated in terms of its impact on poverty
alleviation relative to other feasible target-
ing and transfer schemes assuming the
same total budget.
The evaluation adopts an indicator that
is considered sensible for classifying house-
holds into poor and non-poor, while being
careful to point out that this is not necessar-
ily the perfect poverty indicator. The indica-
tor used to examine PROGRESA’s targeting
is predicted household consumption. Con-
sumption for households contained in 
PROGRESA’s sample (beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries) is estimated using the
1996 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Gasto
de los Hogares (ENIGH). Based on this 
indicator, the accuracy of PROGRESA’s 
targeting is assessed using the concepts of
undercoverage (exclusion error) and leak-




The conclusion regarding the accuracy of
PROGRESA’s targeting is that overall it is
an effective method of selecting households
into the program. The evaluation analysis
shows that the accuracy of PROGRESA’s
targeting, in terms of both selecting locali-
ties where poor households are more likely
to be found and selecting poorest house-
holds within these localities, is good 
(Skoufias et al. 1999a,b, 2001). However,
this accuracy fades when it comes to distin-
guishing between localities in the moder-
ate level of marginality. A similar conclu-
sion is derived from the evaluation of the
targeting of households within localities.
PROGRESA’s targeting is not perfect, but
relatively more effective at identifying the
extremely poor households within localities
and less so when it comes to selecting
households that are moderately poor.
Household Targeting versus
Other Feasible Alternatives
Based on simulations using quantitative
data that take into account the costs of tar-
geting, PROGRESA’s targeting as practiced
during the second phase of the program is
found to be the most effective among the set
of feasible targeting and transfer schemes in
reducing the depth of poverty and the sever-
ity of poverty in Mexico (Skoufias et al.
2001).
In short, PROGRESA performed closer
to the ideal of “perfect” targeting than any
of the alternative feasible transfer and tar-
geting schemes examined such as uniform
transfers (i.e., no targeting at all), targeting
based on consumption or “perfect” target-
ing, and targeting at the locality level rather
than at the household level. The research
finds that PROGRESA’s method of select-
ing households outperforms alternative
methods in terms of reducing poverty mea-
sures, weighting extremely poor households
more heavily (Skoufias et al. 1999a,b). A
similar conclusion is drawn when one ex-
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ing on social welfare instead of the standard
poverty measures (Coady 2000).
The research also finds that the non-eco-
nomic costs associated with targeting de-
serve serious consideration in the overall
decision to pursue a household level target-
ing strategy. The targeting evaluation study
finds that PROGRESA’s method of target-
ing households outperforms alternative
methods in terms of reducing the poverty
gap and severity of poverty indices, even
after taking into account the economic costs
of targeting. However, the reduction in the
higher order measures of poverty accom-
plished by household targeting over and
above those accomplished by simply in-
cluding all the households in the locality are
relatively small (only 3.05 percentage
points higher than the reduction in poverty
achieved by including all households in the
locality). Whether these marginal successes
of targeting at the household level is a
worthwhile effort depends on the size of the
noneconomic, or political and social costs
of targeting, all of which are very difficult to
quantify. As the qualitative surveys from
PROGRESA’s evaluation discussed in the
following section indicate, these costs of
targeting in rural, often indigenous, commu-
nities may not be negligible.
PROGRESA and Its 
Impact on Poverty
In assessing the impact of the PROGRESA
cash transfers on short-run poverty indica-
tors two approaches were adopted. The first
approach relies on simulations based on the
predicted consumption of each household in
the evaluation sample in November 1997
and adding the maximum amount of 
PROGRESA cash transfers an eligible
household could receive assuming full com-
pliance with the program’s requirements
(Skoufias et al. 1999a,b). The second ap-
proach relies on reported household income
and household consumption using the infor-
mation collected by the household socio-
economic census (ENCASEH) and the eval-
uation surveys (ENCEL) and the amount of
cash benefits received by beneficiary house-
holds in treatment areas (Appendix C). Al-
though each one of these approaches has a
number of shortcomings associated with it,
in combination they offer the opportunity to
check on the robustness of the measured im-
pact of PROGRESA.
The results obtained from the simulated
impact of PROGRESA’s cash transfers
show that the headcount ratio, which simply
measures the percentage of the population
with income levels below the poverty level
in a community, is reduced by about 10 per-
cent through the supports of PROGRESA.
The poverty gap and severity of poverty
measures that place greater weight on the
poorest households within the population in
poverty show that the level of poverty ac-
cording to the poverty gap is reduced by 
30 percent whereas the severity of the
poverty index is reduced by 45 percent. For
comparison, an untargeted or uniform 
transfer is found to reduce the poverty 
gap by 28 percent and the severity of
poverty by 36 percent. Given that these in-
dicators put greater weight on the poorest
of the poor, the simulation results suggest
that the largest reductions in poverty of 
PROGRESA are being achieved in the
poorest of the poor population.
One potential shortcoming of using 
simulations to measure the impact of 
PROGRESA on poverty is the fact that the
income households receive from other gov-
ernment programs and children working in
the labor market are both assumed to be
constant. As discussed earlier, households
receiving PROGRESA benefits should not,
in principle, be receiving other similar ben-
efits from programs such as Abasto Social
de Leche, de Tortilla, and the National Insti-
tute of Indigenous People (INI). In addition,
the school attendance requirements of 
PROGRESA may force children to with-
draw from paid activities and devote more
of their time to school. Both of these factors
may work to negate the positive effect of the
36 CHAPTER 4PROGRESA cash transfers on total house-
hold income.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates in more detail
that among PROGRESA beneficiary house-
holds in treatment localities the percent-
age of households receiving government
transfers from other programs besides 
PROGRESA appears to decrease dramati-
cally after the start of the PROGRESA pro-
gram. In addition, among PROGRESA 
beneficiary households with children be-
tween 8 and 17 years of age the total in-
come  received from children in this age
group decreased.37
Relying on reported household income
allows one to obtain the difference-in-
differences (2DIF) estimate of the impact of
the program on poverty which compares the
change in a poverty measure in treatment
villages to the changes in the corresponding
poverty measure in control villages. In addi-
tion to controlling for macroeconomic
shocks common to both treatment and 
control localities, this estimate allows one to
account for any preexisting differences in
poverty between control and treatment lo-
calities and thus yields a “cleaner” estimate
of the impact of the program on poverty.
Irrespective of the measure of welfare
used (per capita income or per capita con-
sumption) and irrespective of the poverty
line used (value of basic food basket or 
median of the value of household con-
sumption) the 2DIF estimates imply that
PROGRESA had a significant impact in re-
ducing poverty between November 1997
and November 1999. For example, using in-
come per capita as a measure of welfare and
the 50th percentile of the value of consump-
tion per capita as a poverty line suggests
that the headcount poverty rate declined by
17 percent in treatment areas between No-
vember 1997 and November 1999. Over the
same period, the poverty gap and the sever-
ity of poverty measures declined by 36 per-
cent and 46 percent (see Appendix C).
These estimates are very much in line with
the estimates obtained using simulations,
and provide further confirmation that the
impact of PROGRESA is concentrated at
improving the welfare of the poorest of the
poor households in marginal rural areas.
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Figure 4.1 Percentages of households in treatment localities that receive transfers from
other programs and PROGRESAPerceptions of Stakeholders
Regarding the Selection of
Beneficiary Households
Quantitative and qualitative data indicate
that there are perceived problems with the
selection process—mainly, that there are
poor people who need the benefits and do
not receive them and, less frequently men-
tioned, that there are people receiving bene-
fits who do not need them (Adato, Coady,
and Ruel 2000a). Although not statistically
representative, the qualitative data collected
from focus groups indicate some problems
with the original socioeconomic survey
(i.e., the ENCASEH survey). For example,
in some cases people were not home when
the enumerator came to call and the enu-
merators did not return, or people overstated
their resources because they were ashamed
to admit their poverty. Most respondents in
the qualitative research did not disagree
with targeting in the sense that they did not
believe that professionals, shop owners, or
other relatively rich people should receive
benefits; rather they believe that the mis-
takes should be corrected. Also, focus
groups indicated that aside from these more
obviously richer people, in these rural com-
munities people perceive themselves as “all
poor” and all in need, and thus did not agree
with the finer distinctions made in the selec-
tion process. However, they did indicate that
the selection did not appear to be politically
motivated.
At the community level, focus groups
and interviews with doctors and school di-
rectors indicated that there has not been an
opportunity to have an input into the selec-
tion process. In addition, these stakeholders
indicated that PROGRESA’s household tar-
geting strategy has in some communities
been associated with social divisions, most
often manifested in non-beneficiaries not
wanting to participate with beneficiaries in
community work (Adato 2000; Adato et al.
2000a). Responses from these stakeholders
suggest that these problems could be re-
duced through a more systematic imple-
mentation of PROGRESA’s policy proposal
to provide an opportunity for communities
to review and improve the selection so that
they are in agreement with its fairness.
Impact on Community 
Social Relationships
The overall conclusion of this research is that
PROGRESA’s system of household target-
ing involves social costs that should be taken
into account in evaluations of this system
and consideration of alternative targeting
systems. Communities exhibit social solidar-
ity in terms of the common ways in which
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries evaluate
the beneficiary selection process, outcomes,
and impacts. At the same time, there is evi-
dence of problems that the targeting has 
introduced into community social relation-
ships. Although the percentage of  communi-
ties in Mexico that have experienced these
problems is not known from a statistical per-
spective, the frequent and similar statements
of beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, promo-
toras, and doctors in the majority of focus
groups and interviews conducted across six
states provide strong evidence that there is a
problem that should be addressed.
PROGRESA has also strengthened social
relationships between beneficiary women, 
potentially building new forms of social capi-
tal. This is a valuable second-round effect 
of the program, and suggests that these types
of approaches to PROGRESA activities 
that promote social capital could be encour-
aged. At the same time, the creation of a 
group of “PROGRESA women” who partici-
pate in separate activities can reinforce 
social divisions, so these problems related to
household targeting need to be addressed 
simultaneously.
PROGRESA, Work Incentives for
Adults, and the Allocation of
Resources within Households
PROGRESA also does not appear to create
negative incentives for work (Parker and 
Skoufias 2000). Analysis of before and after
program data shows no reduction in labor
force participation rates either for men or 
38 CHAPTER 4for women. These results may in part reflect
the design of PROGRESA, in which benefits
are provided to families for three years, 
irrespective of family income, so that there is
no disincentive effect on work, as opposed 
to transfer programs in other countries which
often reduce benefits with work income. 
The conventional wisdom is that there are
trade-offs between providing benefits to a
population in need and stimulating work; 
the analysis here shows that, thus far, there 
is not necessarily any such trade-off in 
PROGRESA.
There are no significant differences be-
tween treatment and control groups by year
and over time with regard to the receipt of
monetary transfers from individuals or
friends not living in the household, includ-
ing transfers from relatives working abroad,
such as in the United States. The analysis
finds that after 19 months of receipt of ben-
efits, the selection into the PROGRESA
program has no influence over the incidence
or level of either monetary or nonmonetary
private transfers within households (Teruel
and Davis 2000).
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Summary of the Methods Used to Evaluate
the Impact of PROGRESA
A
ll of the reports evaluating the impact of PROGRESA did so using either the differ-
ence-in-differences (2DIF) estimator or the cross-sectional differences (CSDIF) esti-
mator of the program impact (discussed in Chapter 3). However, rather than simply
comparing unconditional means between treated and control groups, all of the reports used re-
gression methods. The estimation of the 2DIF and CSDIF estimates of program impact
through regression methods provides the advantage of controlling for the role of observed
characteristics of the individual, the household, and the locality on the variation in the ob-
served value of the outcome indicator of interest. Without any adjustment for the role of such
confounding factors, all the differences in the mean value of the outcome indicator are attrib-
uted to the program. As a matter of principle, it is preferable to have an estimate of the impact
of the program net of the influence of these observed characteristics on the difference in the
mean value between treatment and control households.
The discussion that follows provides a summary of the regression methods that one can
use to estimate the impact of eligibility in the PROGRESA program on a generic outcome in-
dicator. It should be kept in mind that the nature of the outcome indicator (i.e., whether it is a
continuous variable, such as household consumption, or a binary variable, such as child school
enrollment) necessitates an appropriate econometric method for the estimation of the program
impact (such as ordinary least-squares [OLS], probit, or logit).38
To begin, consider the case where data are available for treatment and control households
before and after the start of the program.39 Restricting the sample to eligible households only
(E = 1), the various estimators for program evaluation discussed earlier that control for indi-
38However, it should be kept in mind that when nonlinear methods (such as probit or logit) are employed, the es-
timated parameters of the model must be transformed into marginal effects that depend on the values of the re-
gressors used in the model. The common practice in these circumstances is to estimate marginal effects at the
means of the regressors.
39It is assumed that there is only one observation after the start of the program for expositional simplicity. The avail-
ability of more than one round of observations after the start of the program can be easily accommodated by includ-
ing an additional binary variable (say R3) together with its interaction with the treatment dummy (R3*T). Then
the coefficient of the (R3*T) term is an estimate of the 2DIF program impact estimate in the third round of the
survey and can yield information on whether the impact of the program is strengthened or weakened over time
(e.g., Schultz 2000a; Parker and Skoufias 2000).
40vidual, household, and locality observed
characteristics can be obtained by estimat-
ing a regressions equation of the form40
Y(i, t) = α + βTT(i) + βRR2 + 
βTR(T(i)*R2) +Σj θj Xj + η (i,v,t), (17)
where Y(i,t) denotes the value of the out-
come indicator in household (or individual)
i in period t; α, β, γ, and θ are fixed param-
eters to be estimated; T(i) is an binary vari-
able taking the value of 1 if the household
belongs in a treatment community and 0
otherwise (i.e., for control communities);
R2 is a binary variable equal to 1 for the sec-
ond round of the panel (or the round after
the initiation of the program) and equal to 0
for the first round (the round before the ini-
tiation of the program); X is a vector of
household (and possibly village) character-
istics; and η is an error term summarizing
the influence of random disturbances.
To better understand the preceding spec-
ification it is best to divide the parameters
into two groups: one group summarizing
differences in the conditional mean of the
outcome indicator before the start of the pro-
gram (i.e., α, βT) and another group sum-
marizing differences after the start of the
program (i.e., βR, βTR). Specifically, the co-
efficient βT allows the conditional mean of
the outcome indicator to differ between eli-
gible households in treatment and control
localities before the initiation of the pro-
gram whereas the rest of the parameters
allow the passage of time to have a different
effect on households in treatment and con-
trol localities. For example, the combination
of parameters βR and βTR allows the differ-
ences between eligible households in treat-
ment and control localities to be different
after the start of the program.
One advantage of this specification is
that the t-values associated with some of
these parameters provide direct tests of a
number of interesting hypotheses. For ex-
ample, the t-value associated with the esti-
mated value βT provides a direct test of the
equality in the conditional mean of Y be-
tween treatment and control before the initi-
ation of the program and serves the role of a
test of the randomness in selection of local-
ities. For if there were a truly random selec-
tion of localities into control and treatment,
then the conditional mean of the outcome
indicator should be identical across treat-
ment and control households/individuals.
Specifically, given the preceding specifi-
cation, the conditional mean values of the
outcome indicator for treatment and control
groups before and after the start of the pro-
gram are as follows:
[E(Y | T = 1, R2 = 1,X)] 
= α + βT+ βR+ βTR + Σjθj Xj (18a)
[E(Y | T = 1, R2 = 0,X)] 
= α + βT+ Σjθj Xj (18b)
[E(Y | T = 0, R2 = 1,X)]  
= α + βR+ Σjθj Xj (18c)
[E(Y | T = 0, R2 = 0,X)] 
= α + Σjθj Xj (18d)
According to the preceding specification,
the cross-sectional difference estimator is
given by the expression
CSDIF = (18a – 18c) = [E(Y | T = 1, 
R2 = 1,X) – E(Y | T = 0, R2 = 1, X)] 
= βT+ βTR, (19)
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40It should be noted that a slightly more restrictive specification is to pool all eligible and non-eligible households
and include an additional variable denoting eligibility (E) along with a full set of its interactions with the binary
variables T and R2. This alternative specification, in addition to estimates of CSDIF and 2DIF, yields the triple
difference (3DIF) or difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator which compares changes in the inequality
of the outcome indicator between eligible and non-eligible households.while the before-and-after difference esti-
mator is given by
BADIF = (18a – 18b) = [E(Y | T = 1, 
R2 = 1,X) – E(Y | T = 1, R2 = 
0, X)] = βR+ βTR. (20)
Expression (19) describing the CSDIF esti-
mator highlights the fact that the estimated
impact of the program is inclusive of any
pre-program differences between treatment
and control groups (summarized by the
presence of the βT term). Along similar
lines, expression (20) indicates that the
BADIF estimator is inclusive of any trend or
aggregate effects in the changes of the out-
come indicator Y (summarized by the pres-
ence of the βR term).
The advantage offered by the difference-
in-differences (2DIF) estimator is that it
provides an estimate of the impact of the
program that is net of any pre-program dif-
ferences between treatment and control
households and/or any time trends or aggre-
gate effects in changes of the values of the
outcome indicator.41 By comparing before
and after differences between treatment and
control households (or differences between
treatment and control households after and
before the program), one is able to get an 
estimate of the impact of the program (sum-
marized by the single parameter βTR):
2 DIF = (18a – 18b) – (18c – 18d) 
= (18a – 18c) – (18b – 18d) 
= βTR. (21)
Using the terminology of Heckman et al.
(1999), the parameter βTR provides an esti-
mate of the “mean direct effect of treatment
on those who take the treatment.” It should
also be noted the program effect summa-
rized by the parameter βTR is inclusive of
the role of the operational efficiency or in-
efficiency with which the program operates.
It is likely that persistent delays in the pro-
cessing of forms in some states or munici-
palities and other administrative bottlenecks
may lead to weaker impacts of the program
on households residing in these states rela-
tive to those in states where the program is
operating more efficiently.42 This question
was dealt with as part of the operations eval-
uation of PROGRESA rather than as part of
the impact evaluation of the program.
In the majority of the reports, the vector
Xtypically consists of variables characteriz-
ing the age and gender composition of the
household, household size, and the age and
education level of the household head and
his or her spouse. Given that the vector X
does not contain any supply-related vari-
ables, βTR is an estimate of the impact of 
the conditional cash transfers (demand-side
effects) and the improvements in the quan-
tity and quality (or supply-side effects) of
educational and health services and facili-
ties associated with the PROGRESA pro-
gram. Efforts to distinguish between the de-
mand and supply effects of the program
require the inclusion of supply-related vari-
ables as additional regressors in equations
(18).43 However, the extent to which one is
able to isolate sufficiently the demand effect
from the supply effect depends on whether
the observed supply-related variables cap-
ture sufficiently all the supply effects of the
program.
The availability of repeated observations
before and after the start of the program on
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41It is important to note, however, that these advantages of the 2DIF estimator are based on some implicit as-
sumptions. For example, the 2DIF estimator assumes that the time trend present among control households is an
adequate representation of the trend that would have prevailed among treated households in the absence of the
program.
42For example, such regional inefficiencies in the operation of the program could be captured empirically by al-
lowing the coefficient of treatment dummy variable T in expression (17) to vary by region or state.
43For example, see Schultz (2000a) and Coady (2000).non-eligible households in treatment areas
also offers the opportunity to examine the
potential effects of the program on the non-
eligible households residing in the treatment
communities. For example, improvements
in the quantity and quality of supply of
health and educational services may also
benefit the non-eligible households in the
treatment communities. Non-eligible house-
holds may also benefit by attending volun-
tarily the monthly pláticas offered in the vil-
lages covered by PROGRESA. In addition,
non-eligible households in treatment locali-
ties may alter their behavior (such as work
less or withdraw their children from school)
in anticipation that such actions may qualify
them for the program. An evaluation of the
extent to which the program has had some
indirect effects on the outcome indicator
among non-eligible households in treatment
areas can also be conducted by estimating 
a regression similar to equations (18) but re-
stricted to the sample of non-eligible house-
holds (E = 0).
When data for the outcome variable of
interest are available for one round (or more
rounds) after the start of the program, then
the evaluation of the impact of the program
reduces to whether the coefficient of the T(i)
binary variable identifying the households
residing in treatment localities, is positive
and significantly different from zero. Using
the sample of eligible households only (E =
1), then a specification that could be esti-
mated is of the form
Y(i) = α + γTT(i) + Σjθj Xj
+ η (i,v). (22)
In this case, an estimate of the cross-
sectional difference estimator (CSDIF) is
provided by
CSDIF = E(Y | T = 1,X) – 
E(Y | T = 0,X) = γT. (23)
The availability of observations for more
than one round after the start of the program
allows one to examine whether the impact
of the program is strengthened or weakened
by the passage of time. For example, denot-
ing observations from the third round of the
evaluation survey by R3 (that is the second
round after the start of the program) is a re-
gression of the form
Y(i) = α + γTT(i) + δRR3 + 
δRT(R3*T(i)) + Σjθ jXj + η (i,v). (24)
With this specification, a statistical compar-
ison of the relative sizes of the coefficients
δRT and γT (using one-tailed tests) can re-
veal whether the impact of the program in
the third round is significantly greater or
smaller than the impact of the program in
the second round (e.g., see Hoddinott, 
Skoufias, and Washburn 2000; Skoufias and
Parker 2001).
The discussion so far did not address the
role of unobserved heterogeneity summa-
rized by the error term η(i, v, t) in the pre-
ceding regressions. One primary implica-
tion of the clustering of the households with
villages is that the household-specific error
terms η(i, v, t) are likely to be correlated
within each village (as well as across time).
Failure to account for such a correlation
may lead to a considerable bias in the esti-
mated standard error of the program impact
(e.g., see Murray 1998). For this reason, all
of the impact evaluation reports account for
the clustered nature of the sample and report
robust standard error estimates for the im-
pact of the program.44
Some Important Details
Before continuing with the presentation of
the impact evaluation results it is necessary
to state upfront some of the caveats associ-
ated with the evaluation of the impact of the
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44Robust standard error estimates were obtained using the “robust” option in STATA v7.0.PROGRESA program.45 First, and perhaps
more importantly, a key assumption is that
the indirect effects or spillover effects of the
PROGRESA program from treatment local-
ities to control localities are negligible. This
assumption is necessary in order for the “no
treatment” state to approximate the “no pro-
gram” state. Certainly in the early rounds of
the program when the census and the first or
second evaluation surveys were conducted
it would be safe to say that such spillover ef-
fects were likely to be insignificant. How-
ever, the extent to which the spillover effects
were still insignificant during the later
rounds of the evaluation is a matter of debate.
In fact, in most of the states covered by the
evaluation sample, the control localities 
are surrounded by localities covered by
PROGRESA. In addition, control locali-
ties were eventually incorporated within 
PROGRESA and started receiving cash ben-
efits in December 1999.46 Although neither
of these two facts necessarily invalidates the
evaluation of PROGRESA, one should be
aware of the possibility that PROGRESA
has had indirect or spillover or anticipation
effects on households in control localities.
Second, the variable used to identify
households eligible for PROGRESA bene-
fits varies across some of the reports. Since
this is a potential source of misunderstand-
ing among readers of the individual evalua-
tion reports, this point deserves more de-
tailed elaboration. In the early stages of the
program the PROGRESA beneficiary selec-
tion method led to approximately 52 percent
of the households in the evaluation sample
to be classified as eligible for the program
benefits (identified by the variable E1).47
By July 1999, PROGRESA had added new
households to the list of beneficiaries since
it was felt that the original selection method
was biased against the elderly poor who no
longer lived with their children.48 As a re-
sult of the revised selection process, the
fraction of households classified as eligible
for program benefits increased from 52 per-
cent of the evaluation sample to 78 percent
of the sample. Accordingly, a new variable
identifying the new and “final” list of eligi-
ble households was provided for both treat-
ment and control areas (denoted by E2).49
Use of the variable E2 to identify the eligi-
ble households for PROGRESA benefits al-
lows program evaluators to estimate the ef-
fect of “treatment on the treated” whereby
the term treatment is used to represent the
“offer to treat” or the “intent to treat” effect
of PROGRESA (Heckman et al. 1999).
Given the differences across reports in
the variable used to identify the eligibility
status of a household, Table 5.1 provides a
guide of the key outcome indicators used in
the quantitative evaluation of PROGRESA,
as well as the econometric estimator used to
measure the impact of PROGRESA. The
majority of the evaluation reports by IFPRI
rely on the variable E2 to identify the 
households eligible to receive PROGRESA
benefits. The two evaluation reports that
rely exclusively on the variable E1 to iden-
tify household eligibility status are Schultz
(2000a,b,c) and Behrman et al. (2000).
To the extent that there is significant
dropout or attrition from the program among
beneficiary households or administrative 
44 CHAPTER 5
45More detailed discussion of these and related issues can be found in Heckman (1992), Heckman and Smith
(1995), and Heckman et al. (1999).
46IFPRI researchers were unable to determine whether households in control villages were given any specific rea-
sons as to why PROGRESA did not cover their locality. It is not unlikely, however, that promises were made by
local PROGRESA officials about possible inclusion of the control localities into the program in the future.
47E1 denotes the variable named “pobre_1” provided with the original data sets.
48The Spanish term used to describe this revised selection process is densification.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































linefficiencies/delays in including all eligible
households on the final list of households
that actually receive program benefits, the
“treatment of the treated” effect provides 
an underestimate of the mean effect of 
the program on those who actually received
the benefits of the program (e.g., see Heck-
man et al. 1999). Data on the records of 
payments made out by the PROGRESA ad-
ministration could not be obtained until late
into the evaluation process. After the release
of these payment records in late August
2000, it was found that in the evaluation
sample, many of the households that were
supposed to be added to the updated list of
beneficiaries had never received any cash
benefits since the start of the distribution of
program benefits in these localities. Specif-
ically, of the 12,291 households in treatment
localities eligible to receive PROGRESA
benefits, 3,350 or 27 percent of the total el-
igible population had not received any ben-
efits by March 2000. After cross-checking
this finding with the PROGRESA adminis-
tration, it was confirmed that the explana-
tion for this discrepancy is that 2,872 house-
holds (or 85.7 percent of the eligible
households not receiving any benefits) had
not been incorporated into the program. All
of these “forgotten” households were
households with a revised eligibility status
from non-beneficiary to eligible beneficiary
as a result of the revision of the selection
process (densification). The remaining 478
households not receiving any benefits (or
14.3 percent of the forgotten eligible house-
holds and 3.9 percent of the total eligible
population in treatment areas) were house-
holds that were incorporated during the
early months of 1998, and chose either not
to participate or to move out of the locality
covered by PROGRESA.50
50There is no official record as to whether these households formally declined the opportunity to participate in
the program.
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A Summary of the Findings 
of the Impact Evaluation and 
a Cost Analysis of the Program
Impact of PROGRESA on School Enrollment
Studies have shown that the economic returns to children from continuing to enroll in sec-
ondary school are relatively large and provide children with opportunities to escape from
poverty. Mexico’s children typically maintain a high enrollment rate in primary school of
about 93 percent. For the rural poor, however, education often stops there.
There appear to be two critical dips in enrollment rates among rural children in Mexico.
Children generally begin dropping out of school after completing the sixth grade, when en-
rollment rates decline to 55 percent (see Figure 6.1). But the trend in enrollment once again
witnesses a steep decline during the transition to senior secondary school or tenth grade, where
enrollment once again falls, to 58 percent for those qualified to enter.
The most critical objective of PROGRESA’s education program is to increase the transi-
tion of poor rural youth into junior secondary school (seventh to ninth grade). By design, ed-
ucational grants for enrolling in the first year of junior secondary school increase by 50 per-
cent, with a small advantage to girls over boys in the first three years of secondary school.
Methodology
PROGRESA’s effect on school enrollment is evaluated at two levels: first, by comparing for
each grade completed simple differences in average enrollment rates of children in treatment
(i.e., PROGRESA) and control localities; and second, by comparing differences in enrollment
outcomes at the level of the individual child between those who are program eligible and those
who are not receiving benefits. Family and community factors are controlled for in this later
analysis. To ensure confidence in the results, the robustness of the estimated impact of PRO-
GRESA is also examined by comparing the impact of PROGRESA using two different sam-
ples of children. One sample consists of the children who are present in all five rounds of the
surveys; the other consists of all observations on all children for whom data are available.
Impact on Enrollment Rates
After an exhaustive series of statistical tests, it was concluded that in all cases PROGRESA
had a positive enrollment effect for both boys and girls, primary and secondary levels, and ir-
respective of the sample used. Figure 6.2 displays the impact of the program on the mean
school attendance of children.
48At the primary school level, in which
enrollment rates before PROGRESA were
between 90 and 94 percent, statistical meth-
ods that control for the age and family back-
ground of children as well as community
characteristics revealed that PROGRESA
succeeds at increasing the enrollment rate of
boys by 0.74 to 1.07 percentage points and
of girls by 0.96 to 1.45 percentage points
(Schultz 2000a).51
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Figure 6.1a School enrollment and labor force participation of boys in PROGRESA
communities prior to program implementation
Source: Parker and Skoufias (2000).
Figure 6.1b School enrollment and labor force participation of girls in PROGRESA
communities prior to program implementation
Source: Parker and Skoufias (2000).
51For clarification, all the impact estimates discussed in this chapter are statistically significant (i.e., have associ-
ated t-values that are greater than or equal to 2). Impact estimates with t-values less than 2 are referred to as in-
significant or not statistically significant.At the secondary school level, in 
which the initial enrollment rates before
PROGRESA were 67 percent for girls and
73 percent for boys, the increase in enroll-
ment effects for girls ranged from 7.2 to 9.3
percentage points and for boys from 3.5 to
5.8 percentage points. This represents a 
proportional increase of boys from 5 to 8
percent and of girls from 11 to 14 percent
(Schultz 2000a).
If these program effects could be sus-
tained over the period in which a child is of
school age, the accumulated effect on edu-
cational attainment for the average child
from a poor household would be the sum of
the estimated change for each grade level.
Summing these values for grades 1–9 sug-
gests that the program can be expected to in-
crease educational attainment of the poor of
both genders by 0.66 years of additional
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Figure 6.2a School attendance of children 8–11 years old
Source: Author’s calculation.
Figure 6.2b School attendance of children 12–17 years old
Source: Author’s calculation.schooling. Girls in particular are gaining
0.72 years of additional schooling by the
ninth grade while boys gain 0.64 years of
additional schooling (Schultz 2000a). Given
that the average 18-year-old youth achieved
about 6.2 years of completed schooling
prior to the program, these data are sugges-
tive of an overall increase in educational 
attainment of about 10 percent.
Potential Impact of
PROGRESA on the Adult
Earnings of Children
If current urban wages approximate what
PROGRESA’s beneficiaries can expect to
earn from their schooling in terms of future
percentage increases in their wages, the in-
ternal rate of return, taking into account the
costs of the grants, to PROGRESA’s educa-
tional benefits is roughly 8 percent per year
(Schultz 2000a). Children, when they reach
adulthood, will have permanently higher
earnings of 8 percent as a result of the in-
creased years of schooling. Thus, in addi-
tion to improving beneficiaries’ current
livelihood by reducing current poverty and
raising consumption, PROGRESA is hav-
ing a significant impact on raising overall
human capital into the future.
Comparing the Effect of
PROGRESA to Increased
Access to Schools
It should be emphasized that PROGRESA
might have additional impacts on increasing
education beyond the level of secondary
school if children are more likely to go on to
higher levels of schooling, implying the es-
timates here are lower bounds of the im-
pacts of PROGRESA on schooling. Note
that there are higher returns to education 
in Mexico for high school education than
for junior high school. These possible im-
pacts would increase the overall impact of
PROGRESA on schooling and should be
evaluated in the future.
Increased access to schooling may be
considered as an alternative to providing 
educational grants to poor families. For ex-
ample, 12 percent of the children in the
PROGRESA evaluation sample currently
have to travel more than 4 kilometers to a
junior secondary school. The evaluation re-
search shows that when access to secondary
schooling is measured in terms of distance,
if additional schools were to be built and
staffed so that all children reside only 4 kilo-
meters from their junior secondary school,
secondary school enrollments would in-
crease by 0.46 percentage points for girls
and by 0.34 for boys, impacts less than one
tenth the size of those from PROGRESA. In
comparison to the impact of PROGRESA’s
targeted educational grants to poor families,
the effect of increased access to schooling
appears to be a relatively less effective
means of increasing school enrollments.52
Furthermore, a more detailed investi-
gation taking into consideration the costs
associated with the options of building
schools against the alternative of providing
cash transfers conditional on enrollment 
as in PROGRESA revealed that in terms 
of the objective of getting more children
into school a demand-side intervention 
such as PROGRESA is more cost effective
than a supply-side one (Coady 2000). In
other words, the cost incurred in generat-
ing one extra year of schooling is lower in
PROGRESA than the alternative of building
new schools.
Impact on the Transition
from Primary to Secondary
Schooling Level
The impact of PROGRESA on enrollment
rates is largest for children who have com-
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52It is interesting to note, however, that in the case of Indonesia, Duflo (1999) finds that a primary school con-
struction program had a significant impact on increasing school enrollments and earnings.pleted the sixth grade and are thus qualified
to enroll in junior secondary school, in-
creasing 11.1 percentage points for both
genders combined or 14.8 percentage points
for girls and 6.5 percentage points for boys,
representing percentage increases of over
20 percent for girls and about 10 percent 
for boys (Schultz 2000a). These results
imply that, whereas many children before
PROGRESA would leave school after com-
pleting the primary level, an important frac-
tion, particularly girls, are now going on to
secondary school.
The available evidence also shows that
much of the positive impact on enrollment
is due to increasing continuation rates rather
than on getting children who were out of the
school system to return to school. For in-
stance, for girls (boys) who were attending
school prior to the program, the impact of
PROGRESA is to increase enrollment rates
by 11 (7–8.5) percentage points. For boys
who were out of school, this impact was
only 5.4 percentage points. Furthermore,
those children who do return to school tend
to return only for a year, whereupon they
drop out again, suggesting that the pro-
gram’s impact is primarily to increase con-
tinuation rates rather than return rates. It is
perhaps not surprising that many children
do not return, given that most of these chil-
dren had been out of school several years al-
ready at the time PROGRESA was imple-
mented. With new generations of children, it
is likely that PROGRESA will reduce
dropout rates, and thus reinforce the effect
of PROGRESA to increase continuation
rates (Coady 2000).
Impact on Dropout Rates,
Progression through Grades, 
Grade Repetition Rates, and 
School Reentry Rates
These questions are explicitly addressed in
a study by Behrman et al. (2001). Their
findings show that the participation in the
program is associated with earlier ages of
school entry, less grade repetition and better
grade progression, lower dropout rates, and
higher school reentry rates among dropouts.
The program is especially effective in re-
ducing dropout rates during the transition
from primary to secondary school. In addi-
tion, at the secondary level the program ap-
pears to be more effective in inducing boys
to enroll in the second and third years of
secondary school, despite the fact that the
benefit levels are slightly higher for girls.
The study also finds the program to be ef-
fective in inducing children who dropped
out prior to the initiation of the program to
reenter school. However, it should be noted
that a related analysis by Coady and Parker
in Coady (2000) found that the impacts of
the program on children who were previ-
ously out of school are not sustainable over
time. This suggests that those children who
do return to school tend to do so for only a
year and then drop out again.
PROGRESA and Child Labor
The results show very clear negative im-
pacts of PROGRESA on children’s labor
market participation. Estimates based on
double-difference models of labor force
participation before and after the implemen-
tation of PROGRESA show important re-
ductions in children’s labor force participa-
tion for both boys and girls, in both salaried
and non-salaried activities. Labor force par-
ticipation for boys shows reductions as large
as 15–25 percent relative to the probability
of participating prior to the program. For
girls, in spite of their overall lower partici-
pation level prior to the program, there are
also significant reductions associated with
PROGRESA. In addition, the lower inci-
dence of child work due to the PROGRESA
program is found to account for 65 percent
(in November 1999) to 82 percent (in No-
vember 1998) of the increase in the enroll-
ment of boys in school. In other similar 
programs, such as the Food for Education
program in Bangladesh, the lower incidence
of child labor was found to account for 25
percent of the increase in the enrollment of
boys in school (Parker and Skoufias 2000).
These estimates suggest that a PROGRESA-
52 CHAPTER 6like program has the potential of combating
the problem of child labor.
Impact on Time Spent 
Doing School Homework
Whereas PROGRESA has a significant im-
pact on the number of children who enroll
in school, it thus far does not show a signif-
icant impact on the time children spend in
school or on the time they spend after
school on assigned homework. This sug-
gests that the impacts of PROGRESA are
primarily to increase the number of children
in school and to reduce the number of chil-
dren who are working, but not necessarily,
for instance, to reduce the hours worked of
children who attend school. A substantial
number of children continue to combine
both work and school under the program
(Parker and Skoufias 2000). In addition,
analysis of school-standardized tests did not
show any significant impact of PROGRESA
in improving student scores on achievement
tests (Behrman et al. 2000). Whereas addi-
tional years of data are needed to provide
more conclusive evidence, the possibility of
including bonuses or prizes to provide in-
centives for achieving high grades could be
explored.
Impact on School Attendance
A panel sample of data using children ages
6–16, some who benefit from PROGRESA
scholarships and some who do not, indi-
cates that for the school year of 1998/99, 
attendance rates in schools are higher in 
localities that are further removed from
major urban areas but the evaluation re-
search clearly shows that PROGRESA has a
more pronounced effect on school enroll-
ment rates than on attendance rates. Be-
cause enrollment does not guarantee atten-
dance, this question deserves fuller
investigation (Schultz 2000b).
Impact of Fertility
By design, the educational benefits of
PROGRESA are targeted to children be-
tween 8 and 17 years of age. For these ben-
efits to have a significant effect on the fer-
tility decisions of rural men and women it
is necessary for households to have confi-
dence that these benefits will be continued
for at least eight years into the future. As of
November 1999 there is no statistical evi-
dence that female PROGRESA beneficiar-
ies had higher fertility than poor females in
control localities.
Perceptions of Stakeholders
Regarding the Operation of the
Educational Component 
of the Program
Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative
data revealed that delays in the receipt of ed-
ucational grants were common in the early
stages of the program, in part because of the
cumbersome nature of the form design used
to register school attendance (Adato et al.
2000a). The collection, filling out, and re-
turning of forms involved substantial time
costs often incurred personally by school di-
rectors. The simplification of the forms ap-
pears to have reduced the time it takes to fill
them out and teachers and school directors
seem to be in agreement with the objectives
of the program and the conditioning of
transfers on attendance. Beneficiaries may
have experienced a lag in the receipt of ed-
ucational grants and indeed PROGRESA’s
own records reveal that significant delays
took place at the early stages of the pro-
gram, primarily owing to delays in the veri-
fication of school attendance.
Analysis of the beneficiary surveys sug-
gests that, on the supply side, the increased
demands generated by the program has at
least not led to a degeneration in the quality
of education services, suggesting that re-
sources have been increased. In many cases,
there seems to have been an improvement.
This view is also consistent with evidence
from the quantitative survey of directors,
with most schools reporting some improve-
ments in infrastructure and other resources,
albeit from a poor initial position. It is clear
from the qualitative interviews that the
process of acquiring extra resources is time
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school directors. But some teachers still com-
plain that they lack such basic resources as
televisions for telesecondary schools. It will
be interesting to compare this picture of the
supply side with other data sources. Although
most directors in the qualitative interviews
report improvements in education outcomes,
they attribute most of this to improved atten-
dance, student interest, and nutrition, rather
than improvements in the supply side.
Both the quantitative analysis of the
school directors’ survey and the qualitative
analysis of the focus group interviews sup-
port the general perception that PROGRESA
has led to improvements in the attitude of
beneficiary students and their families to-
ward education. The program is viewed as
allowing parents whose children were al-
ways motivated to acquire education, but
who faced severe economic hardship that
made it impossible to incur travel and other
educational expenses and who needed any
income that children could contribute, to
continue to send their children to school.
The fact that lack of resources (or poverty)
seems to be a major factor in explaining
nonattendance at school, especially for
older children, is consistent with the 
program design and initial estimates of pro-
gram impact (Schultz 2000a) since the 
education subsidy (or scholarship) seems to
have been effective in increasing demand.
Particularly from the focus-group analy-
sis, there is evidence that families place a
strong emphasis on school attendance and
homework and that, where possible, parents
attempt to adjust to these demands if chil-
dren attend school. This was seen to be an
acceptable tradeoff, with others in the family
willingly substituting for schoolgoing chil-
dren’s time, especially during the week. But
children, in general, appear to have to con-
tinue to contribute to household chores, es-
pecially at the weekend and during the peak
agricultural season. For some children, pos-
sibly those from the poorest families or those
who have long distances to travel to second-
ary school, the balancing of the demands of
school and work is very demanding.
But children’s lack of interest in school
is also an important factor in explaining
nonattendance at school, especially for
older children, although this appears to be at
least in part indirectly motivated by poverty
and the desire of older children to contribute
to the family, and the lure of migration
which is seen as “progress.” In the case of
older female children, concern for their
safety when they have to travel long dis-
tances is also an issue.
One of the common complaints in the
qualitative interviews with school directors
was that teachers were never consulted
about the objectives and design of the pro-
gram or informed how it would function. In
particular, many could not understand why
some “deserving” students were excluded,
why some who need it do not receive it, and
why they could not have had a role in the se-
lection of beneficiaries. Also, parents often
blame teachers for their children not being
included, for delays in transfers, or for their
child not receiving transfers because of 
poor attendance. Non-beneficiaries in some
communities are reluctant to contribute 
toward school resources, arguing that bene-
ficiary families should be relied upon 
more. They also argue that the demands on
them for school supplies should be less 
than for beneficiaries. Finally in some cases
the school directors point out that the in-
crease in demand has brought in some stu-
dents from remote areas who were given
poor quality education and thus require
more input from teachers.
In the qualitative interviews with teach-
ers we asked them for their overall view of
the program. Their answers suggested that,
on the whole, teachers saw the program as
being beneficial for the communities and
were in favor of greater participation. They
invariably agreed with the objectives of 
the program as well as the conditioning 
of transfers. Some even suggested attaching
extra conditions such as linking scholar-
54 CHAPTER 6ships to academic performance. Most were
in favor of money transfers, although con-
cern for how households spent their money
were behind some suggestions that food or
education coupons be introduced. The gen-
eral perception was that the supply side was
not sufficient to deal with the increase in de-
mand, although better attendance and atti-
tudes to schooling made teaching easier and
more rewarding. Also some schools that
would have shut down because of insuffi-
cient demand could now remain open.
While in some cases the promotoras were
viewed as an asset to the school, in others
there seemed to be some friction, possibly
because of her perceived “interference” in
educational matters.
The Impact of PROGRESA
on Health, Nutrition, 
and Health Care Use
The use of health care in rural Mexico is ex-
tremely low compared to other Latin Amer-
ican countries. On average, rural Mexicans
make less than one visit to a medical
provider per year. The non-poor make about
0.8 visits and the poor make about 0.65 vis-
its per year.
The nutrition of preschool children is of
considerable importance not only because of
concern over their immediate welfare, but
also because their nutrition in the formative
stage of life is widely perceived to have a
substantial and persistent impact on their
physical and mental development and on
their health status as adults. Stunting, defined
as having a z-score of height-for-age less than
–2, is a major form of protein–energy mal-
nutrition. Survey results for 1998 indicate
that 44 percent of 12- to 36-month-old chil-
dren in PROGRESA regions were stunted.
Methodologies
The effect of PROGRESA on health is eval-
uated at two levels: first, at the level of
health clinics based on the administrative
records of public clinics; second, at the 
individual level using data from the 
PROGRESA evaluation surveys. The analy-
sis of the impact of PROGRESA on health
care centers investigates whether the service
and incentive provided by the program led
to improved health care and maintenance by
exploring the impact on the use of facilities
in terms of number of visits, and on the pur-
pose of these visits, such as the monitoring
of the nutritional status of children and the
use of prenatal care.
The facility-level data were obtained
from surveys of 3,541 clinics operated by
Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social
(IMSS)–Solidaridad from January 1996 to
December 1998. This information, com-
piled from the records of PROGRESA, per-
tains to the number of beneficiary families
incorporated to the program every month in
each clinic. About two thirds of these clinics
are in PROGRESA areas, while the remain-
ing one third operates in control areas.
As is the case for the PROGRESA eval-
uation survey, the availability of repeated
observations at the same clinic over time,
before and after the start of the program,
permitted analysis of the changes over time
within treatment and control clinics.
The individual level data from the 
PROGRESA evaluation surveys included
information on the utilization of public clin-
ics, public hospitals, private providers, the
incidence and type of illness, children’s vis-
its to clinics for nutritional monitoring, and
whether children have received different
types of immunization. Analysis of blood
tests for anemia and other deficiencies did
not form part of this evaluation, although
the National Institute of Public Health in
Cuernavaca has carried out analysis in this
area. In the last two rounds of the survey,
adolescent and adult health status was
measured by collecting information for the
last four weeks on the days of difficulty
with daily activities due to illness, days in-
capacitated due to illness, days in bed due to
illness, and the number of kilometers they
were able to walk without getting tired.
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Improving livelihood security for the poor
depends on improving early childhood
health care. Frequency and duration of ill-
ness have profound effects on the develop-
ment and productivity of populations. The
analysis indicates that improved nutrition
and preventive care in PROGRESA areas
have made younger children more robust
against illness. Specifically, PROGRESA
children from birth to five years of age have
a 12 percent lower incidence of illness than
non-PROGRESA children do (Gertler
2000, 2004).
Impact on Adult Health
The analysis also finds that adult members in
beneficiary households are significantly
healthier (see Figure 6.3; Gertler 2000). On
average, PROGRESA beneficiaries have 19
percent fewer days of difficulty with daily
activities, 17 percent fewer days incapaci-
tated, 22 percent fewer days in bed, and are
able to walk about a 7 percent longer dis-
tance than non-beneficiaries. Prime age
PROGRESA adults (ages 18–50) had a sig-
nificant reduction in the number of days of
difficulty with daily activities due to illness
and a significant increase in the number of
kilometers able to walk without getting tired.
Specifically, PROGRESA beneficiaries have
19 percent fewer days of difficulty due to ill-
ness than non-PROGRESA individuals, and
are able to walk about 7.5 percent more
without getting tired. For those older than
50, PROGRESA beneficiaries have signifi-
cantly fewer days of difficulty with daily ac-
tivities, days incapacitated, and days in bed
due to illness than non-beneficiaries. As with
younger adults, they are able to walk more
kilometers without getting tired.
Impact on Utilization 
of Health Facilities
In January 1996, more than a year before
PROGRESA began, average visits to clinics
were identical in control and treatment lo-
calities. In 1998, the first full year in which
PROGRESA was operational in all treat-
ment localities, visit rates in PROGRESA
communities were shown to grow faster in
PROGRESA villages than in control areas
(see Figure 6.4; Gertler 2000). In addition,
there was a significant increase in nutrition
monitoring visits, immunization rates, 
and prenatal care. Regarding prenatal 
care, the evaluation analysis indicates that
PROGRESA increased the number of first
visits in the first trimester of pregnancy by
about 8 percent. This shift to early prenatal
care significantly reduced the number of first
visits in the second and third trimesters of
pregnancy. Thus as a result of PROGRESA,
pregnant women make their first visit to the
clinic much earlier than before, a positive
change in behavior that is documented to
have a significant improvement in the health
of babies and pregnant mothers.
The analysis of the individual-level data
on health care use by type of provider con-
firms that for 18- to 50-year-olds and for
those older than 50, there was no impact on
visits to private providers (Gertler 2000).
This suggests that the increase in the use of
public clinics was not from substitution out
of the private sector, but rather new partici-
pation for preventive purposes, from house-
holds previously not using public services.
Nutritional Supplements 
and Child Growth
The data suggest that PROGRESA has had
a significant impact on increasing child
growth and in reducing the probability of
child stunting for children in the critical age
range of 12–36 months (Behrman and Hod-
dinott 2000). These estimates imply an in-
crease of about a sixth (16 percent) in mean
growth per year, corresponding to about 1
cm for these children per year. The effects
may be somewhat larger for children from
poorer households and poorer communities
but who come from households with more
educated household heads. Overall, the ef-
fects suggest that PROGRESA had an im-
portant impact on growth for the children
who received treatment in the critical 12- to
36-month age range.
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Figure 6.3a Incidence of illness for newborns to two-year-olds
Figure 6.3b Incidence of illness for three- to five-year-olds
There is evidence that a significant frac-
tion of children in PROGRESA are not reg-
ularly receiving the supplements (Behrman
and Hoddinott 2000). Furthermore, in some
cases, supplements were not fully con-
sumed and in several households the sup-
plement was shared among other family
members, suggesting that its effects may
have been diluted. Increased and more ac-
curate distribution of the supplement may
increase the impact of PROGRESA on nu-
trition indicators, such as height.
The analysis of the data suggests that
PROGRESA may be having a fairly sub-
stantial effect on lifetime productivity and
potential earning of currently small children
in poor households. IFPRI estimates that the
impact from the nutrition supplements alone
could account for a 2.9 percent increase in
lifetime earnings (Behrman and Hoddinott58 CHAPTER 6
Figure 6.4 Daily visits to public clinics
2000). In addition, there are likely to be
other effects through increased cognitive
development, increased schooling, and low-
ered age of completing given levels of
schooling through starting when younger
and passing successfully grades at a higher
rate. Since the nutrition supplement (papilla)
constitutes only a small fraction of the pro-
gram costs given full compliance, the 
benefit–cost ratio of the nutrition supple-
ment is likely to be high.
Perceptions of Stakeholders
Regarding the Operation of the
Health and Nutritional Component
of the Program
Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative
data revealed that the administration of the
health and nutrition component of the pro-
gram has improved considerably (Adato 
et al. 2000a). In 1999, registration of bene-
ficiaries was reported to have reached 97
percent and health care professionals report
little problems with filling out forms. 
Appointment books have proven to be an 
effective mechanism for ensuring compli-
ance to scheduled visits despite the reported
lack of time, transportation, and aware-
ness of the benefits of preventive health
care. The health education seminars (pláti-
cas) were found to be widely available, ef-
fective, and very popular among beneficiar-
ies,  promotoras, and health professionals.
Problems reported with pláticas in some
cases were that male doctors giving talks to
women about family planning and the Pap
smear is culturally problematic, and that 
the participation of non-beneficiaries varies
widely.
Nutritional supplements for the mother
and child are very popular among benefici-
aries, yet some receive only a fraction of the
daily ration they are supposed to receive
from the program. Surveys reveal that fam-
ilies either run out of supplements; share the
supplements with other household mem-
bers; or the supplements are diluted, which
diminishes their effectiveness. It also ap-
pears that the supplements are being distrib-






standard of living measures are preferable to
income-based measures because estimates
of current consumption are likely to providea more reliable estimate of a household’s
permanent income than estimates of current
income that is subject to peaks and troughs.
Consumption measures what people actu-
ally consume and thus provides a better
measurement of a household’s standard of
living.
Measuring consumption is not straight-
forward. Households rarely know how
much they have spent over a given reference
period, and experiments in survey design in-
dicate that questions about broad categories
of expenditures tend to lead to underesti-
mates of consumption. Thus, the questions
the evaluation exercise posed to households
related to consumption were narrowed and
then the results were aggregated up.
In each of the evaluation surveys, house-
holds were asked a set of questions on ex-
penditures for food and non-food goods.
The “most knowledgeable individual” in the
household was asked, “In the last seven
days, how much did you spend on the fol-
lowing foods?” Thirty-six different foods
were queried.
Non-food expenditures are reported
based on weekly expenditures, monthly ex-
penditures, and expenditures made over the
previous six months. These were all con-
verted to monthly expenditures and then
converted into November 1997 prices for
comparable analysis.
The connection between PROGRESA’s
subsidy and both monetary and nonmone-
tary private transfers from individuals out-
side the household was investigated using
two methods of empirical analysis. Descrip-
tive statistics compared the frequency and
level of interhousehold transfers between
non-beneficiaries and beneficiary groups at
two points in time for which the data were
available. Other characteristics of the house-
holds that received and did not receive were
also compared. Second, selection into 
PROGRESA was analyzed econometrically
to determine whether the selection itself had
a significant impact on the incidence and 
levels of existing private transfers, such as re-
mittances from individuals working abroad.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the large
increase in cash that these communities re-
ceive as a result of having PROGRESA
beneficiaries is likely to have an effect on
local economies and the development of
new markets. Whereas this was not an as-
pect that was evaluated, it is an important
topic that deserves further examination in
future evaluations of PROGRESA and other
conditional cash transfer programs.
Impact on Household 
Consumption and Diet
Using data from the three surveys after the
start of PROGRESA, the average level of
consumption (including purchases and con-
sumption out of own production) increases
by approximately 14.53 percent. (Hoddinott
et al. 2000). The rest of the transfers were
likely used for savings or other purchases
such as durable goods.
In November 1998, median food expen-
ditures were only 2 percent higher. How-
ever, in November 1999 median food ex-
penditures were 10.6 percent higher in
PROGRESA households when compared
with comparable control households (Hod-
dinott et al. 2000).
Not only are PROGRESA households
increasing overall acquisition of food, they
are choosing to improve dietary quality over
caloric intake. The increase in household
consumption is driven largely by higher ex-
penditures on fruits, vegetables, meats, and
animal products. By November 1999, me-
dian caloric acquisition rose by 7.1 percent.
There is also clear evidence that dietary
quality has improved in PROGRESA
households (Hoddinott et al. 2000). The im-
pact is greatest on the acquisition of calories
from vegetable and animal products. These
quantitative findings from the seven-day re-
call surveys reinforce the views of benefici-
aries that access to PROGRESA has meant
that they “eat better.”
Participation in PROGRESA is found to
have a significant impact on the acquisition
of calories from fruits, vegetables, and ani-
mal products even after controlling for the
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monetary transfers (Hoddinott et al. 2000).
There is also some evidence that informa-
tion conveyed during the pláticas spills
over, and alters, in a positive fashion, the 
behavior of non-beneficiaries in treatment
localities.
A possible concern is that the provision
of the papilla may cause households to di-
vert expenditures on food to other items,
thus undermining efforts to increase caloric
availability in these households. If the
papilla is truly “crowding out” household
acquisition of calories, we would expect to
see lower measures of impact for benefici-
ary households, especially among those
with preschool children. Statistical analysis
of the caloric acquisition in households con-
taining at least one child below the age of
five revealed that such concerns are un-
founded (Hoddinott et al. 2000). The impact
of participation in PROGRESA on caloric
acquisition is, if anything, slightly higher
for these households.
Impact of PROGRESA 
on Women’s Status and
Household Relationships
Methodology
Measuring the impact of PROGRESA on
women’s status and household relationships
is challenging. In general, household sur-
veys are blunt instruments in this regard be-
cause gender-based decision making is
often understated; without adequate under-
standing of the sociocultural context, prob-
ing questions can easily be misinterpreted.
Thus, this section of the evaluation takes a
two-pronged approach using quantitative
and qualitative surveys to ascertain the posi-
tion of women within the household (Adato
et al. 2000b). The analysis seeks to ascertain
(1) whether PROGRESA has influenced
household relationships and the impact of
women’s status and (2) the extent to which
PROGRESA has influenced the attitudes to-
ward the education of girls and women.
Several rounds of qualitative surveys
conducted over a two-year period asked a
series of questions related to women’s status
and intrahousehold relationships. In addi-
tion, related questions were explored
through focus groups and interviews con-
ducted by IFPRI’s researchers. An addi-
tional qualitative research effort took place
in 1999 to further investigate questions
raised during the previous surveys. Focus
groups rather than semistructured interviews
were chosen in order to enrich responses.
Impact on Decision 
Making within Households
PROGRESA’s monetary transfers are a cru-
cial aspect of the program with respect to
bringing about changes in patterns of deci-
sion making within households. While re-
siding in a PROGRESA locality is shown to
not have an effect on patterns of decision
making,  being in PROGRESA decreases
the probability that the husband is the sole
decision maker in five out of the eight 
decision-making outcomes. In PROGRESA
families, over time husbands have shown
they are less likely to make decisions by
themselves, particularly as they affect the
children. The surveys also indicate that,
through time, the probability that women
solely decide on the use of their extra in-
come increases.
Impact on Men’s Attitudes 
toward Women
Research has shown that by giving money
to women, PROGRESA forces recognition
among men, and within the community as a
whole, of women’s importance and of the
government’s recognition of women’s level
of responsibility in caring for the family.
The survey shows that most men do not
have problems with their wives’ participa-
tion in PROGRESA. Men see the benefits
as good for the entire family, since salaries,
in general, are very low.
In focus group discussions, when asked,
respondents indicated that, with a few 
exceptions, men do not take women’s 
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said to work as hard and still give the same
amount of money as they did before the
family received PROGRESA.
Impact on Women’s Time
Statistical analysis of time use of women
shows that participation in the program
yielded some evidence that the time de-
mands on women associated with satisfying
program obligations are significant (Parker
and Skoufias 2000). Women in PROGRESA
are more likely to report spending time in
both taking household members to schools,
clinics, and so forth as well as having a
greater participation in community work
and  faenas. Overall, however, there is no
significant impact of PROGRESA on the
leisure time of both male and female adults.
This again provides reinforcing evidence
that adult beneficiaries do not use the bene-
fits to work less and increase their leisure, as
may be predicted by some economic mod-
els. These results would also seem to sup-
port the hypothesis that PROGRESA does
not create dependency on its benefits, in 
the sense that it does not appear to reduce
the work incentives of adults.
In general accordance with the results of
the quantitative analysis, focus group dis-
cussions revealed that women were evenly
divided as to whether PROGRESA was too
demanding on their time. Those who said it
was demanding referred to the time de-
mands of meetings. Women also discussed
how they and sometimes their husbands had
to do additional work that used to be done
by their children. However, they were quick
to point out that this was worthwhile in
order for their children to study.
Impact on Women’s Empowerment
and Bargaining Power
The vast majority of responses indicated
that women have benefited in ways that can
be seen as “empowerment”—defined as in-
creased self confidence, awareness, and
control over their movements and house-
hold resources. Women report that they
leave the house more often; have the oppor-
tunity to speak to each other about concerns,
problems, and solutions related to the
household; are more comfortable speaking
out in groups; are becoming more educated
through the health pláticas; and have more
control over household expenditures.
Impact on Attitudes toward 
Girls’ Education
PROGRESA’s educational incentives for
girls are based on the belief that the in-
creased education of girls is fundamental to
improving their living standards and social
participation. In an exploration of attitudes
toward girls’ education, the survey found
overwhelming support among women for
girls’education.
Yet when faced with the hypothetical
dilemma of sending a boy or a girl to school,
most respondents chose the boy. It is
thought that boys are favored because of
men’s responsibility as breadwinners and
heads of households and the fact that girls
get married. That said, the main reason to
encourage girls’enrollment in school was to
enable girls to get employment, or better
employment. In general, women in the pro-
gram do not understand the concept of
PROGRESA’s incentive to keep girls in
school. Most think that the benefit for girls
is higher than for boys because girls have
higher expenses.
Because responses about girls’ educa-
tion were far stronger than statements about
PROGRESA’s effect on women’s position
within the household, it is thought that
PROGRESA will have a far stronger sec-
ondary effect on household relationships
through the next generation than the pro-
gram is having on this one.
Cost Analysis of PROGRESA
Methodology
In conducting an economic analysis of
PROGRESA it is necessary to highlight two
of the complicating factors involved. First,
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etary valuations to the human-capital im-
pacts generated by the program, one is un-
able to aggregate across the range of
impacts in order to undertake unified
cost–benefit analysis of the program. Sec-
ond, on the cost side one faces the concep-
tually difficult problem of allocating joint
costs to the various program components.
For these reasons and in order to apply
cost–benefit (or cost effectiveness) analysis
to the evaluation of the program, IFPRI’s
evaluation can be characterized as making
two types of comparisons:
• Comparisons across different programs
• Comparisons across different policy
questions.
In making comparisons across different pro-
grams, one can think of a number of differ-
ent program designs. Each component of
PROGRESA (i.e., current poverty, educa-
tion, and health) may be considered as a
stand-alone program. Then one can deal
with each of the impacts separately and
identify the costs that would have to be in-
curred to generate these impacts in isola-
tion. For example, one can focus on the cost
of transferring income to households
through the program, or the cost of generat-
ing the observed human-capital impacts. All
of these hypothetical programs will incur
the joint costs but certain costs will be spe-
cific to individual components, for example,
the supply-side costs or the costs of moni-
toring attendance at schools and health cen-
ters. These can then be compared to the
costs that would have to be incurred to gen-
erate the same impacts using an alternative
instrument.
When comparing across different policy
questions one can distinguish between the
costs associated with implementing the pro-
gram from scratch (i.e., the actual program),
the costs associated with expanding the pro-
gram to incorporate more localities (i.e.,
program expansion), and the costs associ-
ated with continuing the existing program
unchanged (i.e., continuation of the pro-
gram). The relevant costs are generally
lower in moving from the actual program to
program expansion to program continua-
tion, reflecting the presence of sunk costs.
As explained in more detail in the report
of Coady (2000), the total costs of a pro-
gram of the nature of PROGRESA can be
categorized as program costs and  private
costs. Program costs capture all the costs
associated with the delivery of cash trans-
fers to households such as (1) targeting
costs associated with the targeting of trans-
fers to the most marginal localities as well
as only to the poorest households within
these localities; (2) conditioning costs asso-
ciated with ensuring that households meet
their responsibilities by ensuring atten-
dance of children at school and household
members at scheduled regular preventative
check-ups; and (3) operation costs associ-
ated with the actual operation of the 
program.  Private costs are the costs that
households incur in order to receive cash
transfers. For example, private costs include
the time and financial costs of traveling to
schools and health clinics (i.e., due to the
conditioning of the program) as well as to
collect the transfers from distribution
points.
Although information on total private
costs is in general a useful input into policy
analysis, for the purposes of evaluating
PROGRESA it is only the incremental costs
due to the introduction of the program that
are relevant. For example, in order to qual-
ify for the food transfer, household mem-
bers must make a series of visits to health
clinics for check-ups and health lectures.
One estimate of the private costs incurred
by households is that households incur travel
costs of 6.38 pesos per 100 pesos received
through the food transfer (Coady 2000).
Such an estimate, however, is substantially
higher than the incremental private costs 
incurred by the household as a result of
PROGRESA. The incremental private cost
incurred by the household is the cost of the
extra trips brought about by the program.
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brought about a 30–50 percent increase in
the number of trips. Using an estimate of a
40 percent increase, this implies that only
28.6 percent of total trips are additional. This
in turn implies that the incremental private
costs of receiving the food transfer are 1.82
pesos per 100 pesos received. Approxi-
mately the same cost ratio is estimated for
the incremental travel costs incurred by
households sending their older children to
secondary schools outside their locality (1.5
pesos per 100 pesos received) and the travel
costs incurred for collecting the bimonthly
PROGRESA cash transfer (1.2 pesos per
100 pesos received).
The Program Costs and the
Total Costs of PROGRESA
IFPRI’s analysis of PROGRESA’s program
costs consisted of calculating cost–benefit
ratios that summarize the program cost in-
curred in transferring monies to beneficiar-
ies. According to the program costs analysis,
for every 100 pesos allocated to the  pro-
gram, 8.2 pesos are administration or 
program costs. Given the complexity of the
program, this level of program costs appears
to be quite small. It is definitely relatively
low compared to the numbers given by
Grosh (1994) for the Leche Industrial
CONASUPO (LICONSA) and the Subsidio
a la Tortilla (TORTIBONO) programs, which
imply program costs of 40 pesos and 14 pesos
per 100 pesos transferred, respectively.
By comparing the cost–benefit ratios
across the different hypothetical programs
to that for the actual program, which is tar-
geted and provides cash transfers condition-
ally, one can also identify the relative im-
portance of the different activity costs (see
Table 13 in Coady 2000). For example, the
largest cost component is that associated
with targeting at the household level. This
activity accounts for nearly 30 percent of
the program cost. This is followed by the
costs associated with conditioning the pro-
gram, which account for 26 percent of the
program cost. Thus the costs associated
with both the targeting and the conditioning
of the program make up 56 percent of the
program’s costs. This also implies that it is
important to ensure that there is a return to
these activities.
When the incremental private costs dis-
cussed above are added to the program costs
it is found that the total cost–benefit ratio in-
creases by about 27 percent (from 0.089 to
0.113). So, for every 100 pesos transferred
to households, 11.3 pesos are incurred in
administrative and private costs. The cost
analysis also reveals that private costs asso-
ciated with participating in the program are
as important as household targeting and
conditioning costs.
Overall, the administrative costs em-
ployed in getting transfers to poor house-
holds appear to be small relative to the costs
incurred in previous programs and for tar-
geted programs in other countries. This is in
spite of the program being quite complex,
involving both the targeting and condition-
ing of transfers and all the costs that such
activities entail. Although this partly reflects
operational efficiency, it is important to
keep in mind that the size of the program
also plays an important role in keeping
these numbers low. In combination, the
large number of households covered by the
program and the size of the transfers tend to
reduce the unit fixed costs of the program.
The Financing of PROGRESA
and Its Impact on Welfare
The preceding cost analysis and the evalua-
tion of the impact of the program on poverty
focus exclusively either on the costs of op-
erating the program or on the direct effects
of the program on beneficiaries. Such par-
tial equilibrium analyses may provide only
a limited view of the potential costs or ef-
fects of the program since they ignore the
indirect effects arising from the need to fi-
nance the program domestically. As a mat-
ter of principle, in evaluating a program of
the size and nature of PROGRESA it is also
necessary to adopt a broader perspective.
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ered as being financed by the elimination of
subsidies and various reforms in the struc-
ture of value-added taxes. The removal of
food subsidies is likely to have a negative
impact on the welfare of poor households in
urban areas where PROGRESA is not yet in
operation; yet, their removal will also have
efficiency gains.
These potential indirect effects of the
PROGRESA program are examined using a
computable general equilibrium model of
the Mexican economy (Coady and Harris
2000). Their results show that financing the
program through the elimination of distor-
tionary food subsidies is associated with a
substantial welfare gain. The simulation re-
sults suggest that there are clear welfare
gains from introducing a new efficiently tar-
geted program such as PROGRESA; the
benefits from more efficient targeting of
households is substantial and they are rein-
forced by the welfare gains from being able
to reform the existing system of subsidies
and taxes. The results also clearly indicate
substantial welfare gains from the expan-
sion of the PROGRESA program to include
the urban poor.
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Conclusions and Future 
Policy Considerations
P
overty alleviation programs such as PROGRESA are an important component of the
set of instruments that governments have at their disposal for redistributing income and
assets among households. The availability of a variety of programs and instruments
that can be used gives rise to the need for an evaluation of the impacts of these programs in
relation to their stated objectives.
Program evaluation can improve the design and implementation of programs so that they
can have a larger effect on household welfare. In addition, program evaluation, when applied
consistently across a wide spectrum of programs, allows governments to have a greater effect
on social welfare with the same budget by reallocating resources from less effective to more
effective programs. In addition to these economic considerations, there are also social and po-
litical reasons for justifying program evaluations. Primary among these is that program evalu-
ation can serve as a means of increasing the accountability of governments toward their citi-
zens by providing a template for comparing sensibly whether public funds are used effectively
toward poverty alleviation.
In the case of PROGRESA the national elections that were forthcoming in the year 2000
and the increasing public support in favor of the opposition parties contributed to an unprece-
dented willingness by the Zedillo administration to support a rigorous and politically neutral
evaluation of the program. Undoubtedly, the decision to evaluate PROGRESA was meant to
serve a political purpose by signaling a break from the wasteful practices of the past and thus
indirectly increasing the administration’s chances of reelection. However, at the same time the
decision to evaluate the program established a precedent that any future administration could
hardly afford not to imitate.
With these considerations in mind, the majority of the evaluation findings suggest that
PROGRESA’s combination of education, health, and nutrition interventions into one inte-
grated package has a significant impact on the welfare and human capital of poor rural fami-
lies in Mexico. The initial analysis of PROGRESA’s impact on education shows that the pro-
gram has significantly increased the enrollment of boys and girls, particularly of girls, and
above all at the secondary school level (Schultz 2000a). In addition, most of the increase in
school attendance is attributable to children, especially boys, working less. The results imply
that children will have, on average, about 0.7 years of extra schooling because of PROGRESA,
although this effect may increase if children are more likely to go on to senior high school as
a result of PROGRESA. Taking into account that higher schooling is associated with higher
levels of income, the estimations imply that children have lifetime earnings that are 8 percent
higher due to the education benefits they have received through PROGRESA. As a result of
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are also experiencing improvements in
health. Specifically, children receiving
PROGRESA’s benefits have a 12 percent
lower incidence of illness as a result of the
program’s benefits and adults report a de-
crease in 19 percent of sick or disability
days (Gertler 2000). In the area of nutrition,
PROGRESA has had a significant effect on
reducing the probability of stunting for chil-
dren 12–36 months of age (Behrman and
Hoddinott 2000). PROGRESA has also 
had important impacts on food consump-
tion. Program beneficiaries report higher
calorie consumption and are eating a more
diverse diet, including more fruits, vegeta-
bles, and meat. The program is also found to
have no apparent effects on the work incen-
tives of adults, while the award of the cash
benefits to mothers in beneficiary house-
holds appears to have led to the empower-
ment of women.
A detailed cost analysis of the program
also provides strong evidence that the pro-
gram is generally administered in a cost-
effective manner. For example, for every
100 pesos allocated to the program, 9 pesos
are “absorbed” by administration costs
(Coady 2000). Given the complexity of the
program, this level of program costs appears
to be quite small and definitely relatively
low compared to the numbers for roughly
comparable programs.
One of the most important contributions
of IFPRI’s evaluation of PROGRESA was
that the program was continued in spite of
the historic change in the government of
Mexico after the 2000 election. The over-
whelming (and unprecedented) evidence
that a poverty alleviation program shows
signs of having a significant impact on the
welfare and human capital investment of
poor rural families in Mexico has con-
tributed to the decision of the Fox adminis-
tration to continue with the program and to
expand its coverage in the poor urban areas
of the country after some improvements in
the design of the program.
The majority of the improvements in the
design of PROGRESA (renamed Oportu-
nidades by the Fox administration) were
based on findings of the evaluation of 
PROGRESA that revealed areas of needed
improvements in some of the structural
components and the operation of the pro-
gram. For example, the evaluation revealed
a larger program impact only on the school-
ing attendance of children of secondary
school age. This suggests that it would be
preferable to reorient the funds from pri-
mary school to families with children of
secondary school age. Oportunidades did
exactly that by extending the benefits of 
the program to children attending high
school (preparatoria) rather than just junior
high school, as it was in the earlier 
PROGRESA. Also, initially the award of
PROGRESA’s educational benefits was
conditional on regular school attendance but
not performance. Oportunidades improved
on this design feature by linking benefits to
performance, such as granting bonuses to
encourage successful completion of a grade,
or linking benefits with participation in
other programs. For example, the creation
of a related program, Jovenes con Oportu-
nidades, aims to create income-generating
opportunities for poor households through
preferential access to microcredit, housing
improvements, adult education, and social
insurance.
Yet in spite of these improvements in the
program, the evaluation findings suggest
that some issues remain to be resolved. For
example, the qualitative analysis revealed
that although the program strengthened 
social relationships between beneficiary
women, the targeting of the program within
these communities has introduced some 
social divisions between beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries. The quantitative evalua-
tion of PROGRESA’s targeting method sug-
gests that in poor rural communities it may
be preferable to include all residents into the
program instead of discriminating among
households. Also, the program was found to
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ment test scores of children in beneficiary
localities or on their regular school atten-
dance. This implies that if the program is 
to have a significant effect on the human
capital of children more attention needs to
be directed to the quality of education pro-
vided in schools. Enrolling in and attending
school regularly are only necessary condi-
tions for the improvement of children’s
human capital. Last, it is also important 
to find ways to maintain and improve 
the quality of the information provided in
the pláticas.
The opportunity to conduct a rigorous
evaluation of the PROGRESA program has
set a higher set of standards for the design
and conduct of social policy in Mexico and
in Latin America in general. As policy-
makers now have a better sense of the basic
elements of a program that can be effective
toward alleviating poverty in the short run
and, perhaps, in the long run, the list of
questions and concerns about program
choices and design cannot help but grow
longer. For example, is it possible for uncon-
ditional cash transfers without any “strings”
attached to have similar or higher impact on
human capital investments of poor rural
families? Is the amount of the cash transfer
given to families too high? Perhaps a lower
cash transfer could achieve the same im-
pact. Is the simultaneous intervention in the
areas of education, health, and nutrition
areas preferable to intervening in each of
these sectors separately? PROGRESA has
been accompanied by complimentary ef-
forts and resources directed at strengthening
the supply and quality of educational and
health capacity constraints that might arise
as a result of the more intensive use of ex-
isting facilities and resources. Perhaps this
feature of the program plays a critical role,
as PROGRESA and programs that do not
pay sufficient attention to the capacity con-
straints that might arise as a result of the
conditionality of cash transfers may be less
effective. Is it not possible that similar or
even higher effects on school attendance
can be achieved through alternative pro-
grams, such as building new schools or im-
proving the quality of educational services?
What if the benefits were given to fathers
rather than the mothers in the household?
Are programs aimed toward younger chil-
dren to be preferred over programs aimed
toward older children?
The nature of the program and the scope
of the program’s impact evaluation can pro-
vide only a tentative answer to some of
these questions. More definite answers can
be obtained through the analysis and evalu-
ation of programs that incorporate all or
some of these features as part of their struc-
ture. It is hoped that early involvement of 
researchers in the design and evaluation 
of programs implemented in other Latin
American countries, such as Brazil, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Jamaica, and
Argentina, can shed some light on these
critical questions for policy.
Finally, the critical question of whether
the vicious cycle of poverty and its inter-
generational transmission are indeed broken
can be determined only by following the co-
horts of children currently in the program.
At least in Mexico, the evaluation of 
PROGRESA’s impact in the short term has
provided a solid foundation for determining
whether the program was able to have a sig-
nificant difference in the welfare and earn-
ings of these children as adults.
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Summary of Mexican Anti-Poverty Programs
I
t is important to note that the Mexican government distinguishes between three types of
anti-poverty programs.53 These include programs aimed at (1) human capital development,
(2) income earning opportunities, and (3) infrastructure development. The first two types
of programs are benefits provided at the individual or household level whereas the third group
is aimed at the community or regional level. This document covers principally programs in the
first two groups. It is important to note that neither Programa de Becas de Capacitacion para
Desempleados (PROBECAT) nor Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo (PROCAMPO) is
classified as an anti-poverty program by the Mexican government although we describe these
programs in the following paragraphs.
During the past few years, anti-poverty programs have undergone several important tran-
sitions. First, overall spending has increased in real terms by about 20 percent over the past
five years (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2000). Second, there has been an increasing tendency to-
ward giving states and municipalities greater control over resources and some consequent de-
centralization of programs. Third, there has been a gradual transition toward a relatively
greater participation of rural areas in terms of spending. For instance, in food and nutrition
subsidies, whereas in 1994 rural areas received only 31.4 percent of spending, by the year
2000 rural areas were receiving 76.4 percent of all spending on these programs. Overall spend-
ing on anti-poverty programs shows similar trends. By the year 2000, 76 percent of all anti-
poverty spending was dedicated to rural areas whereas in 1994 only 48 percent of all anti-poverty
spending was spent in rural areas (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2000). Finally, there has also been
a gradual transition away from general subsidies and toward targeted programs. Again, refer-
ring to spending on food and nutrition subsidies, in 1994 targeted programs received only 39
percent of overall spending, whereas by the year 2000 95.5 percent of all spending was on tar-
geted programs (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2000; Subsecretaría de Egresos 2000a).
Human Capital Development
DICONSA
An important social supply program, DICONSA provides basic consumer goods, including
milk, tortillas, and other food items, at low prices in 23,200 stores in rural areas, benefiting
29.2 million individuals in 2000. DICONSA helps to guarantee that basic products are avail-
able in isolated areas at an affordable price. Its objective communities are those with high and
very high margination with community size between 500 and 4,000 inhabitants.
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53This appendix was prepared with the help of Susan W. Parker.TORTIBONO and LICONSA
Two other important food subsidy programs
include TORTIBONO, which currently pro-
vides approximately 1.7 million poor fami-
lies with one free kilogram of tortillas daily
through producers affiliated with the pro-
gram, and LICONSA, which operates a
milk subsidy program, supplying milk at a
reduced price to, in 2000, 2.4 million poor
households with children younger than 12
years of age, corresponding to 4.2 million
children. The average subsidy of LICONSA
results in a savings of approximately 52 per-
cent per liter of milk with respect to equiv-
alent brands of milk. It is important to 
note that both TORTIBONO and LICONSA
cannot operate in the communities where
PROGRESA benefits are received. Never-
theless, both TORTIBONO and LICONSA
are in the process of transition toward using
the same selection mechanism as that of
PROGRESA in terms of choosing house-
holds in eligible communities.
DIF
The DIF (National System for Integral 
Family Development) operates three differ-
ent nutritional programs. The largest is its
school breakfast program which during the
year 2000 gave a total of 3 million free
breakfasts daily to children in preschools
and primaries. DIF has two other sub-pro-
grams that include Programa de Asistencia
Social Alimetaria a Familias (PASAF) and
Program de Cocinas Polulares y Unidades
de Servicios Integrales (COPUSI). PASAF
provides a monthly despensa (package of
basic food products) to families in mar-
ginated urban and rural areas, benefiting in
the year 2000 1.7 million families. COPUSI
also provides hot breakfasts, and assisted
571,000 individuals in 2000 (Poder Ejecu-
tivo Nacional 2000).
CONAFE (National Council 
to Promote Education)
CONAFE is part of the Secretary of Public
Education (SEP) and distributes school sup-
plies to children in isolated and marginated
areas as well as didactic materials, school
equipment, and resources to support parent–
teacher associations. It is important to note
that the benefits of CONAFE have been
largely concentrated in the same communi-
ties that are served by PROGRESA. The
overall budget of CONAFE in the year 2000
was about 400 million dollars, benefiting
about 4.5 million children (Subsecretaría de
Egresos 2000b).
INI
The general objective of Instituto Nacional
Indigenista (INI, National Indigenous Insti-
tute) is to design and implement public poli-
cies oriented toward indigenous communi-
ties. In practice, INI has a wide range of
objectives ranging from cultural research,
social and economic development, and
human rights. As part of its actions in pro-
moting investment in human capital, INI
provides albergues escolares, which are res-
idences that provide lodging and food to in-
digenous students from communities where
education services are not available or in-
sufficient. They also provide education
grants to promote students at the junior high
and high school levels. Its operation is 
supported by community committees that
supervise and participate in resource alloca-
tion. In 1999, the coverage of INI included
1,082 albergues with a total of 59,823 stu-
dents. It also provided 12,000 education
grants to students at junior and senior high
school.
Niños de Solidaridad
Other grants received by children in isolated
and highly marginalized regions derive
from Programa Estímulos a la Educación
Básica (Program Incentives to Basic Educa-
tion), financed by Fondo para la Infraestruc-
tura Social Municipal (FISM) (Fund for
Municipal Social Infrastructure), which
consists of funds decentralized to munici-
palities under the spending areas of Ramo
33. Note that this program was formally
called Niños de Solidaridad. These grants
are given to children who are not receiving
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mitted that communities and even house-
holds with PROGRESA benefits have chil-
dren receiving these grants. The only
restriction is that the same child is not 
receiving an education grant from both
PROGRESA and from Programa Estímulos
at the same time (PROGRESA 2000). About
560,000 children received these grants in the




Fondo Nacional de Apoyo a Empresas 
Sociales (FONAES) (National Social Enter-
prise Fund) contributes to generating em-
ployment and income opportunities through
the financing of productive projects with
risk capital and other forms of credit (5,000
projects last year with a budget of about 80
million dollars). The most common activi-
ties that have been financed include com-
merce and fishing projects.
PET 
The Temporary Employment Program
(PET), begun in 1995, is another important
source of income for families that focuses
resources in rural areas in Mexico. During
2000, through the Secretariat of Social De-
velopment, 518,996 temporary jobs were
created in Mexico, with work involving im-
provements in basic infrastructure, roads
and highways, irrigation, and reforesting
projects. Through the Secretariat of Com-
munications and Transportation, another
278,000 temporary jobs were created. Fi-
nally, the Secretariat of Agriculture and
Rural Development began operating within
the Temporary Employment Program sup-
porting 228,000 producers. In all, more 
than one million temporary jobs were cre-
ated with PET in the year 2000. The objec-
tive of the program is to respond to possible
lack of work in rural areas due to different
farming seasons and differences in produc-
tive activity. About 90 percent of all jobs





One of the most important training pro-
grams in Mexico is the Program of Training
Scholarships for Unemployed Workers
(PROBECAT). Here, unemployed individu-
als receive short training courses (generally
lasting less than 3 months), in accordance
with the economic activities common to
their region and requirements of firms with
vacancies in the area. During the period in
which they receive the training, they are
given a grant equivalent to one minimum
salary. Coverage in this program grew sig-
nificantly between 1995 and 1997, from
412,318 recipients in 1995 to 552,186 re-
cipients in 1999, corresponding to about
25,000 training courses. It is important to
emphasize that almost half of the courses
and grants given correspond to the Project
of Local Initiatives on Temporary Employ-
ment, a program that tries to incorporate
productive projects to the population living
in marginalized areas.
CIMO
The Modernization and Integral Quality
Program (Programa Calidad Integral y
Modernizacion [CIMO]) gives training
courses on systems to improve productivity,
mainly in very small firms. During the year
1999, it benefited 760,000 workers in about
418,000 firms.
PROCAMPO (Programa de 
Apoyos Directos al Campo)
This cash transfer program is provided by
the secretary of agriculture to producer/
farmers who produce any of the following
70 APPENDIX Acrops: corn, beans, wheat, rice, soy, cotton.
The farming area (number of hectares) de-
termines the amount of the cash transfer,
which currently ranges from 700 to 800
pesos per hectare depending on the season.
In the year 2000, approximately 2.9 million
producers benefited, covering a square area
of approximately 14 million hectares.
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Characteristics of the Localities 
in the Evaluation Sample
All Control Treatment
Committees present in the locality
Municipal president 0.04 0.02 0.05
Municipal agent 0.40 0.42 0.38
Municipal sub-delegado 0.35 0.37 0.34
Ejidal marshal 0.37 0.47 0.32
Communal property marshal 0.08 0.11 0.07
Committee of municipal development 0.14 0.14 0.14
Health committee 0.63 0.61 0.64
Education committee 0.75 0.73 0.76
Agriculture committee 0.14 0.12 0.15
Cattle ranching committee 0.07 0.07 0.07
DICONSA clerk 0.20 0.20 0.21
Indigenous language–speaking inhabitants 0.42 0.32 0.48
Locality infrastructure
Water from community well 1.00 1.00 0.99
Flowing water 0.98 0.96 0.99
Stagnant water 0.98 0.95 0.99
Water truck 0.98 0.95 0.99
Potable water 0.98 0.95 0.99
Garbage is burned 0.99 0.99 0.99
Garbage is buried 0.98 0.95 0.99
Garbage is put in open fields 0.97 0.94 0.99
Garbage is put in public facility 0.97 0.94 0.99
Garbage is left for a truck to collect it 0.97 0.94 0.99
Electricity 0.76 0.97 0.64
Drainage system 0.16 0.23 0.12
Public phone 0.25 0.33 0.21
Private phone 0.02 0.02 0.02
Movie theater 0.00 0.00 0.00
Post office 0.03 0.05 0.02
Telegraph office 0.01 0.02 0.01
Educational facilities in the locality
Preschool 0.82 0.83 0.82
Primary school 0.97 0.95 0.98
Telesecondary 0.17 0.25 0.13
Secondary school 0.01 0.01 0.01
High school 0.01 0.02 0.00
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Higher education (CONALEP) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Higher education (CETA) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Higher education (CETIS) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Higher education (CEBTA) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Higher education (CEBTIS) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Higher education (other) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health facilities in the locality
Health ministry clinic 0.10 0.13 0.08
IMSS-SOLIDARIDAD clinic 0.04 0.05 0.03
IMMS clinic 0.00 0.00 0.00
ISSSTE clinic 0.00 0.00 0.00
Private doctors 0.00 0.00 0.00
Medical aids 0.60 0.62 0.58
Dispensary 0.07 0.09 0.06
Midwives 0.32 0.25 0.36
Witch doctors 0.12 0.12 0.13
Other health care workers 0.03 0.01 0.05
Mobile health centers 0.75 0.76 0.74
Visits of private doctor to locality 0.06 0.03 0.07
Pregnancy supervision 0.28 0.26 0.29
Delivery supervision available 0.25 0.24 0.25
Baby checkups available 0.32 0.26 0.35
Immunizations available 0.79 0.77 0.81
Diarrhea supervision 0.50 0.42 0.55
Family planning 0.44 0.39 0.47
Hospitalization 0.05 0.03 0.06
Salaries
Daily official minimum salary of agricultural 
workers in locality 25.21 24.79 28.17
Actual daily salary 25.34 24.69 29.81
Economic activities
Main first activity is agriculture. 0.97 0.99 0.97
Main first activity is commerce. 0.01 0.01 0.01
Main first activity is cattle ranching. 0.01 0.00 0.01
Main first activity is art and crafts production. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Main first activity is construction. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Main first activity is industrial production. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Main first activity is services. 0.00 0.01 0.00
Main first activity is mining. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Main second activity is agriculture. 0.02 0.01 0.03
Main second activity is commerce. 0.12 0.15 0.10
Main second activity is cattle ranching. 0.22 0.15 0.26
Main second activity is art and crafts production. 0.02 0.01 0.03
Main second activity is construction. 0.03 0.02 0.03
Main second activity is industrial production. 0.00 0.01 0.00
Main second activity is services. 0.01 0.01 0.00
Main second activity is mining. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Main third activity is agriculture. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Main third activity is commerce. 0.03 0.03 0.03
Main third activity is cattle ranching. 0.02 0.00 0.03
Main third activity is art and crafts production. 0.01 0.00 0.02
Main third activity is construction. 0.02 0.01 0.03
Main third activity is industrial production. 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Main third activity is services. 0.01 0.00 0.01
Main third activity is mining. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Markets and product supplies
Public market 0.00 0.00 0.00
DICONSA shop 0.19 0.19 0.19
Supply warehouse 0.00 0.00 0.00
Grocery shop 0.36 0.43 0.32
Weekly market 0.01 0.01 0.02
Regional market 0.00 0.00 0.01
Traveling market (1) 0.01 0.01 0.01
Traveling market (2) 0.03 0.03 0.02
Household commerce 0.39 0.40 0.38
Traveling vendor 0.18 0.24 0.14
Pharmacy 0.00 0.00 0.01
DICONSA (filter) 0.19 0.19 0.19
Can buy maize in locality? 0.39 0.40 0.38
Can buy maize flour in locality? 0.47 0.46 0.47
Can buy beans in locality? 0.56 0.57 0.55
Can buy rice in locality? 0.64 0.68 0.62
Can buy sugar in locality? 0.70 0.74 0.68
Can buy milk in locality? 0.47 0.52 0.43
Can buy eggs in locality? 0.62 0.68 0.58
Can buy oil or lard in locality? 0.71 0.74 0.68
Can buy meat in locality? 0.06 0.09 0.04
Can buy chicken in locality? 0.12 0.13 0.11
Can buy soap, toothpaste, etc. in locality? 0.67 0.73 0.64
Can buy medicines in locality? 0.09 0.10 0.09
Can buy school supplies in locality? 0.34 0.38 0.32
Government programs in locality
Community kitchens program 0.04 0.04 0.04
Distribution of DICONSA milk 0.08 0.06 0.10
Provisions? 0.45 0.48 0.43
Tortilla de Solidaridad Program 0.00 0.00 0.01
Scholarships from Solidaridad 0.66 0.67 0.66
Scholarships from PROBECAT 0.02 0.01 0.02
Temporary employment program (PET) 0.12 0.12 0.12
Source: Locality Socio-Economic Characteristics Survey (ENCASEL Nov-97).
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On the Impact of PROGRESA on Poverty
T
his appendix discusses in more detail the estimated impact of PROGRESA on poverty
and provides some background discussion for the income per capita measure used 
as an indicator of poverty.54 The November 1997 ENCASEH survey as well as the 
November 1998, June 1999, and November 1999 ENCEL surveys collected detailed informa-
tion on income earned or received from a variety of sources for each individual in the house-
hold. The survey instrument used to collect individual and household income for these various
sources changed significantly beginning with the November 1998 survey. With this caveat 
in mind, it should be noted that a serious effort was made to maintain comparability of in-
come by source across the survey rounds. The various sources of income (excluding the 
PROGRESA cash transfers) were transformed into monthly income and then aggregated into
four main sources of income:
1. Labor income
2. Income from self-employment (such as income from sewing, food preparation, construc-
tion or carpentry, commerce, produce transportation, repairs, and laundry or cooking)
3. Other income (such as pensions, interest income, rents, and community profits)
4. Government transfers (such as educational scholarships from Niños de Solidaridad, 
benefits from Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI), PROBECAT, Empleo Temporal, and
Procampo)
For households in treatment villages receiving PROGRESA cash transfers, total income per
month was adjusted upwards by the cash transfer per month received by the household. The
actual amount of cash transfers received per month was obtained from the records of payments
sent out each month since May 1998 by the PROGRESA administration headquarters in Mex-
ico City. The monthly income measure calculated for each round of the survey was then ex-
pressed into November 1998 pesos by dividing by the corresponding adjustment ratio of the
national consumer price index.
The first item examined concerned the incidence of receipt of benefits from other govern-
ment programs. Households receiving PROGRESA benefits should not, in principle, be re-
ceiving other similar benefits from programs such as Abasto Social de Leche, de Tortilla, and
the National Institute of Indigenous People (INI). Figure 4.1 suggests that among beneficiary
households (i.e., those that received any PROGRESA benefits between May 1998 and No-
vember 1999) the incidence of benefits received from DIF, Ninos de Solidaridad, and Abasto
54This appendix was prepared with the help of Claudia Aburto-Szekely.
75Social de Leche decreased dramatically. As
discussed in the first part of Chapter 5, the
set of beneficiary households is not identical
to the set of eligible households. Benefi-
ciary households are defined to be the (eli-
gible) households that actually received
PROGRESA benefits. These households
were identified based on the payment record
data. Specifically, for households in treat-
ment localities, a household is classified 
as a beneficiary (BEN = 1) as long as the
household received a positive amount of
cash benefits since the start of PROGRESA
in March 1998 and the November 1999
round of the evaluation survey (BEN = 0
otherwise).
Second, we examined how the income
contributed to beneficiary families by chil-
dren between ages 8 and 17 evolved across
different survey rounds. Children can con-
tribute income to families by working for
wages or by being recipients of cash trans-
fers from other government transfer pro-
grams excluding PROGRESA. Figure C.1a
reveals that the total (labor + other) income
(excluding PROGRESA cash transfers)
beneficiary families received from children
declined in both treatment and control lo-
calities since the initiation of PROGRESA
in November 1998. Note that for compari-
son purposes we use the set of all eligible
households in control localities (E2 = 1).
The mean total income reported in Novem-
ber 1998 is slightly lower among treatment
households compared to control house-
holds and the gap gets even bigger by the
June 1999 round. By November 1999 this
gap is completely eliminated as control
households are already incorporated into
PROGRESA.55
Figures C.1b and C.1c break down total
income into its two components, that is, in-
come from labor and other income that con-
sists mainly of government transfers. These
graphs reveal that the differences in mean
total income from children in beneficiary
households and eligible households in con-
trol localities are primarily due to drops in
the child-related income beneficiary fami-
lies received from other government pro-
grams. It also appears that there are no sig-
nificant differences in the labor income of
children from beneficiary households in
treatment localities and the labor income
contribution of children in eligible house-
holds in control villages.
Next the impact of the PROGRESA cash
transfers on poverty was estimated using the
income per capita as reported in (and con-
structed from) the various household sur-
veys. For this purpose we used two different
poverty lines. The first one is the value of the
standard food basket (canasta basica) in No-
vember 1997 pesos. The second poverty line
used is the median or 50th percentile of the
value of consumption in November 1998
(expressed in November 1997 pesos).
The availability of poverty estimates in
treatment and control localities before and
after the start of the PROGRESA program
provides the opportunity to calculate a dif-
ference-in-differences (2DIF) estimate of
the impact of PROGRESA’s cash transfers
on the poverty rate in the sample. Such 
estimates allow for the possibility of pre-
existing differences in poverty between
treatment and control localities as well as
for the role of aggregate or macroeconomic
shocks that affected all localities during the
time period between the first survey round
in November 1997 and subsequent survey
rounds.
Tables C.1 and C.2 present the estimated
poverty rates in treatment and control local-
ities in each survey round as well as a 2DIF
estimate of the impact of PROGRESA’s
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55Note that control households started receiving cash benefits in December 1999. Households are first incorpo-
rated into PROGRESA, meaning that they are given all the necessary forms and informed of all the program re-
quirements. A few months later, the cash benefits are sent out by the PROGRESA administration headquarters.IMPACT OF PROGRESA ON POVERTY 77
Figure C.1a Mean household total income from childhood (excluding PROGRESA cash
transfers) among beneficiary households with children 8–17 years of age
Figure C.1b Mean household labor income from children among beneficiary households
with children 8–17 years of age
Figure C.1c Mean household other income from children among beneficiary households
with children 8–17 years of age78 APPENDIX C
Table C.1 Poverty measures and difference-in-difference tests for total income 
per capita using canasta basica as poverty line
Standard Standard
Measure Mean error t 2DIF error t
Head count ratio
Oct-97 Control 0.927 0.003 302.889
Oct-97 Treatment 0.926 0.002 383.197
Oct-98 Control 0.935 0.003 325.836
Oct-98 Treatment 0.932 0.002 406.049 –0.002 0.005 –0.418
Jun-99 Control 0.946 0.003 356.493
Jun-99 Treatment 0.937 0.002 416.080 –0.008 0.005 –1.602
Nov-99 Control 0.940 0.003 347.807
Nov-99 Treatment 0.925 0.002 378.144 –0.014 0.005 –2.594
Poverty gap
Oct-97 Control 0.575 0.003 174.386
Oct-97 Treatment 0.598 0.003 223.418
Oct-98 Control 0.610 0.003 186.859
Oct-98 Treatment 0.594 0.003 233.816 –0.038 0.006 –6.496
Jun-99 Control 0.658 0.003 191.019
Jun-99 Treatment 0.624 0.003 232.768 –0.057 0.006 –9.280
Nov-99 Control 0.593 0.003 189.077
Nov-99 Treatment 0.527 0.003 209.916 –0.089 0.006 –15.273
Squared poverty gap
Oct-97 Control 0.409 0.003 118.037
Oct-97 Treatment 0.441 0.003 153.006
Oct-98 Control 0.450 0.004 125.878
Oct-98 Treatment 0.430 0.003 158.585 –0.052 0.006 –8.129
Jun-99 Control 0.518 0.004 130.365
Jun-99 Treatment 0.473 0.003 158.554 –0.077 0.007 –11.486
Nov-99 Control 0.428 0.003 126.858
Nov-99 Treatment 0.350 0.003 138.566 –0.110 0.006 –17.789
cash transfers. The standard errors reported
for the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT)
poverty indices are calculated using the
method proposed by Kakwani (1993).
Specifically, the 2DIF estimate of the
impact of PROGRESA on the poverty rate
demoted by P between round R, where 
R = 2, 3, 4, and the first round of the survey
(R = 1) is calculated as
2DIF = (PTREAT(R) – PTREAT (1)) 
– (PCONTROL(R) – PCONTROL(1)).
Inspection of Tables C.1 and C.2 reveals
that irrespective of the poverty line used
(i.e., the value of basic food basket or the
median value of household consumption)
the 2DIF estimates imply that PROGRESA
had a significant impact in reducing poverty
between November 1997 and November
1999. For example, using the 50th per-
centile of the value of consumption per
capita as a poverty line suggests that the
headcount poverty rate declined by 17 per-
cent in treatment areas between November
1997 and November 1999 (using as base the
67.4 percent poverty rate in treatment local-
ities in November 1997). Over the same pe-
riod, and using as base the corresponding
value of the poverty gap and squared
poverty gap indices in treatment areas in
November 1997, the poverty gap measuredeclined by 36 percent, and the severity of
poverty measure declined by 46 percent.
These estimates are very much in line with
the estimates obtained using simulations
and provide further confirmation that the
impact of PROGRESA is concentrated at
improving the welfare of the poorest of the
poor households in marginal rural areas.
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Table C.2 Poverty measures and difference-in-difference tests for total income 
per capita using 50th percentile of per capita value of consumption as poverty line 
Standard Standard
Measure Mean error t 2DIF error t
Head count ratio
Oct-97 Control 0.652 0.006 116.437
Oct-97 Treatment 0.674 0.004 156.024
Oct-98 Control 0.698 0.005 130.130
Oct-98 Treatment 0.681 0.004 160.306 –0.039 0.010 –3.922
Jun-99 Control 0.758 0.005 150.238
Jun-99 Treatment 0.712 0.004 170.030 –0.068 0.010 –7.011
Nov-99 Control 0.694 0.005 132.232
Nov-99 Treatment 0.599 0.005 131.543 –0.117 0.010 –11.783
Poverty gap
Oct-97 Control 0.319 0.004 82.296
Oct-97 Treatment 0.357 0.003 110.179
Oct-98 Control 0.364 0.004 89.969
Oct-98 Treatment 0.343 0.003 111.617 –0.060 0.007 –8.378
Jun-99 Control 0.444 0.005 98.214
Jun-99 Treatment 0.392 0.003 115.398 –0.090 0.008 –11.921
Nov-99 Control 0.339 0.004 89.219
Nov-99 Treatment 0.248 0.003 89.104 –0.129 0.007 –18.622
Squared poverty gap
Oct-97 Control 0.211 0.004 59.182
Oct-97 Treatment 0.252 0.003 81.895
Oct-98 Control 0.253 0.004 65.227
Oct-98 Treatment 0.231 0.003 82.093 –0.063 0.007 –9.439
Jun-99 Control 0.344 0.005 74.477
Jun-99 Treatment 0.288 0.003 87.587 –0.097 0.007 –13.182
Nov-99 Control 0.226 0.004 –63.378
Nov-99 Treatment 0.152 0.002 62.201 –0.115 0.006 18.06581
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